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Abstract 
In 2014, the One Environmental System for mining came into effect. This legislative 
framework was introduced to streamline the environmental regulation of mining activities by 
consolidating such regulation in the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA). The 
most significant aspect of the regulatory framework, for purposes of this research, is the 
allocation of powers to the authorities responsible for implementing the One Environmental 
System. The authorities tasked with implementing the One Environmental System are the 
Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE), the Department of Environment, 
Forestry and Fisheries (DEFF) and the Department of Human Settlements, Water and 
Sanitation (DHWS). 
In the distribution of power, the DMRE is tasked with enforcing the regulatory framework in 
the minerals extraction industry. The DEFF sets the regulatory framework and is the appeal 
authority for decisions taken by the DMRE. Finally, the DHWS is responsible for regulating 
and enforcing the National Water Act. 
Although introducing the One Environmental System has improved the regulation of the 
environment in relation to mining, its regulation - and, more so, enforcement - has received 
more criticism than praise. Intragovernmental fragmentation has been cited as a cause of 
ineffective implementation of the regulatory framework. A lack of cooperation between the 
departments hampers the objective of streamlining the environmental regulation of mining. 
Therefore, it is imperative that the authorised departments cooperate with each other to achieve 
the effective implementation of the One Environmental System for mining. 
The aim of this dissertation is to suggest ways to foster cooperation between the DMRE, DEFF 
and DHWS to achieve the effective implementation of the One Environmental System. This 
goal is achieved by providing an analysis of the implementation efforts of the three 
departments. Since the analysis shows that intragovernmental fragmentation has hampered the 
effective implementation of the regulatory framework, this research provides recommendations 
to improve the implementation of the One Environmental System. 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
1 Introduction 
In 2014, the One Environmental System for mining came into effect.1 This regulatory 
framework was introduced to streamline the environmental regulation of mining activities.2 It 
does this by consolidating the environmental provisions relating to mining in the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA).3 The most significant aspect of the regulatory 
framework, for purposes of this research, is the allocation of powers to the authorities 
responsible for implementing the One Environmental System.4 The authorities tasked with 
implementing the One Environmental System are the Department of Mineral Resources and 
Energy (DMRE), the Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries (DEFF) and the 
Department of Human Settlements, Water and Sanitation (DHWS).5  
For many years preceding the introduction of the One Environmental System, the mining 
industry criticised environmental regulation in the context of mining for its duplication of laws 
and the lengthy periods associated with obtaining environmental authorisations.6 In addition, 
concerns were raised about the various authorisations required under various laws and from a 
range of government departments.7 The One Environmental System promised to improve the 
1 Section 50A of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (hereinafter NEMA) & section 63A 
of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 (hereinafter NWA); T Humby ‘One Environmental System: Aligning the 
Laws on the Environmental Management of Mining in South Africa’ (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law 119. 
2 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings on the Underlying Socio-economic Challenges of 
Mining-affected Communities in South Africa (2016) at 43 available at 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/SAHRC%20Mining%20communities%20report%20FINAL.pdf 
accessed 17 February 2018; Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and 
Violation of Environmental Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at XIII available at https://cer.org.za/news/zero-
hour, accessed 15 March 2018. 
3 Section 50A(2)(a) NEMA. 
4 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 44; Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
5 In June 2019, all three departments were renamed and had their mandates expanded. The DMRE was previously 
known as the Department of Mineral Resources; the DEFF was previously known as the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and the DHWS was previously known as the Department of Water and Sanitation; Section 
50A NEMA & section 163 NWA. 
6 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on the 
One Environmental System (2019) unpublished parliamentary document presented at the Colloquium on the One 
Environmental System convened by the Portfolio Committee on Environmental Affairs at the Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa, 20 November 2018 (copy on file with author) 2; South African Human Rights 
Commission National Hearings 43. 
7 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 43. 
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process of obtaining authorisations for mining activities by streamlining the processes between 
the respective governmental department.8 Contrary to that, the regulatory framework created 
legal uncertainty regarding the allocation of powers between the authorities responsible for 
implementing the One Environmental System.9 
The allocation of powers between the departments responsible for the One Environmental 
System was the subject of contention in Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd v Magistrate for 
the District of Vredendal, Kroutz NO and Others (Mineral Sands Resources).10 This judgment 
clarifies that the One Environmental System stems from an agreement between the DMRE, 
DEFF and the DHWS.11 The DMRE is tasked with enforcing the regulatory framework in the 
minerals extraction industry.12 The DEFF sets the regulatory framework and is the appeal 
authority for decisions taken by the DMRE.13 Finally, the DHWS is responsible for regulating 
and enforcing the National Water Act.14   
2 Background and Context 
The operation of the One Environmental System is best understood within its background and 
context as set out below. Various authorisations are required before mining activities can be 
conducted.15 In its effort to streamline the environmental regulation of mining, the One 
Environmental System changed the prerequisites for mining activities, introduced a new 
enforcement authority and consolidated its provisions in NEMA.16 
To conduct mining activities, an applicant requires a mining right.17 Before the commencement 
of the One Environmental System, applicants for mining rights required two environmental 
management programmes (EMP); one in terms of NEMA and the other in terms of the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA).18 Applicants for mining rights had to 
8 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at XIII. 
9 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on the 
One Environmental System 1 – 15; Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
10 Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd v Magistrate for the District of Vredendal, Kroutz NO and Others [2017] 2 
All SA 599 (WCC) para 1 (hereinafter Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate). 
11 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 42. 
12 Section 50A(2)(b) NEMA. 
13 Section 50A(2)(b)-(c) NEMA. 
14 Section 50A(2)(d) NEMA. 
15 Section 24 & 24N NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 14; Chapter 2, part 3 of this dissertation. 
16 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at XIII. 
17 Section 22 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (hereinafter MPRDA). 
18 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 15 – 17. 
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conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment to produce the MPRDA EMP and the NEMA 
EMP.19 To simplify the application process for the mining industry, the coming into effect of 
the One Environmental System repealed the provision requiring the MPRDA EMP.20 The 
effect of this pronouncement is that only the NEMA EMP is required from applicants for 
mining rights.21 
In addition to the mining right and NEMA EMP, an environmental authorisation is required 
for certain listed activities.22 Because mining was introduced as a listed activity when the One 
Environmental System came into effect, an environmental authorisation is required before 
mining activities are conducted.23 The DMRE is the authority responsible for issuing 
environmental authorisations in the context of mining.24 The allocation of this power with the 
DMRE was not well received by environmental lobby groups for a number of reasons.25 Firstly, 
the proposed regulatory framework had initially designated the DEFF as the authority for 
issuing environmental authorisations for mining activities.26 Second, the DEFF remains the 
authority for issuing environmental authorisations for all industries except mining.27  
Notwithstanding that the DMRE is the authority empowered to issue environmental 
authorisations, the DEFF is the appeal authority for decisions taken by the DMRE.28 To ensure 
the efficient operation of the One Environmental System, NEMA has laid down a process to 
be followed by applicants for environmental authorisation who are not satisfied with the 
DMRE’s decisions.29 Where the DMRE has not made a decision regarding an application 
within the prescribed time-frame, the applicant may apply to the DEFF to consider the 
application.30 The DEFF Minister may make a decision regarding environmental authorisations 
19 Section 39 (1) of the MPRDA, which has been repealed. 
20 Section 12(4) National Environmental Management Amendment Act 62 of 2008. 
21 Section 12(4) National Environmental Management Amendment Act 62 of 2008; Mineral Sands Resources v 
Magistrate para 30. 
22 Section 24 NEMA. 
23 Section 24 NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 21. 
24 Sections 24C(2A) NEMA & section 38A MPRDA. 
25 G Ashton ‘An Example of the Impacts of Adopting the ‘One Environmental System’ of Mining Governance: 
Some Lessons from MRC’s Tormin Mine’ (2017) Conversation around Transparency and Accountability in 
South Africa’s Extractive Sector 17; Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining 
and Violation of Environmental Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at XIII. 
26 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 121; M Diemont,, C Pillay & G Rapson 
‘Environmental regulation of the mining industry’ Lexology 02 September 2014, available at 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dafa2598-0b1b-42c7-9cbf-02aebdd46d5f accessed 14 August 
2017; Chapter 2, part 2 of this dissertation. 
27 Section 24C(2) NEMA. 
28 Section 50A NEMA & section 163 NWA. 
29 Section 24C(2C)(a)(f) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 100. 
30 Section 24C(2C)(a) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 100. 
4 
only if the DMRE Minister is consulted and if due processes are followed.31 This appeals 
process gives effect to the cooperative governance dimension of the One Environmental 
System.32 The concept of cooperative environmental governance is explored in chapter five of 
this research.33 
Even before the introduction of the One Environmental System, NEMA made provision for 
environmental management inspectors (environmental inspectors) from the DEFF to enforce 
the provisions of NEMA.34 The introduction of the One Environmental System saw the 
establishment of the environmental mineral resource inspectorate (mining inspectors).35 The 
DMRE, through its mining inspectors, is now empowered as the enforcement authority for 
environmental laws in the context of mining.36 The DEFF remains the enforcement authority 
for environmental laws for all industries, except mining.37 Where mining inspectors experience 
capacity challenges in enforcing NEMA, the DEFF may instruct environmental inspectors to 
assist with the enforcement of the One Environmental System.38  
The focus of this research is on the implementation, that is the regulation and, more so, the 
enforcement, of the One Environmental System. The DMRE is the enforcement authority while 
the DEFF is tasked with setting the regulatory framework and managing the appeals against 
the DMRE’s decisions.39 The role of the DHWS is that of regulator and enforcer of the National 
Water Act.40 This research focuses on the intragovernmental fragmentation between the 
DMRE, DEFF and DHWS in relation to the implementation of the One Environmental 
System.41 The aim of this research is to unpack the challenges that plague the implementation 
of the One Environmental System and to propose solutions to achieve its effective 
implementation.  
31 The process is set out in section 24C(2C)(a)-(f) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 100. 
32 Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
33 Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
34 Section 31B NEMA. 
35 Section 31BB NEMA. 
36 Section 31D(2A) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 23. 
37 Section 24C(2) NEMA. 
38 Section 31D(4) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 25. 
39 Section 50A NEMA & section 163 NWA. 
40 Section 50A NEMA & section 163 NWA. 
41 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 15. 
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3 Research Question 
The discussion above notes the intragovernmental fragmentation between the DMRE, DEFF 
and DHWS in implementing the One Environmental System.42 A lack of cooperation between 
the departments hampers the objective of streamlining the environmental regulation of 
mining.43 Therefore, it is imperative that the authorised departments cooperate with each other 
to achieve the effective implementation of the One Environmental System for mining.44  
The aim of this research is to determine how cooperation between the DMRE, DEFF and 
DHWS can be fostered to achieve the effective implementation of the One Environmental 
System. This research question translates to the following sub-questions: 
1. To what extent have the DMRE, DEFF and DHWS fulfilled their duties under the One
Environmental System for mining?
2. How can cooperation between the departments be improved to ensure the effective
implementation of the One Environmental System for mining?
These questions are addressed by unpacking the challenges faced by the authorised 
departments through a discussion and analysis of the regulatory framework.45 The regulatory 
framework aims to streamline the environmental regulation of mining; however, an analysis of 
the One Environmental System brings its efficacy into question.46 
Although each of the three departments are experiencing challenges in fulfilling their duties, 
the focus of this research is on the enforcement challenges experienced by the DMRE.47 The 
DMRE has been the target for much of the criticism against the One Environmental System.48 
Therefore, this research considers the criticism levelled against the DMRE regarding its duty 
to enforce the One Environmental System.49 Although the focus is on the DMRE, this research 
also analyses the DEFF and the DHWS’s roles in the One Environmental System.50   
42 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 15. 
43 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation 
44 Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
45 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
46 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
47 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
48 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
49 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
50 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
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Proposing solutions to the challenge of implementing the One Environmental System is an 
essential part of this research.51 However, researching this topic was limited by the lack of 
reporting on the progress of the One Environmental System by the DMRE.52 Furthermore, the 
limited scope of the research does not permit an in-depth discussion of all the available 
enforcement measures.53 Therefore, the discussion is limited to the enforcement measures that 
have been effective and those that are likely to improve the implementation of the One 
Environmental System.54  
4 Research Method 
This is a desktop study that relies primarily on legislation, judicial judgements and academic 
literature on the One Environmental System. The research provides an analysis of these 
primary and secondary legal resources to formulate the research question and provide 
recommendations.  
5 Course of Inquiry 
This research is divided into six chapter as outlined below. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The first chapter sets out the research question and its relevance for improved governmental 
cooperation. This introduction discusses the background and context of the One Environmental 
System. In doing so, the chapter establishes why the intragovernmental fragmentation within 
the system is a topic that warrants research.  
Chapter 2: Regulatory Framework – The One Environmental System 
This chapter sets out the regulatory framework of the One Environmental System and provides 
an analysis of it. It provides a background into the formation of the regulatory framework and 
discusses the key concepts that are relevant for a discussion of the One Environmental System. 
The relevant legislation and landmark cases are discussed to establish a foundation for the 
51 Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
52 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit DMR Disregards Key Monitoring Provisions of 
NEMA and the One Environmental System for Mining (2019) unpublished parliamentary document presented to 
the Portfolio Committee on Environmental Affairs at the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 19 November 
2018 (copy on file with author) 1 – 8. 
53 Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
54 Chapter 4 & 5 of this dissertation. 
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research. An assessment of the implementation of the One Environmental System follows, 
thereby giving context to the research question. 
Chapter 3: Theories of Compliance and Enforcement in Relation to the One Environmental 
System 
This chapter provides a theoretical background for the research. It considers the research 
question and proposes solutions from a theoretical perspective by discussing the rationalist and 
normative theories of compliance and enforcement. These theories focus on the behavioural 
motivations that drive compliance. Once the behavioural motivations are determined, effective 
enforcement measures are formulated to complement the compliance behaviour or lack thereof. 
This theoretical chapter forms a basis for the discussion of practical enforcement measures in 
the One Environmental System that follows in chapter four. 
Chapter 4: Compliance and Enforcement Measures in the One Environmental System 
This chapter discusses the various measures that are available for the enforcement of the One 
Environmental System. The measures are categorised as either command-and-control measures 
or alternative compliance measures. This chapter considers under what circumstances each of 
these measures should be used to secure compliance from regulated persons.  
Chapter 5: Recommendations for the Effective Implementation of the One Environmental 
System 
This chapter provides recommendations for the effective implementation of the one 
Environmental System. Cooperative environmental governance is discussed as a remedy for 
intragovernmental fragmentation. Thereafter, the chapter considers the practical implications 
of cooperation between the DMRE, DEFF and the DHWS to achieve an effective One 
Environmental System.  
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the research. It summarises the findings of the preceding chapters and 
sets out the recommendations. 
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Chapter 2:  
Legislative framework:  
The One Environmental System 
1 Introduction 
For many years, concerns have been raised about the environmental regulation of mining 
operations in South Africa.55 Investors considered the environmental regulatory framework to 
be among the most convoluted and over-regulated, because of the lengthy periods associated 
with obtaining environmental authorisations.56 The issue of a fragmented system was 
exacerbated by the fact that the authorisations were required under various pieces of legislation 
and from a range of governmental departments.57 In response to this fragmented system, 
Parliament passed laws that gave effect to the existing One Environmental System, which 
commenced on 8 December 2014.58  
55 In 1990, the South African Parliament and mining industry worked towards incorporating environmental issues 
into mining legislation and regulations. In 2008, the government started developing a single environmental system 
for mining; South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings on the Underlying Socio-economic 
Challenges of Mining-affected Communities in South Africa (2016) at 1 available at 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/SAHRC%20Mining%20communities%20report%20FINAL.pdf 
accessed 17 February 2018; T Humby ‘One Environmental System: Aligning the Laws on the Environmental 
Management of Mining in South Africa’ (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 111; G Ashton 
‘An Example of the Impacts of Adopting the ‘One Environmental System’ of Mining Governance: Some Lessons 
from MRC’s Tormin Mine’ (2017) Conversation around Transparency and Accountability in South Africa’s 
Extractive Sector 17. 
56 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System (2019) unpublished parliamentary document presented at the Colloquium on the 
One Environmental System convened by the Portfolio Committee on Environmental Affairs at the Parliament of 
the Republic of South Africa, 20 November 2018 (copy on file with author) 3. 
57 Ashton (2017) Conversation around Transparency and Accountability in South Africa’s Extractive Sector 17. 
58 The laws that gave rise to the One Environmental System include, but are not limited to, the following legislative 
provisions, amendments; regulations and listing notices: Section 50A of the National Environmental Management 
Act 107 of 1998; section 63A of the National Water Act 36 of 1998, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Amendment Act 49 of 2008; the National Appeal Regulations, 2014 (as amended) (GG 38303-GN 
993); National Environmental Management Laws Amendment Act 25 of 2014; National Exemption Regulations 
994 of 2014. Department of Mineral Resources ‘Government on rollout of One Environmental System’ available 
at http://www.gov.za/government%E2%80%99s-one-environmental-system-ready-commence-8th-december-
2014 accessed on 3 April 2017; Convoluted pieces of legislation caused confusion as to whether the 
commencement date of the One Environmental System was 1 September 2014 or 8 December 2017.The 
regulations accompanying NEMA and the MPRDA came into effect on the latter date, therefore leading to it being 
the accepted date of commencement. Furthermore, the government released a press statement on 6 December 
2014 confirming that the rollout of the One Environmental System would start on 8 December 2014. 
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The One Environmental System stems from an agreement between three governmental 
departments.59 The parties to the agreement include the Department of Mineral Resources and 
Energy (DMRE), the Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries (DEFF) and the 
Department of Human Settlements, Water and Sanitation (DHWS).60 The legislative 
framework that operated before the One Environmental System precipitated a lack of 
integration.61 Environmental management laws were spread between the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act62 (MPRDA) and the National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA).63  
Faced with the need for improved regulation and enforcement of environmental laws at mines, 
Parliament repealed all the environmental provisions from the MPRDA and consolidated them 
in NEMA.64 One of the most significant aspects of the One Environmental System is its 
allocation of authority between the three departments.65 The DMRE is tasked with issuing 
mining-related environmental authorisations and enforcing environmental laws in the minerals 
extraction industry.66 The DEFF sets the regulatory framework and is the appeal authority for 
decisions taken by the DMRE.67 Finally, the DHWS is responsible for issuing water use 
licences as well as regulating and enforcing the National Water Act.68 In addition, the 
“Interdepartmental Project Implementation Committee has been established to coordinate the 
activities of the three departments.”69 By coordinating activities, the three departments are able 
to “conduct joint site inspections for monitoring and enforcement purposes.”70  
59 Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd v Magistrate for the District of Vredendal, Kroutz NO and Others [2017] 2 
All SA 599 (WCC) para 43 (hereinafter Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate). 
60 In June 2019, all three departments were renamed and had their mandates expanded. The DMRE was previously 
known as the Department of Mineral Resources; the DEFF was previously known as the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and the DHWS was previously known as the Department of Water and Sanitation. Section 
50A of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (hereinafter NEMA); see also section 163A of 
the National Water Act 36 of 1998 (hereinafter NWA). 
61 Ashton (2017) Conversation around Transparency and Accountability in South Africa’s Extractive Sector 17. 
62 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (hereinafter MPRDA). 
63 Ashton (2017) Conversation around Transparency and Accountability in South Africa’s Extractive Sector 17. 
64 Section 50A(2)(a) NEMA. 
65 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 44. 
66 Section 50A(2)(b) NEMA. 
67 Section 50A(2)(b)-(c) NEMA. 
68 Section 50A(2)(d) NEMA. 
69 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 121; Department of Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation Report on the Implementation Evaluation of the Environmental Governance in the Mining Sector 
(2015) 45 available at https://evaluations.dpme.gov.za/evaluations/510/documents/ae4636ed-1319-46e3-a03e-
7536e7d9a4ec accessed 23 March 2018. 
70 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 43. 
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Figure 1: One Environmental System – authorities and responsibilities71 
The main objective of the One Environmental System is to streamline the environmental 
regulation of mining.72 The aim of streamlining is to make the regulation and enforcement of 
environmental laws related to mining more efficient.73 Streamlining is achieved by 
consolidating environmental regulation in NEMA.74 In addition, the One Environmental 
System seeks to reduce the time required for processing environmental authorisations.75 
However, an assessment of the regulation and enforcement of the One Environmental System 
in this chapter brings into question the efficacy of this framework.76  
71 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 44. 
72 Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd v Magistrate for the District of Vredendal, Kroutz NO and Others [2017] 2 
All SA 599 (WCC) para 1 (hereinafter Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate); Centre for Environmental Rights 
‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 
XIII available at https://cer.org.za/news/zero-hour, accessed 15 March 2018; S Gore & G Howard ‘One 
Environmental System: reduced time frames for environmental authorisations applications’ 2014 Environmental 
Alert 1; South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 45. 
73 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 45. 
74 Section 50A(2)(a) NEMA. 
75 Section 50A(2)(d) NEMA. 
76 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 1 – 15; see discussion under heading 5 below. 
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The discussion in this chapter unpacks the provisions governing the One Environmental 
System. This chapter further assesses the regulation and enforcement of the One Environmental 
System. Before doing so, the background and key concepts are discussed. 
2 Origins of the One Environmental System 
An inter-departmental agreement concluded in 2008 envisioned that environmental regulation 
would no longer be contained in the MPRDA. Instead, it would be wholly regulated by 
NEMA.77 The transfer of the environmental regulation of mining operations from the MPRDA 
to NEMA would culminate into the One Environmental System for the mining sector.78 The 
implementation of this version of the One Environmental System resulted from the 
amendments to the MPRDA and NEMA in 2008.79 The said amendments arose from the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Amendment Act (2008 MPRDAA)80 and the National 
Environmental Management Amendment Act (2008 NEMAA).81 These two Acts are 
subsequently collectively referred to as “the Amendment Acts.” 
The Amendment Acts envisioned a three-phase transition for the One Environmental System.82 
The table below, followed by a comprehensive explanation, sets out the timeline that had been 
envisioned for the implementation of the One Environmental System.83  
77 J Ridl & E Couzens ‘Misplacing NEMA? A Consideration of Some Problematic Aspects of South Africa’s New 
EIA Regulations’ (2010) 13 PELJ 107. 
78 Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Report on the Implementation Evaluation of the 
Environmental Governance in the Mining Sector 6. 
79 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Amendment Act 49 of 2008; National Environmental 
Management Amendment Act 62 of 2008. 
80 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Amendment Act 49 of 2008 – GN 437 GG 32151 of 21 April 
2009. 
81 National Environmental Management Amendment Act 62 of 2008 – GN 22 GG 31789 of 9 January 2009. 
82 M Diemont, C Pillay & G Rapson ‘Environmental regulation of the mining industry’ Lexology 02 September 
2014, available at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dafa2598-0b1b-42c7-9cbf-02aebdd46d5f 
accessed 14 August 2017. 
83 Diemont, Pillay & Rapson Lexology. 
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Figure 2: One Environmental System – transition timeline84 
During the first phase of the transition, the status quo as regards the regulation and enforcement 
of environmental laws at mines was to remain in place until the promulgation of the 2008 
MPRDAA or section 2 of the 2008 NEMAA, whichever was the later enactment.85 The 2008 
MPRDAA was the later enactment.86 Its coming into effect on 7 June 2013 marked the 
commencement of the three-phase transition.87 Phase one was to be succeeded by two phases 
over a period of three years.88 The transition would result in the shift of the environmental 
regulation of mining to NEMA from the MPRDA.89 Ultimately, the plan was to have the DEFF 
as the authority responsible for the regulation and enforcement of NEMA.90 
The agreement had envisioned that, in phase two, all provisions relating to the environment 
would be moved from the MPRDA to NEMA.91 The DMRE would be the authority responsible 
for implementing the provisions in NEMA relating to mining, while the DEFF would be the 
appeal authority for decisions taken by the DMRE.92 In terms of the agreement, the DEFF 
84 Summary of Timeline: Diemont, Pillay & Rapson Lexology. 
85 Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Report on the Implementation Evaluation of the 
Environmental Governance in the Mining Sector 6. 
86 Diemont, Pillay & Rapson Lexology. 
87 Diemont, Pillay & Rapson Lexology. 
88 Diemont, Pillay & Rapson Lexology. 
89 Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Report on the Implementation Evaluation of the 
Environmental Governance in the Mining Sector 6. 
90 Diemont, Pillay & Rapson Lexology. 
91 Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Report on the Implementation Evaluation of the 
Environmental Governance in the Mining Sector 6. 
92 Ridl & Couzens (2010) PELJ 108. 
13 
would also be tasked with setting out policies, legislation and regulations.93 Phase two was to 
last for 18 months, after which the final phase would follow.94 The final phase entailed the 
DMRE handing over all enforcement duties to the DEFF.95 At this point, the One 
Environmental System would be complete with all environmental provisions contained in 
NEMA under the control of the DEFF 96  
The agreement did not unfold as had been planned.97 On 2 September 2014, the National 
Environmental Laws Amendment Act (2014 NEMLAA) was passed.98 The impact of this 
promulgation was that phase two of the “original 2008 plan was implemented immediately and 
phase three never came into force.”99 Therefore, the DMRE retained its power to enforce 
environmental compliance in the minerals extraction industry, and the DEFF remained “the 
appeal authority for appeals lodged against decisions of the DMRE.”100  
As already mentioned, the One Environmental System was introduced to streamline the 
environmental regulation of mining.101 Critics argue however that the regulatory framework 
was mainly propelled by the influence of powerful economic players in the minerals 
industry.102 The drive was to overcome, what the mining industry perceived to have been, 
unreasonable delays in the processing of authorisations in relation to mining operations, which 
were caused by objections lodged by the DEFF through NEMA.103 
To understand the external influence of the mining industry on the establishment of the One 
Environmental System, regard must be had to the Joint Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
meeting for Mineral Resources, Environment and Water of September 2013.104 The topics of 
discussion included an assessment of the ills which the One Environmental System sought to 
93 Ridl & Couzens (2010) PELJ 108. 
94 Diemont, Pillay & Rapson Lexology. 
95 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 121; Diemont, Pillay & Rapson Lexology. 
96 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 121; Diemont, Pillay & Rapson Lexology. 
97 Diemont, Pillay & Rapson Lexology. 
98 National Environmental Management Laws Amendment Act 25 of 2014. 
99 Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Report on the Implementation Evaluation of the 
Environmental Governance in the Mining Sector 6. 
100 Ridl & Couzens (2010) PELJ 108. 
101 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 45. 
102 Ashton (2017) Conversation around Transparency and Accountability in South Africa’s Extractive Sector 17. 
103 Ashton (2017) Conversation around Transparency and Accountability in South Africa’s Extractive Sector 17. 
104 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Mine Environmental Management: Briefing by the Departments of 
Environmental Affairs and Mineral Resources’ 10 September 2013, available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-
meeting/16338/ accessed on 17 February 2019; Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 
121.
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cure and the regulatory framework to cure the ills identified.105 The tone of discussion was 
“generally business-centric and pro-investment.”106 During its two-hour meeting, the 
committee made no mention of the constitutional environmental right, rights of communities 
and duties that may be owed to the environment.107 Much more weight was placed on the need 
to streamline and shorten timeframes for mining, environmental and water authorisatons which 
would run parallel to each other and not sequentially.108 Emphasis was also placed on 
centralising and limiting the appeals process and resorting to ‘cooperative governance 
solutions’ when departments in the system failed to fulfill their mandates.109 
Apart from the influence of economic forces, Humby suggests that the One Environmental 
System came into effect as a result of a quid pro quo between the DEFF and DMRE.110 
Essentially, the DEFF Minister agreed to have the DMRE Minister as the enforcement 
authority only because the DEFF’s authority to determine the scope of the DMRE’s authority 
was expanded.111 For example, the 2008 NEMAA conferred a considerable increase of power 
on the environmental authority.112 Although the 2014 NEMLAA did not make substantive 
changes to the DEFF’s powers, it strengthened certain provisions in NEMA dealing with 
financial provisions and liability for pollution.113 For instance, when the DMRE Minister 
considers an application for environmental authorisation, he must also assess the applicant’s 
ability to comply with prescribed financial provisions.114 
105 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Mine Environmental Management: Briefing by the Departments of 
Environmental Affairs and Mineral Resources’ 10 September 2013. 
106 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 122. 
107 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Mine Environmental Management: Briefing by the Departments of 
Environmental Affairs and Mineral Resources’ 10 September 2013; Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law 122. 
108 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Mine Environmental Management: Briefing by the Departments of 
Environmental Affairs and Mineral Resources’ 10 September 2013; Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law 122. 
109 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Mine Environmental Management: Briefing by the Departments of 
Environmental Affairs and Mineral Resources’ 10 September 2013; Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law 122. 
110 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 123. 
111 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 123. 
112 These powers related to the management and control of residue stockpiles and deposits, consultations with 
interested and affected parties, mine closer requirements and financial provision for rehabilitation. Humby (2015) 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 123. 
113 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 123. 
114 Section 24O(1)(b)(iiiA) (as amended by the National Environmental Management Laws Amendment Act 25 
of 2014); Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 123. 
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3 Key Concepts of the One Environmental System 
An understanding of the One Environmental System requires an overview of its key concepts. 
The concepts which will be explained include: mining right, listed activities, environmental 
authorisation, environmental impact assessment, environmental management programme, 
environmental management inspectors and environmental mineral resource inspectors. These 
concepts are imperative because they speak to the regulating and enforcing duties of the 
departments involved in the One Environmental System. 
3.1 Mining Right and Environmental Management Programmes 
A mining right is an entitlement to mine.115 The lodging of applications for mining rights is 
dealt with in section 22 of the MPRDA.116 The DMRE Minister must only grant a mining right 
if certain conditions are met.117 Among the conditions is that the mining must not cause 
unacceptable pollution or ecological and environmental degradation.118 In addition, the 
applicant must obtain an environmental management programme and environmental 
authorisation to conduct mining.119  
Before the commencement of the One Environmental System, applicants for mining rights 
required two environmental management programmes; one in terms of the MPRDA and the 
other in terms of NEMA.120 Section 23(5) of the MPRDA provided that a mining right came 
into effect on the date on which the applicant’s mining Environmental Management 
Programme (MPRDA EMP) was approved in terms of section 39(4) of the MPRDA.121 The 
holder of a mining right had to consider, investigate, assess and communicate the impact of its 
mining on the environment.122 Such environmental impacts had to be managed in accordance 
with its approved MPRDA EMP.123 An MPRDA EMP was to be produced after conducting an 
Environmental Impact Assessment.124 When considering an MPRDA EMP, the DMRE had to 
115 Section 1 MPRDA. 
116 Section 22 MPRDA. 
117 Section 23 MPRDA. 
118 Section 23 MPRDA. 
119 Section 24N & 24 NEMA respectively; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 14. 
120 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 15 – 17. 
121 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 15; section 39 MPRDA has been repealed. 
122 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 15; section 38 MPRDA has been repealed. 
123 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 15; section 38 MPRDA has been repealed. 
124 Section 39 (1) – has been repealed. 
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consult with the DEFF.125 The DMRE could not approve an MPRDA EMP without taking into 
account the DEFF’s comments.126  
The need for an MPRDA EMP was one of the reasons the legislative regime that operated 
before the One Environmental System was considered convoluted by applicants and holders of 
mining rights.127 Because NEMA also required an EMP from mining rights applicants, the 
MPRDA EMP was deemed redundant.128 Therefore, the provision requiring an MPRDA EMP 
was repealed.129 The One Environmental System has simplified the application process for 
mining rights in that an MPRDA EMP is no longer required.130 The effect of this provision is 
that an MPRDA EMP that was approved before 8 December 2014 is deemed to be an EMP in 
terms of section 24N of NEMA.131 
“The main function of the EMP is to set out the proposed management, mitigation, protection 
and remedial measures that are available to address the environmental impacts of the listed 
activities.”132 Applications for NEMA EMPs may be considered by the DEFF, DMRE or a 
member of a provincial executive council (MEC).133 Section 24N of NEMA may require a 
NEMA EMP to be submitted when one applies for environmental authorisation.134 
3.2 Environmental Authorisation 
An environmental authorisation is required by an applicant seeking to commence activities 
identified in so-called Listing Notices.135 Listing Notices identify activities requiring 
environmental authorisation and the authority responsible for granting environmental 
authorisation.136 One of the main features of NEMA, as amended, is that mining has been 
included as a listed activity.137 The DEFF remains the competent authority for identifying listed 
125 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 16; section 40 MPRDA has been repealed. 
126 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 16; section 39(4)(b) MPRDA has been repealed. 
127 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 29. 
128 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 27. 
129 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 27. 
130 Section 12(4) National Environmental Management Amendment Act 62 of 2008; Mineral Sands Resources v 
Magistrate para 30 & 58. 
131 Section 12(4) National Environmental Management Amendment Act 62 of 2008; Mineral Sands Resources v 
Magistrate para 30. 
132 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 9. 
133 Section 24N NEMA, Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 22. 
134 Section 24N NEMA, Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 22. 
135 Section 24 NEMA; The DEFF Minister is responsible for promulgating Listing Notices in terms of section 24 
of NEMA.  
136 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 5 & 7. 
137 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 21. 
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activities.138 However the DMRE is responsible for granting environmental authorisations 
where listed activities directly relate to mining.139  
Before the One Environmental System, the DMRE was the competent authority for issuing 
environmental authorisations for related activities occurring in prospecting, mining, 
exploration or production’ areas.140 However, NEMA has broadened the scope of the DMRE’s 
enforcement authority, which must now be invoked when listed activities directly relate to the 
prospecting, mining and primary processing of mineral resources.141 The importance of this 
change lies in the “removal of the spatial restriction” on the DMRE’s enforcement power.142 
“The activities ‘directly related’ to mining activities” no longer need to occur in a mining 
area.143 They may occur anywhere. The DMRE’s authority is not limited to prospecting and 
mining as primary activities. It extends to remediation and rehabilitation endeavours.144  
The extension of the DMRE’s authority over environmental authorisations is a product of the 
removal of section 13 of the 2008 NEMAA.145 This section would have seen the enforcement 
authority shifting from the mining authorities and conferred on the environmental 
authorities.146 The removal of that provision essentially entrenches the permanence of the 
DMRE’s enforcement authority in relation to environmental authorisations.147 
To ensure the efficient operation of the One Environmental System, NEMA has laid down a 
process to be followed by applicants for environmental authorisation who are not satisfied with 
the DMRE’s decisions.148 Where the DMRE has not made a decision regarding an application 
within the prescribed time-frame, the applicant may apply to the DEFF to consider the 
application.149 The DEFF Minister may make a decision regarding environmental 
authorisations only if the DMRE Minister is consulted and if due processes are followed.150 
This appeals process gives effect to the cooperative governance dimension of the One 
138 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 22. 
139 Sections 24C(2A) NEMA & section 38A MPRDA. 
140 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 125. 
141 Sections 24C(2A) of NEMA; Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 125. 
142 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 125. 
143 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 125. 
144 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 125. 
145 62 of 2008. 
146 Diemont, Pillay & Rapson Lexology; Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 125. 
147 Diemont, Pillay & Rapson Lexology; Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 125. 
148 Section 24C(2C)(a)(f) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 100. 
149 Section 24C(2C)(a) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 100. 
150 The process is set out in Section 24C(2C)(a)-(f) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 100. 
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Environmental System.151 The concept of cooperative governance is explored in chapter five 
of this research. 
3.3 Inspectors 
To ensure compliance with these environmental laws, environmental management inspectors 
(environmental inspectors) and environmental mineral resources inspector (mining inspectors) 
have been appointed.152 The enforcement of NEMA and specific environmental management 
Acts (SEMA) by varying inspectors is dealt with in part 2 of chapter 7 of NEMA.153  
This discussion focusses on the legally-mandated powers and functions of environmental and 
mining inspectors as well their concurrent jurisdiction to enforce environmental laws at 
mines.154 Although, inspectors are tasked with applying and enforcing criminal sanctions, their 
functions are not limited to criminal law.155 They also deal with civil law matters such as 
issuing permits, licences and directives.156 
3.3.1 Environmental Management Inspectors 
Even before the One Environmental System, environmental management inspectors 
(environmental inspectors) were appointed by the DEFF Minister, the DHWS Minister and 
MECs from provincial government.157 The environmental inspectors appointed by these 
authorities are assigned as either “national, water and provincial inspectors respectively.”158 
Processes have been put in place to appoint environmental inspectors at the local government 
level.159 To give effect to this process at the local level, a series of memoranda of understanding 
have already been adopted with the relevant authorities at municipal level.160 
Environmental inspectors have a mandate to “monitor and enforce compliance with the laws 
for which they have been designated.161 They may investigate any conduct in respect of which 
there is a reasonable suspicion that the conduct might constitute an offence or a breach of the 
151 Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 122. 
152 Section 31BA & 31BB NEMA respectively. 
153 The term ‘specific environmental management Acts’ is defined in section 1 of NEMA.  
154 Part 2 of Chapter 7 NEMA. 
155 Part 2 of Chapter 7 NEMA; see chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
156 Part 2 of Chapter 7 NEMA; see chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
157 Section 31B NEMA. 
158 Sections 31B, 31BA and 31C NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 12 
159 J Glazewski, P Snijman & L Plit ‘Compliance with and Enforcement of Environmental Laws’ in J Glazewski 
Environmental Law in South Africa 36. 
160 Glazewski et al. ‘Compliance with and Enforcement of Environmental Laws’ in Environmental Law 36. 
161 Section 31G of NEMA. 
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law.”162 Environmental inspectors have general powers that allow them, inter alia, to question 
persons, request documentation and to take photographs and samples.163 Environmental 
inspectors are peace officers and may exercise all the powers assigned to peace officers, in 
terms of chapter 2 of the Criminal Procedure, to comply with their mandate.164 
3.3.2 Environmental Mineral Resource Inspectors 
The introduction of the One Environmental System saw the establishment of the environmental 
mineral resource inspectorate.165 NEMA empowers the DMRE Minister to designate any staff 
member from the DMRE as an environmental mineral resource inspector (mining 
inspectors).166 Mining inspectors are mandated to monitor compliance and enforce the 
provisions of NEMA or of SEMA.167  
Mining inspectors ordinarily have the functions and general powers given to national, water 
and provincial inspectors.168 In other words, mining inspectors are given the same powers as 
environmental inspectors.169 The question arises as to whether environmental inspectors and 
mining inspectors have “concurrent jurisdiction to monitor compliance with, and enforce, the 
provisions of NEMA” in relation to mining.170 The provisions of sections 31D(4) – (9) of 
NEMA become relevant in this regard.171 
The aforementioned provisions were promulgated to ensure that enforcement takes place when 
mining inspectors experience capacity challenges.172 If mining inspectors experience capacity 
challenges in monitoring and enforcing NEMA, the DEFF may instruct environmental 
inspectors to enforce compliance with NEMA provisions.173 Where there is a lack of 
enforcement by mining inspectors, the following process applies:  
162 Section 31 of NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 13. 
163 Section 31H of NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 13. 
164 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
165 Section 31BB NEMA; Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 127. 
166 Section 31BB NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 23. 
167 Section 31D(2A) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 23. 
168 Sections 31G and 31H NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 24. 
169 Section 31D(3)NEMA ; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 24. 
170 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 25. 
171 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 25. 
172 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 26. 
173Section 31D(4) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 25. 
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Figure 3: Process to be followed when there is a lack of enforcement by mining inspectors174 
The above process shows that interested parties may lay a complaint with the DMRE when 
compliance monitoring and enforcement functions are inadequately fulfilled by mining 
inspectors.175 If the interested party is not satisfied with the DMRE’s response, the DEFF may 
be approached with the matter.176 After consulting the DMRE on the matter, the DEFF may 
offer assistance or support to the DMRE to fulfill the compliance monitoring and enforcement 
obligations of the DMRE in terms of NEMA.177 Alternatively, environmental inspectors may 
be directed, by the DEFF, to undertake the compliance monitoring and enforcement 
functions.178 
3.3.3 Inspectors’ Concurrent Jurisdiction to Enforce compliance with environmental laws 
at mines 
The distinction of inspectorates raises the question of whether they have concurrent jurisdiction 
to enforce compliance with environmental laws at mines.179 The question stems from the fact 
that there has been confusion about which inspectorate is the competent authority to enforce 
environmental laws at mines.180 This question was the subject of contention in Mineral Sands 
174 Summary of section 31D NEMA. 
175 Section 31D(5 ) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 25. 
176 Section 31D(6) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 25. 
177 Section 31D(7) & (8) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 25. 
178 Section 31D(9) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 25. 
179 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 25. 
180 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 25. 
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Resources (Pty) Ltd v Magistrate for the District of Vredendal, Kroutz NO and Others (Mineral 
Sands Resources v Magistrate).181  
It has been established that environmental inspectors are assigned as either national, water and 
provincial inspectors.182 National and water inspectors may be appointed to enforce NEMA 
and SEMA, although not entirely for provisions relating to mining, as these are enforced by 
mining inspector.183 There is a possibility that, in practice, water inspectors are only instructed 
to enforce the National Water Act.184. However, NEMA does not expressly bar water inspectors 
from enforcing NEMA or national inspectors from enforcing the Water Act.185 
Provincial inspectors may be appointed to enforce only the provisions of NEMA and SEMA 
that fall within the jurisdiction of the province or when the powers or duties to enforce such 
provisions are delegated to the province.186 Of importance is whether national and water 
inspectors may enforce environmental provisions which are managed by the provinces.187 
There is nothing in NEMA that suggests such a restriction.188 
With regard to mining inspectors, they may only monitor and enforce the provisions of 
environmental legislation that confer powers to the DMRE Minister.189 The fact that DMRE 
Minister has the power to grant environmental authorisation for activities related to mining 
means that “mining inspectors can monitor and enforce compliance with the terms of 
environmental authorisations issued for mining purposes.”190 They may also implement 
provisions that apply when activities are unlawfully conducted without obtaining 
environmental authorisation to engage in said activities.191 
In Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate, the court dismissed the argument that environmental 
and mining inspectors have concurrent jurisdiction over mining matters.192 The clarification 
lies in subsections 31D(4)-(9) of NEMA.193 These subsections contain an elaborate process to 
181 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 25. 
182 Sections 31B, 31BA and 31C NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 12 
183 Sections 31B & 31BA NEMA. 
184 Section 31BA NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 42. 
185 Section 31D(1) NEMA; Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 92. 
186 Section 31C NEMA. 
187 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 93. 
188 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 93. 
189 Section 31D(2A) NEMA. 
190 Section 50A(2)(b) NEMA; Humby (2015) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 125. 
191 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 94. 
192 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 96. 
193 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 96. 
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follow when a complainant argues that mining inspectors are failing to fulfil their functions.194 
Section 31D(4), which permits environmental inspectors to intervene when mining inspectors 
lack capacity, is premised on the fact that section 31D(2A) effectively confers exclusive 
jurisdiction on mining inspectors.195  
Section 31D(4) allows environmental inspectors to enforce environmental laws relating to 
mining where mining inspectors are unable to fulfill their duties.196 This option may only be 
resorted to if both the DMRE Minister and DEFF Minister agree to it.197 Mere consultation 
between the ministers does not suffice.198 If environmental and mining inspectors had 
concurrent jurisdiction to implement environmental laws at mines, the precondition in section 
31D(4) would be redundant.199 The articulate process laid down in subsections 31D(4)-(9) 
would also be “unnecessary if, from the outset and without the concurrence of the DMRE 
Minister, national inspectors could simply enforce compliance with” NEMA and SEMAs.200  
“Although the mandates of national, water and provincial inspectors may overlap, there is no 
doubt that efficient administration is generally better achieved by non-overlapping 
mandates.”201 The outcome of an efficient administration would be achieved by interpreting 
section 31D in a way that gives mining inspectors exclusive jurisdiction to implement NEMA 
and SEMA, while considering the qualifications in subsections 31D(4)-(9).202 According to the 
court in Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate, such an interpretation best carries out the 
desired purpose of the One Environmental System.203  
The interpretation of the court guards against the prejudice that would arise against persons 
involved in mining if environmental and mining inspectors were to have concurrent jurisdiction 
to enforce compliance with environmental laws at mines.204 The court stated that it would be 
“administratively inefficient and potentially unfair to persons identified for investigation to be 
subjected to bifurcated investigations and potentially contradictory instructions.”205 Instead of 
194 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 96. 
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196 Section 31D(4) NEMA. 
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199 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 96. 
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dwelling on strained legal distinctions, the solution to the issue of jurisdiction lies in efficient 
cooperative governance, a concept that is explored in chapter five of this research.  
4 Regulation and Enforcement of the One Environmental 
System 
The One Environmental System is expressly recognised in section 50A of NEMA.206 It is 
incorporated verbatim into section 163A of the National Water Act.207 In terms of these 
provisions, NEMA regulates the environmental aspects of mining to give effect to the One 
Environmental System.208 In addition, all environmental provisions will be repealed from the 
MPRDA.209 The regulatory framework for environmental laws relating to mining must be set 
by the DEFF.210 The DMRE is entrusted with the implementation of NEMA provisions relating 
to mining, such as the issuing of environmental authorisations.211 The appeal authority for 
decisions relating to the issuance of environmental authorisations is the DEFF.212 The DEFF 
also sets the regulatory framework. The One Environmental System further requires the DEFF 
Minister, DMRE Minister and DHWS Minister to synchronise the processes related to the 
issuing of authorisations in their departments to a fixed time-frame of 300 days.213  
The coming into effect of the One Environmental System resulted in the abolishment of 
sections 38-42 of the MPRDA.214 These provisions dealt with, inter alia, environmental impact 
assessments and the approval of MPRDA EMPs as a pre-requisite for the granting of mining 
rights.215 What the court refer to as an obscure provision has been inserted as section 38A of 
the MPRDA with the title ‘environmental authorisation’.216 This provision provides that the 
DMRE is now the competent authority for enforcing environmental provisions in terms of 
NEMA in relation to mining activities or ancillary activities on a mining area.217 Furthermore, 
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210 Sections 50A(b) & (c) of NEMA and 163A(b) & (c) of the NWA. 
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an environmental authorisation is a prerequisite for the approval of a mining right and is to be 
issued by the DMRE.218  
The provisions setting out the enforcement authority for the One Environmental System have 
caused much confusion, which has necessitated judicial intervention.219 Mineral Sands 
Resources v Magistrate highlights the legislative uncertainty in the regulation of the 
environmental aspects of mining.220 This case provides certainty as to the legal position of the 
enforcement authority in the One Environmental System.221 
The provisions giving effect to the One Environmental System became the subject of a Western 
Cape High Court decision involving an Australian mining company’s mineral sands project at 
its Tormin mine in the West Coast.222 Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd (Mineral Sands 
Resources) came under fire after a sea cliff located in front of its Tormin mine collapsed into 
the sea.223 After receiving complaints from civil society about alleged criminal activities that 
contravened NEMA, the national inspectors from the DEFF obtained a search and seizure 
warrant and executed the warrant at the Tormin mine.224 The court declared that the search and 
seizure warrant had been unlawfully obtained, inter alia, because the DEFF no longer had 
jurisdiction to enforce NEMA in respect of mining activities.225 As regards national inspectors, 
they can only enforce compliance with environmental laws when mining inspectors fail to do 
so and proper processes are followed under section 31D.226 
The application raised questions of (i) which governmental department the One Environmental 
System holds the authority to implement environmental legislation at mines, and (ii) “the 
powers of various inspectors to monitor and enforce compliance with environmental 
legislation.”227  
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To provide clarity on these questions, the court considered section 38A of the MPRDA read 
with section 31D of NEMA respectively.228 These are among the most significant amendments 
dealing with the enforcement jurisdiction of the DMRE and the DEFF.229 Section 38A of the 
MPRDA provides that the DMRE is responsible for the implementation of NEMA at mines.230 
Section 31D of NEMA empowers the DEFF Minister to appoint national inspectors to enforce 
environmental laws relating to mining where mining inspectors are unable to fulfill their 
duties.231 On a simple reading of section 38A, one would assume that the DMRE has been 
vested with sole jurisdiction to police compliance of all NEMA provisions at mines.232 Mineral 
Sands Resources v Magistrate illustrates that this provision is not as simple as it seems because 
it may be interpreted in various ways.233 The discussion that follows focuses on section 38A as 
the findings of the court on section 31D have already been discussed under part 3 of this 
chapter. 
In its interpretation of section 38A of the MPRDA, the DEFF contended that its authority to 
implement environmental laws at mines was not withdrawn by the One Environmental 
System.234 It argued that the DEFF and DMRE shared the authority to implement NEMA’s 
provisions at mines.235 Since section 38A is titled ‘environmental authorisations’, “the 
provision can be construed as simply confirming that the DMRE is the sole competent authority 
for granting environmental authorisations in mining operations,” and not the authority for 
enforcing all NEMA provisions relating to mining activities.236 
The court described section 38A as a “delphic provision”, meaning that it is obscure and 
ambiguous.237 It admitted that, as suggested by the DEFF, the section could be interpreted as 
merely “confirming that the DMRE Minister is the competent authority for granting 
environmental authorisations.”238 However, such an interpretation was not adopted by the 
court.239 Instead, the court posited that section 38A must be broadly interpreted to apply, not 
228 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 90-101. 
229 W Badenhorst ‘The Delphic Provisions’ Hogen Lovells 30 March 2017 available at 
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only to environmental authorisations, but to all NEMA provisions governing mining 
activties.240 Essentially, the DMRE is responsible for implementing all NEMA provisions 
relating to mining.241 The court adopted this approach to avoid the polarised enforcement of 
environmental legislation by both the DMRE and DEFF.242 The effect of this judgment is that 
the DMRE is the sole authority for enforcing compliance with all NEMA provisions which 
directly link to mining and prospecting.243 
The court declined to rule on the legality of the activities conducted at the Tormin mine because 
the main issue was the allocation of powers between the DEFF and DMRE in terms of the One 
Environmental System.244 When the DEFF had applied to the Magistrate’s Court for the search 
and seizure warrant, it failed to disclose that as from 8 December 2014, the DMRE had become 
the competent authority for enforcing environmental laws at mines.245 The warrant was set 
aside on grounds that the DEFF failed to disclose the changes that were introduced by the One 
Environmental System to the Magistrate’s Court.246 
5 Assessment of the One Environmental System 
To assess the efficacy of the One Environmental System, Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on 
the Environment, Forestry and Fisheries convened a colloquium on the One Environmental 
System in 2018.247 The various stakeholders that participated included the DEFF, the DMRE, 
provincial and local government, mining investors, civil society and academics.248 The 
sentiment shared by an overwhelming majority of the stakeholders is that “the One 
Environmental System is not working” as initially intended.249 In essence, the regulatory 
framework is not being effectively regulated and enforced.250 
240 Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate para 90. 
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The One Environmental system has failed to achieve its primary goal of streamlining the 
environmental regulation of mining operations for a number of reasons.251 The overarching 
challenge has been the lack of cooperative governance between the departments tasked with 
the regulation and enforcement of the system.252 The DEFF, DMRE and DHWS have not been 
working together to ensure the success of the One Environmental System.253 Identifying 
shortfalls and devising solutions for the efficacy of the system has been challenging given that 
there has been little transparency on the enforcement, monitoring and reporting of targets and 
outcomes.254 The discussion below considers the challenges that plague the One Environmental 
System as identified by the aforementioned stakeholders at the Colloquium. 
5.1 Mining Investors 
Despite government’s efforts to improve the environmental regulation of mining through the 
One Environmental System, mining investors still perceive the legislative framework to be 
convoluted and a “nightmare” to comply with.255 Mining Investors, represented by the Minerals 
Council of South Africa and attorneys at the colloquium, argued that the system is not working 
because the legislative framework has not been completed.256 For instance, the regulations 
relating to financial provision for rehabilitation of mines were published in 2015, but left out 
of the amendments published in 2018.257 These regulations determine the amount payable by 
a right holder for the rehabilitation of its mine should there be an unexpected closure.258 The 
effect of the delays in finalising the regulations for the One Environmental System has been a 
legislative framework riddled with uncertainties and contradictions.259 The finalisation of the 
2019 proposed regulations must be prioritised by the DEFF, because right holders currently 
251 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
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have the outdated 2015 regulations to consult regarding the financial provision for 
rehabilitation.260 
A further criticism of the One Environmental System relates to the inconsistent enforcement 
by the DMRE.261 The Minerals Council argues that there are discrepancies in the enforcement 
of the legislative framework in different regions in South Africa.262 The practical application 
of the legislation depends on whether the mining rights and environmental authorisations were 
applied for and granted before or after the One Environmental System came into effect.263 The 
result of the inconsistent application of the law has been confusion.264 Mineral Sands Resources 
v Magistrate is of limited use because of the specific set of circumstances and complexities 
that attach to each matter.265 The legal uncertainty had led investors to argue that there are 
problems with how the legislative framework is perceived, interpreted and applied.266 The 
delays in finalising the legislation combined with the transitional challenges have led to a 
system that is not fully effective or implementable.267  
5.2 Civil Society 
Environmental lobby groups and critics concur that the One Environmental System is not 
working.268 Their reason for this finding is that the legislative framework has been riddled with 
weak, inconsistent or a lack of enforcement since its inception.269 The lack of enforcement of 
environmental laws in the minerals industry pre-dates the One Environmental System.270 The 
literature highlighting this lack of enforcement reveals the negative impact of mining on the 
260 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
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262 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 2. 
263 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 3. 
264 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘One Environmental System Colloquium’ 20 November 2018. 
265 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 3. 
266 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘One Environmental System Colloquium’ 20 November 2018. 
267 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 3. 
268 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at XIII; K Forrest & L Loate ‘Coal, Water and Mining Flowing Badly’ Society, 
Work & Development Institute June 2017 available at https://www.fes-
southafrica.org/fileadmin/user_upload/coal__water_and_minig_flowing_badly.pdf, accessed 23 February 2018; 
South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 44. 
269 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at XIII. 
270 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 19. 
29 
environment through acid mine drainage, air pollution and soil contamination.271 Such “legacy 
issues” of careless mining and non-enforcement in past decades may increase the negative 
impacts of mining in the present if enforcement efforts are not improved.272  
Critics had anticipated a lack of enforcement of the One Environmental System even before it 
came into effect.273 The contention remains that a conflict of interest is inherent in allocating 
the power to enforce environmental laws with the DMRE, a department mandated to promote 
minerals extraction.274 This allocation of power is said to be tantamount to the “lion protecting 
the lamb”.275 This argument stems from the fact that the DMRE performs the dual role of 
promoter of mineral development and protector of the environment.276 The fatal flaw in this 
allocation of powers is arguably that there is a conflict of interest in consigning the 
environmental oversight function to a department mandated to promote minerals extraction.277 
Furthermore, environmental lobby groups argue that the environmental management of mining 
operations will be compromised because the DMRE lacks the expertise to enforce compliance 
with environmental law.278 
Arguments against the allocation of power in the One Environmental System are supported by 
the fact that the DEFF and DMRE carry dissimilar powers and political weight.279 On the one 
hand, the DMRE’s role and mission is to contribute towards transformation, growth and 
development by promoting and regulating the minerals and mining sector.280 The focus is on 
contributing to development through mineral resources exploitation. The DMRE’s 
enforcement efforts have not however prioritised environmental sustainability.281 The benefits 
of sustainability that the DMRE focuses on are more from an economic rather than 
environmental perspective and these are often deemed to be “diametrically opposed versions 
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of sustainability.”282 This argument is not outlandish given that the DMRE is a part of the 
economic cluster of government, along with the Department of Trade, Industry and 
Competition.283 This strategic position of the DMRE allows it to engage with powerful 
corporate and political players.284 
The DEFF, on the other hand, is tasked with environmental management and focuses on 
honouring the constitutional obligation to meet the “triple bottom line”. 285 This is not to say 
that the DMRE does not have this obligation.286 The “triple bottom line” entails balancing the 
protection of the environment with social and economic aspects of development to promote 
sustainable development.287 The economic cluster and free-market supporters view this variety 
of sustainable development as a restriction on economic growth.288 This stance has given rise 
to tensions between the economic cluster and the DEFF.289 The tension has led to the DEFF 
being treated as the “orphan department” in that it is denied similar access to economic or 
political leverage as the DMRE.290  
Despite the criticism, the laws relating to mining and the environment have undoubtedly 
improved since the introduction of the One Environmental System – “they may not be perfect, 
but they are sound.”291 For laws to “work” they must not only be well designed, but also 
efficiently and effectively enforced.292 In the case of One Environmental System, studies show 
that enforcement is lacking.293 The Centre for Environmental Rights levels serious allegations 
against the DMRE and DHWS in its report on the regulatory framework.294 The DMRE is said 
to have failed to enforce laws by granting mining rights to companies already in violation of 
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the MPRDA.295 The DHWS allegedly allowed many mines to use and discharge polluted water 
without water use licences.296 The report containing these assertions proved useful for 
Parliament in assessing the viability of the One Environmental System and the performance of 
the DMRE and DHWS.297 
According to the South African Human Rights Commission, inconsistent enforcement is 
compounded by limited oversight due to a lack of monitoring and reporting.298 Monitoring the 
targets and outcomes of the One Environmental System has been challenging, given that there 
is no transparency in reporting by the competent authorities.299 The DMRE’s annual 
performance plans and presentations to Parliament have not outlined the statistics relating to 
its targets and outcomes.300 The targets and outcomes need to be clearly defined for 
stakeholders to make informed and factually-based judgments on the progress, or lack thereof, 
of the One Environmental System.301 
The lack of enforcement of the One Environmental System is also highlighted in a study by the 
Society, Work and Development Institute.302 Its report evidences many mines transgressing 
water laws without any serious consequences.303 Numerous mines are found to be illegally 
operating in ecologically sensitive areas while others are operating without water use licences, 
because the DHWS lacks the capacity to ensure enforcement.304 The reason the DHWS lacks 
the capacity to administer the granting of water use licences effectively is attributed to the 
overwhelming number of mining rights and environmental authorisations issued by the 
DMRE.305  
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The shortfalls of the One Environmental System reflect a breakdown in cooperative 
governance between the DEFF, DMRE and DHWS.306 Recommendations on how each 
competent authority can foster cooperative governance thereby improving the efficacy of the 
One Environmental System are discussed in chapter five of this research. 
5.3 Provincial and Local Government 
The provincial and local authorities of the DEFF have expressed that they are sidelined by the 
national DEFF, DMRE and DHWS in respect of the One Environmental System.307 For 
instance, there is no provision restricting the DMRE from considering an application for a 
mining prospecting right in an area that is zoned by a province for agriculture or conservation 
as the primary land use.308 The province must be informed of the application and may comment 
that mining is not the primary land use.309 However, the DMRE need not consider the advice 
of the province.310 This anomaly in the legislative framework hampers effective cooperation 
between these key decision-makers in government and creates legal uncertainty.311 The lack of 
cooperation between national and provincial departments was the subject of Mineral Sands 
Resources v Magistrate, which shows a lack of cooperation between the DMRE’s national 
department and the Western Cape provincial environmental authorities.312  
Municipalities criticise the One Environmental System for restricting local government from 
implementing environmental laws.313 Furthermore, the regulatory framework is said to give 
preference to mining over other industries.314 For instance, environmental matters are a shared 
competence under the Constitution between national, provincial and local government.315 This 
means that all three spheres of government are empowered to implement environmental 
laws.316 However, the One Environmental System has separated environmental matters in the 
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context of mining from general environmental matters.317 Resultantly, municipalities are 
excluded from implementing environmental matters in the context of mining.318 Therefore, 
municipalities have limited access to conduct inspections and to investigate activities regulated 
by the One Environmental System.319 
5.4 Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries 
The DEFF has cited a lack of cooperation from the DMRE as a major shortcoming of the One 
Environmental System.320 Initially, when the legislative framework was negotiated, there was 
cooperation between the departments, however the DEFF observes that the cooperation ebbed 
away after the framework was introduced.321 For instance, scheduled meetings were not 
honoured.322  
Cooperation between the departments continues to be undermined because the departments’ 
databases for environmental authorisation have not been linked.323 The DEFF has argued that 
the DMRE has failed to share the information available on its South African Mineral Resources 
Administration Database (SAMRAD).324 The result is that the DEFF’s database for 
environmental authorisations provides information for all sectors, except for mining, since 
SAMRAD is insulated in the DMRE.325 The fact that the DMRE is unable to transfer its 
SAMRAD information into the DEFF’s system is a significant problem for monitoring and 
evaluation.326 Surely the processes for monitoring the environment for all industries should be 
aligned if the intent is to have a single environmental system.327  
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5.5 Department of Mineral Resources and Energy 
The DMRE agrees that cooperation is lacking between it and the DEFF, but argues that it is 
the DEFF that has stifled the success of the One Environmental System.328 The lack of 
cooperation is said to stem from the DEFF’s inability to finalise the governing legislation and 
regulations.329 For instance, the DEFF has allegedly failed to consult with the DMRE regarding 
the changes it has made to NEMA, which has been amended almost annually.330 Resultantly, 
inconsistent timeframes have been set in the mining and environmental legislation.331 For 
instance, the delays caused by the DEFF in finalising the regulations for financial provision 
have frustrated the process of implementing the One Environmental System for the DMRE.332 
The DMRE has expressed that mining companies need a regulatory framework that is certain 
and predictable over time.333 Furthermore, the constant amendment of NEMA adds to the 
complexity of enforcement.334 
Regarding its own inability to provide the DEFF with the information on SAMRAD, the 
DMRE cited financial problems as the reason.335 The lack of funds to create an integrated 
electronic system has meant that the upgrade will be spread incrementally over several years.336 
The DMRE has expressed that it is unable to integrate the individual records that it has captured 
on each mine into the DEFF system.337 The reason given is that the data has to be transferred 
manually and it is not feasible to re-enter the data for each mine into the DEFF’s monitoring 
system.338  
5.6 Parliament 
Parliament, which is tasked with holding departments accountable, has expressed its 
disappointment in the regulation and more so the enforcement of the One Environmental 
328 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘One Environmental System Colloquium’ 20 November 2018. 
329 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘One Environmental System Colloquium’ 20 November 2018. 
330 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
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System.339 The underlying problem is said to be the ongoing weakness in inter-departmental 
relationships.340 Cooperative governance in the environmental regulation of mining arguably 
has more points of weakness than strength.341 
With regards to regulation, Parliament has echoed the sentiments of the DMRE that the DEFF 
needs to finalise the legislation and regulations governing the One Environmental System to 
create legal certainty.342 Other than that, the DEFF is recorded to be performing better in 
regulation than the DMRE has been performing in fulfilling its enforcement responsibilities.343 
Evaluating the DMRE’s enforcement of the One Environmental System has been a challenge 
for Parliament because the DMRE has failed in its legal duty to produce reports of its 
implementation targets and outcomes timeously.344 The failure to be transparent and to provide 
reports of its progress has hampered the success of the One Environmental System.345 
With regards to enforcement, NEMA requires that the DMRE produce two reports on its 
implementation targets and outcomes respectively.346 These reports should provide detailed 
insights into how the DMRE is managing environmental issues relating to mining.347 The first 
of these key monitoring instruments is known as the Departmental Environmental Management 
Plan (management plan).348 This document should report on the implementation targets and 
practical steps to implement the One Environmental System.349 The second report is known as 
the Annual Review on the Implementation of the Department Environmental Management Plan 
339 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit DMR Disregards Key Monitoring Provisions of 
NEMA and the One Environmental System for Mining 4; Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research 
Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on the One Environmental System 9-10. 
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(annual review).350 This document should report on the outcomes of implementation by 
providing an assessment of the management plan.351 
On assessment of the management plan and annual review, Parliament expressed 
disappointment in the weak quality of the reports produced by the DMRE.352 Parliament found 
the reports to be of extremely limited usefulness for oversight and accountability purposes.353  
The management plan is underwhelming, because a great deal of the information contained in 
it is generic.354 It repeats the content of the law and policy intentions rather than outlining actual 
plans. Significant parts of the management plan are outdated.355 For instance, many targets set 
by the DMRE in 2014 in its 2014 – 2019 strategic plan have been significantly revised in 
subsequent annual reports, yet the 2018 management plan records the old targets without 
comment.356 
Chapter eight of the management plan is said to be the most disappointing part of the report.357 
This chapter should recommend ways in which the DMRE can promote the implementation of 
the One Environmental System.358 Two pages in length, it simply outlines the advantages of 
the One Environmental System without giving any information on how to promote the 
implementation of the regulatory framework.359 In chapter eight, the DMRE declines to 
consider any lessons learnt in the first three years of the One Environmental System’s operation 
by stating that “it is too early for [it] to provide the extent of compliance with the new 
regime.”360  
350 Section 16(1)(b) NEMA. The DMRE has not made this document available on a public platform, however an 
analysis of the document is available in Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit DMR 
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The annual review leaves much to be desired. By the end of 2018, the 2017/2018 report was 
not published, therefore Parliament had to assess the report for the 2016/2017 financial year.361 
The report is template driven and largely sets out the requirements of the law, rather than 
assessing the implementation of the One Environmental System from the perspective of mining 
inspectors.362  
The impression created is that the management plan and annual review were generated simply 
to comply with the law, rather than to promote a strategy to implement the One Environmental 
System.363 Parliament considers these reports to be “entirely inadequate” as an assessment of 
the implementation targets and outcomes of the One Environmental System.364  
6 Conclusion 
This chapter gives a breakdown of the regulatory framework of the One Environmental 
System.365 The regulatory framework was introduced to streamline the environmental 
regulation of mining.366 The most significant aspect of the regulatory framework is the 
allocation of powers to the competent authorities.367 In short, the DMRE is tasked with issuing 
mining-related environmental authorisations and enforcing environmental laws in the minerals 
extraction industry.368 The DEFF sets the regulatory framework and is the appeal authority for 
decisions taken by the DMRE.369 Finally, the DHWS is responsible for regulating and 
enforcing the National Water Act.370  
Although introducing the One Environmental System has improved the regulation of the 
environment in relation to mining, its regulation and more so enforcement have received more 
361 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit DMR Disregards Key Monitoring Provisions of 
NEMA and the One Environmental System for Mining 3. 
362 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit DMR Disregards Key Monitoring Provisions of 
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criticism than praise.371 An assessment of the One Environmental System shows that it has not 
achieved its intended purpose of streamlining the environmental regulation of mining.372  
The One Environmental System is “not working” because it is not being effectively regulated 
and enforced.373 The shortcomings identified in the DHWS relate to weak enforcement, which 
has been attributed to capacity constraints.374 The DEFF has hampered the effective regulation 
of the One Environmental System by delaying the finalisation of the regulatory framework.375 
The DMRE has received the most criticism for dereliction of its duties as the enforcement 
authority.376 
When the One Environmental System was introduced, the regulatory framework was criticised 
for the conflict of interest inherent in allocating the power to enforce environmental laws with 
the DMRE, a department mandated to promote minerals extraction.377 As such, the DMRE is 
said to be inappropriate an authority for environmental enforcement.378 Further criticism 
levelled against the DMRE relates to its inconsistent enforcement of the regulatory 
framework.379 Lastly, the DMRE has hampered a proper assessment of the One Environmental 
System and its enforcement efforts by failing in its legal duty to produce reports of its 
implementation targets and outcomes.380 
In addition to the failure by the three competent authorities to honour their individual duties, 
there have been ongoing weakness in the inter-departmental relationships.381 Cooperative 
governance in the environmental regulation of mining arguably has more points of weakness 
371 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
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than strength.382 The lack of intragovernmental cooperation extends to provincial and local 
government.383   
The discussion above shows that, although the regulatory framework for the One 
Environmental System has areas of improvement, the major shortcoming lay in the 
enforcement of the regulatory framework.384 Therefore, this research proceeds with a 
discussion and recommendations on the enforcement, rather than regulation, of the One 
Environmental System. The following chapter sets out the theoretical framework for 
compliance and enforcement in relation to the One Environmental System. 
Chapter 3: 
Theories of Compliance and 
Enforcement in Relation to the 
One Environmental System 
1 Introduction 
The central focus of this research is on how the One Environmental System can be effectively 
enforced to achieve compliance with its provisions. In investigating this inquiry, this chapter 
sets out the theories of compliance and enforcement. 
Compliance refers to the state of regulated persons acting in accordance with prescribed 
behaviour.385 Prescriptions of behaviour come in different forms and require varying 
enforcement.386 Prescribed behaviour can be determined voluntarily by consenting parties 
through an agreement or contract.387 If either party to a contract fails to act, compliance may 
382 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 1. 
383 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 5. 
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Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 70. 
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be secured through legal action.388 When the prescribed behaviour is determined unilaterally 
by the government, rather than by individual agreement, it is called the law or regulations.389  
The government secures compliance by enforcing its laws.390 Enforcement denotes the actions 
taken by governmental authorities to secure compliance from regulated persons.391  
Compliance and enforcement can be conceptualised in different ways.392 This chapter 
conceptualises compliance and enforcement using the rationalist theory and the normative 
theory of behavioural motivations.393  
From a compliance perspective, the rationalist theory posits that regulated persons prioritise 
economic self-interest.394 Based on that priority, regulated persons conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis to determine whether to comply with the law.395 Enforcement authorities who view 
regulated persons as rational actors use a coercive approach to induce compliance.396 Under 
the normative theory, regulated persons are law-abiding citizens that have high regard for 
legitimate laws, but struggle to comply when laws are complex.397 Enforcement authorities 
who view regulated persons as normative actors use a cooperative approach to induce 
compliance.398  
388 R Sharrock Business Transactions Law 9 ed (2016) 754. 
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Using the rationalist and normative theories of compliance and enforcement, this chapter 
considers whether enforcement authorities in the One Environmental System use a coercive or 
cooperative approach to enforcement. It also considers the use of a hybrid system that 
incorporates both the coercive and cooperative approaches to enforcement. After determining 
which approach is used to enforce the One Environmental System, the chapter concludes by 
setting out an implementation strategy that is aimed at achieving effective environmental 
enforcement.   
2 Theories of Compliance 
Compliance is defined as the ideal situation under which regulated persons obey governing 
laws.399 Laws are often taken as a means of promoting social stability and legal certainty.400 
However, without compliance, or at least a general inclination towards compliance, laws 
become meaningless.401 The following discussion unpacks possible explanations of why 
regulated persons comply or fail to comply with laws.402 For purposes of this discussion, 
regulated persons refer to natural and juristic persons that are subject to the provisions of the 
One Environmental System.403  
The conception of compliance is far from universal.404 For purposes of this chapter, compliance 
is the manifestation of behavioural motivations.405 Behavioural motivations may be explained 
under two categories, namely the rationalist theory which falls under “logic of consequences” 
and the normative theory which follows the “logic of appropriateness.”406  
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On one hand, the rationalist theory relies on sanctions to avert non-compliance.407 Regulated 
persons under this theory use the “logic of consequences” to choose rationally between options 
based on their perceived consequences.408 On the other hand, the normative theory relies on 
cooperation from regulated persons to secure compliance.409 Regulated persons using the 
“logic of appropriateness” decide whether to comply with the law based on whether they 
perceive the legal obligations as appropriate.410 These two theories are not mutually exclusive, 
instead they provide a good starting point for a discussion on the concept of compliance.411  
2.1 Rationalist Theory of Compliance: Logic of Consequences 
The rationalist theory of compliance is based on the notion that regulated persons, be it natural 
or juristic, are rational actors whose actions reflect a maximisation of economic self-interest.412 
Regulated persons, under this theory, are amoral and less inclined to obey laws.413 Put 
differently, they are “bad apples” that conduct a cost-benefit analysis before acting.414 
Regulated persons comply with the law only if the cost of non-compliance outweighs the 
benefits of non-compliance.415 The benefits include monetary gain, while costs are deemed to 
be more than just monetary detriment.416 Costs, in this context, refer to “extra-legal 
punishments” such as moral stigma and a tainted reputation.417 Non-compliance therefore 
occurs when the perceived benefits of transgression outweigh the anticipated cost of 
punishment should the non-compliance be detected.418 This logic generally leads to the use of 
traditional enforcement techniques such as widespread monitoring and inspection by the 
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government and sanctions for non-compliance.419 The rationalist theory is often supported by 
other complimenting theories that are discussed below.420 
For a better understanding of the rationalist theory, Becker provides compelling insights from 
a criminal law perspective.421 He posits that a potential offender would decide (to commit a 
crime) based on how likely it is that he will be caught, and how severely he will be punished.422 
Based on this finding, Becker recommends intensifying penalties and amplifying monitoring 
for the sake of detecting crimes more readily and increasing the likelihood of conviction.423  
Further to Becker’s model is the deterrence theory of non-compliance.424 The deterrence theory 
has three tenets.425 Firstly, there must be a high probability of detecting non-compliance. 
Secondly, detection must be followed by prompt, certain and fitting sanctions.426 Lastly, there 
must be a general perception among the regulated persons that the detection and sanctions 
exist.427 The increase in the enforcement authority of the One Environmental System can be 
attributed to the goal of deterring non-compliance with the system’s provisions. In addition to 
environmental management inspectors, environmental mineral resource inspectors were 
established to intensify enforcement of the One Environmental System.428 A larger 
enforcement authority increases the probability of detecting non-compliance and imposing 
sanctions for violations thereby increasing the perception by regulated persons that violations 
will be detected and prosecuted. 
Behavioural-decision theory is another theory that is worthy of mention.429 This theory holds 
that compliance behaviour is influenced by how regulated persons prefer laws to be 
described.430 An important influencing factor is how a certain choice is phrased by the 
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420 Zaelke, Kaniaru & Kruzikova Making Law Work 59. 
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regulating authority.431 For example, a person’s decision may differ when a choice is phrased 
as the number of lives that will be saved, as opposed to the number of lives that will be lost.432 
Under behavioural decision-theory, another factor that may influence the making of 
compliance decisions is how the prospects of detection, prosecution and sanction are described 
in the legislation.433 For instance, a person’s choice may differ when the relevant legislation 
sets out the probabilities of detection, prosecution and punishment for each stage in a series of 
events as opposed to when the cumulative probabilities are set out.434 The National 
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 does a good job of sequentially setting out the 
consequences of non-compliance.435 Section 31K starts by mentioning that inspectors may 
conduct routine inspections to determine whether regulated persons are abiding by the laws.436 
If a violation is detected during the inspection, a compliance notice may be issued to the 
regulated person.437 The regulated person has an opportunity to object to a compliance 
notice.438 If the objection fails and the regulated person does not fulfil the conditions of the 
compliance notice, he risks having his permit or licence revoked.439 
2.2 Normative Theory of Compliance: Logic of Appropriateness 
By contrast, the normative model views regulated persons as “good apples” or law-abiding 
actors that want to obey the law, but struggle, in good faith, to comply for a number of 
reasons.440 The reasons include complicated and contradictory laws, “a lack of awareness or 
expertise, a shortage of resources or the absence of appropriate incentives.”441 These are some 
of the reasons that were advanced by mining companies that are subject to the country’s laws 
because of their investment in South Africa’s mining industry.442 The Minerals Council 
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(formerly known as the Chamber of mines), represents mining companies and reported that the 
DMRE is enforcing provisions of the One Environmental System inconsistently in different 
regions.443 The legislation is enforced differently depending on whether the mining right was 
granted before or after the One Environmental System.444 
According to the normative theory, when regulated persons comply with the law, it is not 
because they fear being penalised, but because they have a sense of duty arising from a “social 
norm.”445 According to Malloy, a “social norm” exists where, firstly, there is a sense of 
obligation by regulated persons to obey the law;446 and secondly, the obligation persists even 
when there are no formal legal sanctions.447 Essentially, the normative model depends on the 
capacity of regulated persons to monitor and control their own behaviour independent of 
external government sanctions.448 Therefore, regulated persons should comply even when 
enforcement authorities are not monitoring their actions.449 What powers the sense of 
obligation is the belief that “legitimate laws” ought to be followed.450 The legitimacy of the 
laws is determined by whether they have been developed and implemented reasonably and in 
a procedurally fair way by governmental authorities.451  
There are two circumstances under which non-compliance would occur in a normative 
community.452 The first is known as the complexity critique and the other as the illegitimacy 
perception.453 Under the complexity critique, regulated persons may deviate from compliance 
if they find laws to be too great in number, complex, unintelligible, too fluid, constantly 
changing and too difficult to find.454 Supporters of this view maintain that regulated persons 
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do not know what “perfect compliance” is, thus cannot attain it.455 For instance, small 
businesses or those acting in good faith would struggle to comply with laws due to the lack of 
resources to stay abreast with the complex, ever-changing regulatory requirements.456 Junior 
mining investors, for instance, criticise the One Environmental System for complicating the 
requirements for environmental impact assessments (EIAs).457 The EIA process creates hurdles 
for small companies who cannot afford the high costs associates with conducting scientific 
studies and engaging in public participation.458  
As mentioned earlier, the normative model is partly rooted in the belief that governmental 
authorities and the laws that they enact and enforce are legitimate, thus worthy of obedience.459 
Therefore, non-compliance becomes a possibility when regulatory authorities and laws are 
perceived to be illegitimate.460 This perception arises when governmental authorities are 
appointed in a procedurally unfair manner or when authorities impose rigid rules that seem to 
be unresponsive to the needs of regulated persons.461 When the perception of illegitimacy 
manifest, regulated persons are less likely to feel obliged to comply.462 In the absence of the 
normative influence, regulated persons are likely to resort to rationality, complying only if the 
cost of non-compliance outweighs the benefit of conforming to the “social norm.”463 
2.3 Integrating Rationalists and Normative Theories 
Both rationalist and normative theories of compliance provide useful insights into behavioural 
motivations that lead to compliance.464 These theories are not mutually exclusive.465 Rather, 
they provide different ways of understanding influences on compliance behaviour.466 When 
regulated persons are deciding whether to comply with laws, both theories prevail to different 
degrees under different circumstances.467   
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458 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 6. 
459 Tyler & Darley (1999) Hofstra Law Review 716; Tyler Why People Obey the Law (1990) 3-4. 
460 Malloy (2003) Temple Law Review 469. 
461 Malloy (2003) Temple Law Review 469. 
462 Malloy (2003) Temple Law Review 469. 
463 Malloy (2003) Temple Law Review 469; Kagan & Scholz ‘The “Criminology of the Corporation” and 
Regulatory Enforcement Strategies’ in Enforcing Regulations 75. 
464 Zaelke, Kaniaru & Kruzikova Making Law Work 54. 
465 Zaelke, Kaniaru & Kruzikova Making Law Work 62. 
466 Zaelke, Kaniaru & Kruzikova Making Law Work 62. 
467 Malloy (2003) Temple Law Review 456 & 475. 
47 
In practice, regulated persons make decisions based on a hybrid logic which is based on both 
the rationalist and normative theories.468 A proper understanding of the behavioural 
motivations driving compliance requires a balancing of these two theories.469 As illustrated 
below, compliance is influenced by and impacts the enforcement of governing laws.470 
Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of compliance theories is best given after discussing 
enforcement theories below.   
3 Theories of Enforcement 
As already mentioned, compliance refers to the state of regulated persons abiding by the law.471 
Enforcement denotes the actions taken by authorities to secure compliance from regulated 
persons.472 Just as compliance has been explored through the rationalists and normative 
theories, this section discusses the merits of enforcing compliance through the same theories.473  
While enforcers under the rationalist theory use a coercive approach to enforcement, enforcers 
under the normative theory use a cooperative approach to enforcement.474 The discussion that 
follows focuses on a number of fundamental differences between the coercive and cooperative 
approach. These differences are set out in the following table: 
468 Zaelke, Kaniaru & Kruzikova Making Law Work 62. 
469 Zaelke, Kaniaru & Kruzikova Making Law Work 62. 
470 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1188. 
471 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 41. 
472 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 44. 
473 Abbot Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation 39. 
474 Abbot Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation 39. 
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Figure 4: Differences between the rationalist theory and normative theory475 
The differences in each approach relate to how enforcement authorities view regulated persons; 
the approach to enforcement; the purpose of enforcement; the enforcement mechanism used to 
achieve said purpose; how enforcement is implemented; and the type of enforcement. These 
are further explained in the discussion below. 
Over the years, environmental enforcement in South Africa has shifted from a traditional, 
purely coercive approach to a less combative approach that uses different techniques to secure 
compliance.476 Through the One Environmental System, the regulating authority adopted a 
more flexible approach to securing compliance by providing for compliance assistance in the 
legislation.477 For instance, the regulations have reduced the number of provisions that need to 
be complied with to conduct mining activities.478 Instead of preparing two environmental 
475 Summary of Glicksman (2015) International Review of Law and Economics 135. 
476 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 52. 
477 Section 12(4) NEMA; K Hawkin ‘Creating Cases in a Regulatory Agency’ (1984) 12 Urban Life 387; 
Glicksman (2015) International Review of Law and Economics 135.  
478 Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd v Magistrate for the District of Vredendal, Kroutz NO and Others 
(18701/16) [2017] ZAWCHC 25 30. 
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management programmes, mining companies now only require one.479 The reduced 
compliance burden on mining companies shows that the regulatory framework has been drafted 
to further encourage compliance. 
Despite the adoption of a cooperative approach to enforcement, there is little proof of a 
complete shift from a coercive to a cooperative approach.480 There is a clear dichotomy 
between the two approaches.481 Nevertheless, enforcement authorities rarely rely exclusively 
on one approach.482 An assessment of the One Environmental System shows that enforcement 
authorities use a flexible, hybrid approach that relies on both coercion and cooperation.483 In 
analysing the theories of enforcement, this chapter formulates a way in which the hybrid 
approach to enforcement should be implemented to achieve effective environmental 
enforcement.484 
3.1 Rationalist Theory of Enforcement: Coercive Approach  
Under the rationalist theory, regulated persons prioritise economic self-interest.485 They 
comply with the law only if the cost of non-compliance outweighs the benefits of non-
compliance.486 The costs of non-compliance include fines and the withdrawal of operating 
licences, while the benefits of non-compliance include avoiding the operational costs 
associated with conducting business in accordance with environmental protection laws.487 
Enforcement authorities who view regulated persons as rational actors use a coercive approach 
to induce compliance.488 The goal of coercion in enforcement is to deter non-compliance.489 
This goal is achieved by imposing sanctions when there has been a failure to comply with the 
law.490 Essentially, enforcement authorities aim to “make sanctions high enough and the 
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480 Glicksman (2015) International Review of Law and Economics 135. 
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structure operates. These sections show that when there is a violation, the enforcement authority begins by 
issuing a notice before resorting to harsher measures like revoking a licence. 
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of Law and Society 20; Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 35. 
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487 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1186. 
488 Scholz (1984) Law and Society Review 183. 
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probability of detection great enough so that it becomes economically irrational for regulated 
persons to disobey the law.”491 The coercive approach is based on inflexible enforcement that 
imposes sanctions uniformly for transgressions of the same nature.492  
Enforcement authorities view imposing sanctions as a mark of success. Enforcement in this 
sense is mainly retrospective since its aim is to react to transgressions that have already 
happened by penalising the transgressor to deter future violations.493 
3.2 Normative Theory of Enforcement: Cooperative Approach 
Under the normative theory, regulated persons are law-abiding citizens that have high regard 
for legitimate laws.494 As such, they comply with laws, but struggle in good faith to maintain 
compliance when laws become increasingly complicated and contradictory.495 
Enforcement authorities who view regulated persons as normative actors use a cooperative 
approach to induce compliance.496 The goal of cooperation in enforcement is to encourage 
compliance.497 This goal is achieved by authorities using their discretion to provide regulated 
persons with assistance and incentives to encourage compliance.498 Assistance includes the 
dissemination of information, technological assistance and inspections aimed at providing 
regulated persons with compliance advice.499 The cooperative approach is based on flexible 
and lenient enforcement that deals with non-compliance on a case by case basis.500 Therefore, 
regulated persons are given opportunities to rectify transgressions before sanctions are imposed 
through coercive means.501 
Cooperative enforcement is deemed to be successful if enforcement authorities have 
considerable discretion to provide guidance and incentives to help regulated persons achieve 
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compliance.502 Authorities under this approach avoid using sanctions as it is a mark of failure 
for them. Enforcement under the normative approach is predominantly prospective since its 
aim is to encourage compliance.503  
3.3 Analysing Theories of Enforcement 
The coercive approach is the prevailing societal approach to environmental enforcement in a 
number of jurisdictions.504 The same is true for the South African One Environmental 
System.505 Although coercion is the dominant approach, cooperation is also relied on.506 In 
essence, the enforcement authority in this system uses a hybrid approach.507 The legal 
positivist, Hart advocated for this approach when he stated that it is only reasonable to expect 
regulated persons to voluntarily cooperate in a coercive system.508 
The purpose of enforcement action, especially enforcement by the government, is to bring 
violators back into compliance rather than subjecting them to sanctions.509 To illustrate this 
purpose, a publication by the Centre for Environmental Rights shows that a number of 
companies that have violated provisions of the One Environmental System were met with either 
no sanctions or minor ones.510 The enforcement, or lack thereof, of section 24G of NEMA is a 
good example. The section provides that the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (the 
DMRE) must impose an administrative fine when a mining company conducts activities 
without an environmental authorisation.511  In the 2017/2018 reporting year, the DMRE 
identified multiple companies operating without environmental authorisations.512 However, no 
502 B Van Rooij Regulating Land and Pollution in China: Lawmaking, Compliance and Enforcement; Theory 
and Cases (2006) 299. 
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fines were issued.513 The leniency by enforcement authorities is corroborated by the judgments 
in S v Blue Platinum Ventures (Pty) Ltd514 and S v Nkomati Anthracite (Pty) Ltd.515 Inspectors 
are sometimes flexible towards non-complying companies and use considerable discretion 
when enforcing the regulations.516 It can be deduced that when inspectors carry out their 
enforcement mandate, they aim to encourage compliance, rather than to punish violators.517  
As mentioned above, the One Environmental System relies on the hybrid approach with the 
coercive approach being more dominant than the cooperative approach.518 In response to the 
scholarship on the dominance of the coercive approach, there is a call to reform this 
enforcement approach.519 However, a case for the continued use of coercion has also been 
made.520 Although the following discussion considers the merits and demerits of the coercive 
and cooperative approach, ultimately effective environmental enforcement requires both 
approaches.521 Therefore, the discussion recommends a way in which both approaches can be 
implemented to achieve effective environmental enforcement.522 
3.3.1 Calls to Reform the Hybrid System by Dismantling the Coercive Approach  
There are calls to reform the hybrid system of enforcement by dismantling the coercive 
approach and relying only on the cooperative approach to enforcement.523 The call comes from 
those who are against effective environmental enforcement.524 These include mining 
companies that want environmental regulations relaxed for them.525 It also includes political 
the Portfolio Committee on Environmental Affairs at the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 19 
November 2018 (copy on file with author) 7. 
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leaders that are involved in the regulation process and relax enforcement to create an investor-
friendly climate.526 The focus of this discussion however is the argument made by scholars that 
support the goal of effective environmental enforcement.527  
The coercive approach to enforcement has been criticised for being counterproductive in that 
it makes regulated persons resentful and less likely to comply with regulations.528 This 
argument stems from a juxtaposition of coercion with cooperation.529 The assumption is that 
regulated persons are law-abiding citizens, therefore persuasion is more effective than 
punishment.530 If enforcement authorities thus respond to non-compliance with sanctions, 
regulated persons will become hostile and resentful.531 As a result, regulated persons will resist 
cooperating with authorities by withholding information, exploiting regulatory loopholes and 
frequent appealing and reviewing decisions made by authorities.532  
Due to reduced cooperation, enforcement authorities will experience difficulties in executing 
their mandate.533 Detecting violations will become harder because regulated persons are less 
likely to voluntarily disclose the challenges that they face in achieving compliance.534 
Enforcement authorities will use more resources to litigate against the violators.535 They will 
also spend more time and effort gathering evidence for the litigation.536 Essentially, the 
coercive approach is counterproductive in that it results in reduced compliance by regulated 
http://cer.org.za/news/mining-companies-launch-their-first-attacks-on-the-one-environmental-system; accessed 
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persons and increased costs to enforcement authorities.537 Therefore, enforcement authorities 
should rely more on the cooperative rather than the coercive approach to enforcement.538 
Proponents of the coercive approach are not convinced by the argument that cooperation is 
more effective than coercion.539 This is because the argument against coercion is founded on a 
few assumptions about enforcement behaviour that can be dispelled.540  
The first assumption made by advocates of the cooperative approach is that regulated persons, 
such as mining companies, abide by the law.541 This assumption is problematic, especially in 
the context of environmental law.542 According to this argument, mining companies are likely 
to violate environmental protection laws more often than laws that promote economic integrity 
such as tax, securities and trade laws.543 Reason being that rational actors seek to promote 
economic self-interest.544 In the absence of coercion, companies are likely to comply with laws 
that benefit them, hence laws promoting economic integrity enjoy greater compliance.545  
The second assumption is that enforcement authorities under the coercive approach are rigid 
and respond to all violations with penalties.546 The response to this assumption is that enforcers 
are more inclined to negotiate informally with violators before resorting to the penalties 
prescribed in the relevant regulations.547 This exercise of discretion by enforcers is seen as 
necessary, desirable and practical.548 
The third assumption is that regulated persons have the resources to comply with laws.549 
Companies can be persuaded to comply with laws if they have the resources to comply.550 
However, it is unlikely that they will comply if they do not have the resources that will bring 
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about compliance and if compliance will lead to significant financial implications for the 
company.551 
From a theoretical perspective, a case has been made for the reform of the traditional approach 
to enforcement, which is a hybrid system with coercive enforcement as the dominant 
approach.552 Notwithstanding this view, there is little consensus on which approach to 
enforcement is more effective than the other.553 In South Africa, there is little definitive 
evidence of the overall state of compliance with and enforcement of the One Environmental 
System.554 Parliament has expressed its disappointment with the lack of reporting on the 
enforcement of the One Environmental System by the DMRE.555  
After considering the call to reform the hybrid approach, the following discussion considers 
which approach authorities should adopt to achieve high levels of compliance. Based on the 
legislative provisions of the One Environmental System and limited knowledge of its 
enforcement, this section finds that the system is a hybrid one with elements of both coercion 
and cooperation.556 Because there is little consensus on which theoretical approach is more 
effective, the following section unpacks the benefits of using the coercive approach in a hybrid 
system.557  
3.3.2 Arguments for a Hybrid System of Enforcement which Emphasises the Coercive 
Approach to Enforcement 
It may be tempting to reform traditional environmental enforcement by dismantling the 
coercive approach.558 Pursuing the reform may be “short-sighted and detrimental to South 
Africa’s long-term interest in effective environmental enforcement.”559 There are a number of 
benefits of the coercive approach that are important for an effective system of enforcement.560 
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Firstly, it provides a credible threat of enforcement.561 Secondly, it discourages state capture.562 
Lastly, it discourages the inconsistent treatment of regulated persons by enforcement 
authorities.563 These benefits are discussed in greater detail below. 
The first positive attribute of the coercive approach is that it sends a credible signal that 
compliance will be monitored.564 Enforcement authorities often “lack the resources to 
comprehensively inspect and monitor every regulated person.”565 Therefore, their enforcement 
actions need to be effective in that they send a “strong and credible threat of enforcement” to 
regulated persons that non-compliance will be meted with penalties.566 These penalties should 
include the recovery all economic gain realised from non-compliance.567 Seizing all economic 
benefits instead of imposing a fine is more pragmatic as the fine imposed may be less than the 
economic benefit of non-compliance.568 In such a case, “imposing a fine would be ineffective 
because the regulated person would have no incentive to comply since not complying would 
be more economically viable.”569 Section 34(3) of NEMA is one such provision that threatens 
enforcement by providing for the seizure of all economic gain that results from unlawful 
environmental degradation.570 
The threat of enforcement is as important as actual enforcement for purposes of achieving 
compliance.571 In essence, it is not necessary for authorities to always punish non-compliance. 
Instead, it is important for regulated persons to believe that their non-compliance will be 
punished.572 Publicising coercive enforcement can result in enhanced compliance by increasing 
a regulated person’s subjective belief that they will be caught.573 Therefore, sole reliance on 
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the cooperative approach to enforcement falls short in that it merely promotes compliance.574 
“Being persuaded to comply without the threat of punishment greatly reduces the incentive to 
comply.575 Therefore, shifting too far toward cooperative enforcement threatens to undermine 
the threat of enforcement that is necessary for widespread compliance.”576  
The second positive attribute of the coercive approach is that it discourages state capture.577 
One distinguishing feature of the cooperative approach is that authorities work closely with 
regulated persons to bring them into compliance.578 Authorities play the role of advisors instead 
of inspectors and punishers.579 The benefits of the cooperative approach cannot be denied.580 
However, there is a concern that this approach can yield counterproductive results.581 
Authorities who establish a close relationship with regulated persons may overlook grave 
violations and exercise leniency in carrying out their enforcement mandate.582 In essence, 
enforcement authorities will be influenced by regulated persons.583 Such a situation is known 
as state capture.584 
State capture is not a novel concept.585 Recommendations of how to deal with state capture 
have included restricting the discretion and flexibility of enforcement authorities.586 Restricting 
the flexibility of authorities may be detrimental in that authorities may punish trivial violations 
thereby sparking resentment from regulated persons.587 There are a number of ways to deal 
with this concern. Firstly, the empowered governmental departments can assign the task of 
carrying out “cooperative” enforcement to a select group of inspectors instead of tasking all 
inspectors with the traditional inspection and enforcement duties.588 Secondly, authorities can 
574 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1226. 
575 CS Russel, W Harrington & WJ Vaughan Enforcing Pollution Control Laws (1986) 38 – 39; Rechtschaffen 
(1998) Southern California Law Review 1230. 
576 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1230. 
577 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1222. 
578 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1222. 
579 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1222. 
580 Glicksman (2015) International Review of Law and Economics 136. 
581 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1222. 
582 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1222. 
583 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1222. 
584 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1222. 
585 JS Hellman, G Jones & D Kaufmann ‘Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence 
in Transition’ (2000) The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2444 available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDEWASHINGTON2000/Resources/hellman.pdf accessed on 30 
March 2019; Shapiro Who Guards the Guardians 65 – 66.  
586 Bardach & Kagan Going by the Book 44 – 46. 
587 Bardach & Kagan Going by the Book 44 – 46; see CR Snyman Criminal Law 6 ed (2014) 139 -140 for a 
discussion of the maxim de minimis non curat lex, which means that the law does not punish crimes of a trivial 
nature.  
588 Bardach & Kagan Going by the Book 44 – 46. 
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involve public interest groups in the enforcement process. For violations that prompt authorities 
to be flexible in their enforcement, authorities can employ public interest groups to assess the 
violation and suggest cooperative ways to bring the recalcitrant person to compliance.589 
The third positive attribute of the coercive approach is that it discourages the inconsistent 
treatment of regulated persons by enforcement authorities.590 Most authorities aspire to have 
an enforcement system that is consistent, that is one that treats similarly placed persons 
similarly. Consistency is important for ensuring the credibility of an enforcement system and 
pervasive compliance.591  
In the context of environmental law, “consistent treatment is essential so that regulated persons 
believe that they are competing on a level playing field.”592 A study shows that mining 
companies that take measures to ensure that they comply with environmental protection laws 
want their competitors who do not take similar measures to be forced into compliance.593 The 
reasoning is that recalcitrant companies that are allowed to evade compliance will have an 
unfair advantage over their compliant competitors.594 The result of the competitive 
disadvantage is that the compliant companies may stop making an effort to comply with 
environmental protection laws.595  
A strictly cooperative approach to enforcement will unlikely solve the problem of varied 
treatment of regulated persons and its consequences.596 If anything, it will probably exacerbate 
it.597 In a cooperative system that leaves compliance and enforcement issues open to 
negotiation, authorities will respond differently to similarly placed offenders.598 The disparate 
treatment of such violators undermines compliance and enforcement because it gives the 
impression that violations will sometimes go unpunished.599 It is thus important to use a hybrid 
589 Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 54 – 60. 1 
590 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1223. 
591 JF Dimento Environmental Law and American Business: Dilemmas of Compliance (1986) 100 – 102.  
592 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1223. 
593 The National Academy of Public Administration Setting Priorities, Getting Results: A New Direction for the 
Environmental Protection Agency (1995) 25 (this study of businesses’ compliance behaviour was conducted in 
the United States of America). 
594 GV Cleve & KW Holman ‘Promise and Reality in the Enforcement of the Amended Clean Air Act Part II: 
Federal Enforceability and Environmental Auditing’ (1997) 27 Environmental Law Reporter 10 & 157. 
595 CC White ‘Regulation of Leaky Underground Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy of Regulatory Failure’ (1996) 14 
UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 136 – 137. 
596 Pearce & Tombs (1990) The British Journal of Criminology 433; Hawkin (1991) The British Journal of 
Criminology 428; P Downing ‘Bargaining in Pollution Control’ (1983) 11 Policy Studies Journal 581 – 582. 
597 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1224. 
598 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1224. 
599 Downing (1983) Policy Studies Journal 584. 
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approach to enforcement.600 In this way, authorities have the option of using coercion which 
treats similarly placed violators consistently.601 
3.3.3 Implementing a Hybrid Approach to Enforcement 
Due to the lack of empirical research evidencing which approach to environmental enforcement 
is most effective, it is no surprise that most enforcement systems rely on a hybrid system that 
mixes both coercion and cooperation.602 Braithwaite goes as far as saying that it is “foolish” to 
adhere strictly to one approach.603 Because the One Environmental System may be classified 
as a hybrid system of enforcement,604 it is best to consider how this system should be 
implemented to ensure effective enforcement.605 
Given that this chapter accepts that the One Environmental System adopts a hybrid approach 
to enforcement, the question that remains is: when do authorities cooperate and when do they 
coerce regulated persons into compliance?606 Upon detecting a violation, authorities should 
begin with the less intrusive cooperative approach which involves warnings and encouraging 
regulated persons to comply with the law.607 It is only when these fail that authorities should 
resort to the coercive approach which involves fines, revocation of licences and criminal 
prosecution.608 Shavell suggests that “the greater the harm, the higher the sanction should 
be.”609 Maximum sanctions should be reserved for high offences because the stricter the 
sanction, the more costly it would be for the government to impose.610 Implementing effective 
enforcement can be explained using the following enforcement pyramid.611 
600 Hawkin (1991) The British Journal of Criminology 428. 
601 Pearce & Tombs (1990) The British Journal of Criminology 433. 
602 Van Rooij Regulating Land and Pollution in China 231; Hawkin (1991) The British Journal of Criminology 
428. 
603 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 19. 
604 Van Rooij Regulating Land and Pollution in China 231; see sections 31K – 31N of NEMA illustrating how 
the hybrid structure operates. These sections show that when there is a violation, the enforcement authority 
begins by issuing a notice before resorting to harsher measures like revoking a licence.  
605 Abbot Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation 39; Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20; Ayres 
& Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 35. 
606 J Braithwaite To Punish or to Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety 86; Abbot Enforcing Pollution 
Control Regulation 39. 
607 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20; see section 31K NEMA for an example.  
608 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20; see section 31N NEMA for an example. 
609 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20. 
610 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20. 
611 Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 35. 
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Figure 5: Enforcement pyramid612 
The enforcement pyramid proposes to solve the question of when to use cooperation and when 
to use coercion to induce compliance.613 The pyramid begins with a cooperative approach to 
enforcement, namely persuasion.614 As enforcement action escalates up the pyramid, more 
coercive and punitive measures are introduced.615 The premise of the pyramid is that 
enforcement should always begin with the cooperative approach then escalate to more coercive 
measures reluctantly and when the less intrusive measures fail.616  
The amount of space at each tier of the pyramid represents the suggested amount of 
enforcement activity at that level.617 Most enforcement action should take place at the “base of 
the pyramid where attempts are first made to induce compliance with persuasion.”618 
Persuasion is often described as the most restorative way of enforcing compliance with the 
law.619 If persuasion does not secure compliance, authorities should issue warning letters. The 
next phase of enforcement is the imposition of civil penalties.620 If civil penalties do not work, 
612 Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 35. 
613 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20. 
614 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20. 
615 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20. 
616 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20. 
617 Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 35. 
618 Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 35. 
619 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20. 
620 Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 36. 
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enforcers should consider imposing criminal penalties then suspending the licence or permit to 
operate.621 As a last resort, enforcers can revoke a company’s licence or permit to operate a 
mining company.622  
4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the analysis of the rationalist and normative theories finds that behavioural 
motivations that drive compliance decisions do not fall squarely within one theory.623 Instead, 
the two theories are different lenses for understanding the basis on which regulated persons 
make compliance decisions.624 Both theories prevail to different degrees under different 
circumstances.625 
In the context of enforcement, there is a lack of empirical research evidencing which approach 
to enforcement is more effective than the other.626 In fact, there is little definitive evidence of 
the overall state of compliance with and enforcement of the One Environmental System.627 The 
limited empirical evidence in this area provides an opportunity for further research. 
Nevertheless, using the available resources and assessing literature on environmental 
enforcement in other jurisdictions, this chapter concludes that the One Environmental System 
adopts a hybrid approach.628 Its enforcement authorities rely on the coercive and cooperative 
approaches as they both have attributes that contribute to effective environmental 
enforcement.629  
Since the discussion favours a hybrid approach, this chapter proposes a way in which this 
approach should be implemented.630 Enforcement authorities should implement enforcement 
by starting with the cooperative approach then escalating to more coercive measures reluctantly 
621 Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 36. 
622 Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 36; Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20. 
623 Kagan & Scholz ‘The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies’ in 
Enforcing Regulations 68; Hawkins (1990) The British Journal of Criminology 453; Zaelke, Kaniaru & 
Kruzikova Making Law Work 55; Hawkin (1991) The British Journal of Criminology 428.  
624 Zaelke, Kaniaru & Kruzikova Making Law Work 62. 
625 Malloy (2003) Temple Law Review 456 & 475. 
626 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1205; Hawkins (1990) The British Journal of 
Criminology 454 argues that more research needs to be done into how regulated persons like businesses make 
compliance decisions. 
627 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit DMR Disregards Key Monitoring Provisions of 
NEMA and the One Environmental System for Mining 1 & 6. 
628 Van Rooij Regulating Land and Pollution in China 231; see sections 31K – 31N of NEMA of how the 
hybrid structure operates. These sections show that when there is a violation, the enforcement authority begins 
by issuing a notice before resorting to harsher measures like revoking a licence. 
629 Rechtschaffen (1998) Southern California Law Review 1204 & 1225; Van Rooij Regulating Land and 
Pollution in China 229.  
630 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20; Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 35. 
62 
and when the less intrusive measures fail.631 Which cooperative and coercive measures are used 
to enforce the One Environmental System is discussed in the following chapter. 
631 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20. 
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Chapter 4:  
Compliance and Enforcement Measures 
in the One Environmental System 
1 Introduction 
Chapter three establishes that there are varying ways in which enforcement authorities in the 
One Environmental System can secure compliance with its regulations.632 Theoretically, 
authorities use a combination of coercive and cooperative measures.633  In practice, the theory 
holds true.634 The enforcement measures used are commonly categorised as command-and-
control measures as well as alternative compliance measures.635 On the one hand, command-
and-control measures include criminal, administrative and civil measures.636 On the other hand, 
alternative compliance measures include incentive-based measures and voluntary compliance 
measures.637 
This chapter aims to set out the enforcement measures that are available to secure compliance 
with the One Environmental System.638 These measures are used to different degrees under 
different circumstances.639 Although command-and-control measures are the most commonly 
used, this chapter suggests that they should be used as a last resort, after using alternative 
measures.640  
632 Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
633 Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
634 M Kidd Environmental Law 2 ed (2011) 268; F Craigie, P Snijman & M Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in 
South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 51. 
635 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 51. 
636 M Kidd ‘Alternatives to the Criminal Sanction in the Enforcement of Environmental Law’ (2002) 9 SAJELP 
26. 
637 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 26. 
638 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 51. 
639 Kidd Environmental Law 269. 
640 Kidd Environmental Law 269. 
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2 Command-and-control Measures 
As the name suggests, command-and-control measures have two main processes.641 First, there 
is the command, which involves prescribing laws that require compliance.642 Secondly, the 
control involves compelling compliance by using enforcement measures in cases of non-
compliance.643 These two processes are the basic characteristics of command-and-control 
measures.644 An enforcement system that relies on this measure generally makes provision for 
prior approval mechanisms such as licences, authorisations and permits.645 Where prior 
approval is required, it is unlawful to conduct certain activities without the requisite 
authorisation.646  
The most notable command-and-control measures in environmental enforcement are criminal, 
administrative and civil measures.647 The main difference between these measures lies in their 
underlying objective.648 While criminal measures focus on penalising persons for causing 
environmental degradation, administrative and civil measures are aimed at directing persons to 
refrain from activities that cause environmental degradation.649  
Due to the narrow scope of this research, the following discussion is limited to criminal and 
administrative measures. A discussion into civil measures is not explored because such 
measures are seldom used and considered inadequate for purposes of environmental 
enforcement.650  
Although traditionally, environmental enforcement authorities have relied on criminal 
measures, there is a shift towards a hybrid approach that incorporates administrative measures 
641 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 51. 
642 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 26. 
643 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 26. 
644 C Abbot Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation Strengthening Sanctions and Improving Deterrence (2009) 
4. 
645 Abbot Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation 4. 
646 Abbot Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation 4. 
647 P Cane ‘Using Tort Law to Enforce Environmental Regulation?’ (2002) 41 Washburn Law Journal 451. 
648 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 52. 
649 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 52. 
650 F Soltau ‘The National Environmental Management Act and Liability for Environmental Damage’ (1999) 6 
SAJELP 35; see R Summers ‘Common-law Remedies for Environmental Protection’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze 
(eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 339 – 369 for a 
discussion of civil measures. 
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and alternative compliance measures.651 Each measure has its benefits and shortfalls, and these 
will be explored further in the discussion below.652 
2.1 Criminal Measures 
Criminal sanctions are the default enforcement measure in legislation regulating the One 
Environmental System.653 Legislation such as the National Environmental Management Act654 
(NEMA) prohibit certain conduct that causes harm to the environment and imposes criminal 
sanctions for contravention of its provisions.655  
The main aim of imposing criminal sanctions is to deter non-compliance.656 Offenders are 
deterred from future non-compliance if there is a high probability of detection and a significant 
penalty attached.657 To deter non-compliance, regulated persons must be made aware of the 
sanctions as “ultimately, one cannot fear what turns to be a paper threat.”658 A lack of 
enforcement promotes disrespect for the law, which leads to contravention.659  It is also 
important for the penalty to be proportional to the harm caused.660 If authorities use heavy 
penalties to punish relatively minor offences, regulated persons will disrespect the law as the 
legal system will be viewed as responding to offenders inappropriately.661 However, if 
penalties are too low, the aim of deterrence is compromised.662  
651 RI McMurray & SD Ramsey ‘Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing 
Environmental Law’ (1986) 19 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1134. 
652 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 26 27 – 28. 
653 Kidd Environmental Law 269; A Paterson & LJ Kotze ‘Towards a more Effective Environmental Compliance 
and Enforcement Regime for South Africa’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement in South Africa Legal Perspectives (2009) 375.  
654 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (hereinafter NEMA). 
655 M Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in 
South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 259. 
656 JT Scholz ‘Cooperation, Deterrence and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement’ (1984) 18 Law and Society 
Review 183; S Terblanche ‘Sentencing’ (2018) 3 SACJ 465; HL Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) 
356. 
657 C Rechtschaffen & DL Markell Reinventing Environmental Enforcement and the State/Federal Relationship 
(2003) 60 – 61; C Reasons ‘Crimes Against the Environment: Some Theoretical and Practical Concerns’ (1991) 
34 Criminal Law Quarterly 97; CR Snyman Criminal Law 6 ed (2014) 15. 
658 S Smith ‘An Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove: Redefining the Role of Criminal Prosecution in Creating an Effective 
Environmental Enforcement System’ (1995) 19 Criminal Law Journal 14; D Farrier ‘In Search of Real Criminal 
Law’ in T Bonyhady (ed) Environmental Protection and Legal Change (1992) 96. 
659 A Ashworth Principle of Criminal Law (1991) 28. 
660 S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA) para 9; S Terblanche ‘Sentencing’ (2009) 22 SACJ 131; A van der 
Merwe ‘Sentencing’ (2016) 29 SACJ 371; J Adreoni ‘Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: 
Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?’ (1991) 22 The Rand Journal of Economics 394; Snyman Criminal Law 13.  
661  S v Heuwel 2018 (2) SACR 436 (WCC) para 15; Terblanche (2018) SACJ 468. 
662 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 242.  
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Because deterrence can be achieved by means other than criminal measures, it is important to 
consider when it is appropriate to use criminal measures and when to use other measures.663 
Setting out the benefits and shortfalls of criminal measures provides guidance in this regard.664 
As highlighted above, deterring non-compliance by using penalties seems to be the main 
benefit of criminal measures.665 Because criminal sanctions are the harshest of all measures, 
they are usually imposed for grave offences where alternative measures would be 
insufficient.666 Although cited less often than deterrence, retribution is also considered to be a 
benefit of criminal measures from an enforcement perspective.667  Retribution refers to 
society’s condemnation of certain conduct thus attaching a criminal stigma to offenders.668   
Notwithstanding the benefits mentioned, criminal sanctions are fraught with shortfalls.669 
Enforcing them is resource intensive and time consuming because authorities must engage in 
litigation before sanctions are imposed.670 Authorities have a heavy burden of proof to 
discharge in that an offender’s guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal 
matter.671 Critics of criminal sanctions also note that such measures address a harm that has 
already occurred as opposed to stopping it before it occurs.672 Other shortfalls that exist include 
a lack of inspectors, difficulties in investigations and a lack of expertise by court officials, such 
as prosecutors.673 
On consideration of the benefits and shortfalls of criminal sanctions, it is plausible to find that 
the use of criminal sanctions should be reserved for serious offences that require heavy 
penalties.674 In the interests of efficiency and cost effectiveness, less serious offences should 
663 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 242. 
664 Kidd Environmental Law 270. 
665 Scholz (1984) Law and Society Review 183; Terblanche (2018) SACJ 465. 
666 J Braithwaite ‘Reward and Regulation’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 20. 
667 DN Husak ‘Retribution in Criminal Theory’ (2000) 37 San Diego Law Review 959; Snyman Criminal Law 12. 
668 R Wertheimer ‘Understanding Retribution’ (1983) 19 Criminal Justice Ethics 23; Snyman Criminal Law 13. 
669 GJ Stigler ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws’ in GS Becker & WM Landes (eds) Essays in the Economics 
of Crime and Punishment (1974) 56; M Jefferson ‘Corporate Liability: The problem of Sanction’ (2001) 65 The 
Journal of Criminal Law 238. 
670 Stigler ‘Optimum Enforcement of Laws’ in Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment 56; M Kidd 
‘Environmental Crime – Time for a Rethink in South Africa?’ (1998) 5 SAJELP 189. 
671 Snyman Criminal Law 102; J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 5 ed (2016) 116; Although not discussed in 
this chapter, there is a lesser burden of proof to discharge in a civil matter in that fault must be established on a 
balance of probabilities. 
672 Snyman Criminal Law 11; C Abbot Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation Strengthening Sanctions and 
Improving Deterrence (2009) 42; C Rechtschaffen ‘Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of 
Environmental Enforcement’ (1998) 71 Southern California Law Review 1188; TF Malloy ‘Regulation, 
Compliance and the Firm’ (2003) 76 Temple Law Review 454. 
673 C Loots ‘Making Environmental Law Effective’ (1994) 1 SAJELP 17 – 18; Kidd Environmental Law 71 – 73. 
674 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 250; Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20; 
Terblanche (2018) SACJ 465. 
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be penalised with alternative enforcement measures.675 This is a compelling argument. 
However, it begs the question: what are the most serious environmental offences?676  
Three categories of conduct qualify as a serious offence.677 First, criminal sanctions must be 
reserved for conduct that amounts to intentional wrongdoing.678 In the context of mining, such 
conduct includes acid mine drainage, deliberately clearing vegetation without environmental 
authorisation and a failure to comply with notices or directives.679 Secondly, criminal sanctions 
must be used where there is perpetual wrongdoing.680 This occurs when an offender repeatedly 
fails to comply with regulations despite being made aware of how his conduct harms the 
environment.681 Thirdly, criminal sanctions should be imposed where the offender negligently 
causes serious harm to people or the environment.682 The above is not a closed list; thus, 
officials may consult relevant laws to determine whether certain conduct qualifies as a serious 
offence thus warranting a criminal sanction.683 
 This discussion proceeds on the premise that the intentional and negligent contravention of 
environmental laws, which results in serious harm to the environment, must be met with 
criminal sanctions.684 Fines and imprisonment are the most commonly used criminal 
sanctions.685 The discussion below however does not delve into imprisonment. It focuses on 
fines as the scope of this chapter is limited to the sentencing of juristic persons, such as mining 
companies, since they cannot be imprisoned.686  
The decision to limit the discussion to the measures used to punish mining companies is 
informed by a number of reasons. Although not the only source, corporate entities are a major 
source of environmental degradation and manage some of the most dangerous types of 
675 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20. 
676 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 250. 
677 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 26; Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South 
Africa 243; K Hawkins Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution (1984) 
201. 
678 N Shover & AS Routhe ‘Environmental Crime’ (2005) 32 Crime and Justice 324; N Gunningham ‘Enforcing 
Environmental Regulation’ (2011) 23 Journal of Environmental Law 178; Hawkins Environment and 
Enforcement 201. 
679 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 243. 
680 Gunningham (2011) Journal of Environmental Law 178; Hawkins Environment and Enforcement 201. 
681 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 243. 
682 Gunningham (2011) Journal of Environmental Law 178; Hawkins Environment and Enforcement 201. 
683 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 243. 
684 Gunningham (2011) Journal of Environmental Law 178; Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 250. 
685 JD Wilson ‘Re-thinking Penalties for Corporate Environmental Offenders: A View of the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada’s Sentencing in Environmental Cases’ (1986) 31 McGill Law Journal 314; EM Fromm 
‘Commanding respect: Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Crimes’ (1990) 21 St. Mary’s Law Journal 822.  
686 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa; Jefferson (2001) 
The Journal of Criminal Law 235. 
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pollutants.687 They have vast economic and political power.688 Having extensive resources 
means that they can reduce pollution and prevent other harms to the environment.689  
2.1.1 Fines 
NEMA provides that a fine may be imposed on an offender who causes harm to the 
environment.690 These fines range between R5 million and R10 million.691 To supplement the 
penalty of a fine, the law provides for other forms of fines and alternative penalties.692 
There is provision in the law for a “fine for continuing offences” which may be imposed for 
every day that an offence continues.693 This measure is imposed to encourage an offender to 
stop the contravention as a matter of urgency.694  An offender may also be imposed with a fine 
which is either equivalent to the benefit gained695 or three times the value of the benefit gained 
from the offence.696 The recovery of monetary gain from offenders is an important deterrent 
for offenders involved in crimes motivated by profit, such as illegal diamond mining.697 
Fines have been criticised as an inadequate enforcement measure as corporates are often able 
to simply write off fines as a cost of doing business.698 Such disregard for fines undermines the 
deterrent and retributive aims of criminal sanctions because the associated stigma is simply 
absorbed as a cost of doing business.699 The resultant costs usually fall on shareholders who 
had no part in committing the offence or consumers and employees of the corporate entity.700  
687 D Saxe Environmental Offences: Corporate Responsibility and Executive Liability (1990) 21; Wilson (1986) 
McGill Law Journal 314. 
688 Saxe Environmental Offences 21. 
689 Saxe Environmental Offences 21. 
690 Section 49B NEMA. 
691 Section 49B NEMA. 
692 Adjustment of Fines Act 101 of 1991 provides for maximum fines set out in legislation to be adjusted if they 
are found to be inadequate. The provisions of this Act may be invoked whether a fine has (section 1(b)) or has not 
(section 1(a)) been legislatively determined.  
693 Section 51(3) National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
694 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 260. 
695 Section 34(3) NEMA; see also section 52(1)(b)(ii) of the National Environmental Management: Air Quality 
Act 39 of 2004. 
696 Section 102(2)(b) of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004. 
697 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 261. 
698 Jefferson (2001) The Journal of Criminal Law 238. 
699 Jefferson (2001) The Journal of Criminal Law 238. 
700 NJ Reville ‘The Shifting Sands of Manslaughter’ (1991) 55 Journal of Criminal Law 233. 
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2.1.2 Alternative penalties 
The law provides for penalties other than fines.701 These penalties include compensation orders, 
reparation orders, forfeiture orders and the revocation of licences and permits.702 The following 
discussion focuses on such penalties. 
The law empowers criminal courts to issue compensation orders.703 If an offender is convicted 
of an offence that results in a loss or harm to a person, the court has the power to calculate the 
loss suffered and order compensation to the victim.704 The victim concerned may be the state 
or any aggrieved person.705 The benefit of a compensation order granted in favour of the state 
is that it presents an opportunity for the state to remedy the environmental degradation at the 
cost of the offender.706 Such a measure is cost-effective for authorities and improves the 
efficiency of enforcement as it removes the need for the matter to be tried in a civil court to 
determine compensation.707 Another measure that promotes remediation of environmental 
degradation is a reparation order.708 Instead of ordering an offender to pay compensation, a 
reparation order requires the offender to remedy the harm.709 It may be granted simultaneously 
with a compensation order should the offender fail to honour the reparation order.710 
An effective criminal enforcement measure is the forfeiture of items from an offender.711 Such 
items include objects illegally obtained (such as diamonds), the instruments used to commit 
the offence (such as trucks), and objects directly used to commit the offence (such as tools to 
clear vegetation).712 It seems plausible to order the forfeiture of objects illegally obtained and 
those directly used to commit the offence.713 However, it has been argued that forfeiting the 
instruments of an offence may be unfair and excessive and that a link between the instrument 
701 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 260. 
702 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 261 – 63.  
703 Section 300 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
704 Sections 34(1) & (2) NEMA. 
705 Sections 34(2) NEMA. 
706 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 261. 
707 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 260. 
708 Section 51(8) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
709 Section 51(8) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
710 Section 51(8) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
711 A van der Walt ‘Civil Forfeiture of Instrumentalities and Proceeds of Crime and the Constitutional Property 
Clause’ (2000) 16 SA Journal on Human Rights 2; see section 68 of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998. 
712 Section 34D NEMA, see also section 68 of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 and section 18(2). 
713 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 262. 
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and the offence must first be established before a sanction is imposed.714 If an instrument is 
only used incidentally in committing the offence, then forfeiture should not be ordered.715 
As a measure of last resort, a court may revoke a licence or permit if the holder of such a right 
contravenes the terms agreed on upon issue.716 Provision for this measure in environmental 
legislation is on the increase and perhaps it should become a standard provision in any law that 
provides for licences and permits.717 
2.1.3 Corporate-specific penalties 
In addition to the aforementioned sanctions, the legislature should consider making provision 
for corporate-specific penalties. For instance, corporate offenders should be penalised using 
managerial intervention and adverse publicity orders.718 A brief description of the proposed 
measures follows. 
A court should be empowered to make an order for managerial intervention by calling for 
internal discipline and reform within the corporation.719 Internal disciplinary action involves 
the corporation investigating the offence and holding the appropriate individuals 
accountable.720 Organisational reform would require the corporation to implement or change 
policies or procedures to prevent future violations.721  
Another creative way of holding corporates accountable for environmental violations is by 
making provision for adverse publicity orders.722 Since corporations are profit maximisers, the 
prestige of a corporation lies largely in its financial success.723 A possible enforcement measure 
would be to order a corporate offender to publicise its conviction in a manner prescribed by the 
court.724 In addition, the offender must cover the cost of the adverse publicity.725 This sanction 
714 van der Walt (2000) SA Journal on Human Rights 7. 
715 S v Vermeulen 1995 (2) SACR 439 (T) 441. 
716 Section 34C NEMA. 
717 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 262; see section 28 
of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 and section 58(8) of the National Forests Act 30 of 1998. 
718 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 263. 
719 M Kidd ‘Sentencing Environmental Crimes’ (2004) 11 SAJELP 70; Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 264. 
720 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 264. 
721 Kidd (2004) SAJELP 71. 
722 E Gellhorn ‘Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies’ (1973) 86 Harvard Law Review 1381. 
723 HA Simon Models of Bounded Rationality: Behavioural Economics and Business Organisation (1982) 291; 
DM Kreps A Course in Microeconomic Theory (1990) 724; E Sutherland White-Collar Crime: The Uncut 
Version (1983) 236. 
724 NJ Stranz ‘Case Comment: R v Bata Industries Ltd’ (1993) 31 Alberta Law Review 730; see section 291(1)(g) 
of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1987. 
725 Section 291(2) of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1987. 
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could be used in place of or in addition to other measures.726 Such an order could give effect to 
the deterrent and retributive aims of criminal sanctions.727 
2.2 Administrative Measures 
Administrative measures have an important role to play in the enforcement of the One 
Environmental System.728 They empower authorised officials to direct offenders to comply 
with the law and, in cases of breach, to remedy the environmental damage.729 Unlike criminal 
measures, administrative measures are implemented by authorised officials and not by 
courts.730 The available administrative measures include directives, compliance notices and the 
withdrawal of authorisations.731 
Administrative measures may supplement or replace criminal measures.732 As previously 
suggested, criminal sanctions should be reserved for serious offences.733 Although less harsh 
than criminal measures, administrative measures can be more effective in securing 
compliance.734 Their effectiveness stems from a number of reasons. First, the officials 
authorised to issue them are given wide discretion to ensure enforcement that is specific to each 
situation.735 Secondly, they are cost effective in that legislation empowers various officials to 
enforce them without relying on courts.736 Thirdly, the authorised officials have the expertise 
to secure compliance with relevant environmental laws in a specific manner that non-specialist 
courts would not be equipped to.737 
The effective use of administrative measures depends on the proper training of officials 
authorised to use them and the political will to use them.738 Historically, these two factors are 
726 Section 291(1) of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1987. 
727 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 264. 
728 M Fourie ‘How Civil and Administrative Penalties can Change the Face of Environmental Compliance in 
South Africa’ (2009) 16 SAJELP 94. 
729 T Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 225.  
730 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 56. 
731 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 55. The term authorisations, in the context of this chapter, refers to 
all entitlements including licences, permits and exemptions. 
732 Fourie (2009) SAJELP 117. 
733 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 250; Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20; Terblanche 
(2018) SACJ 465. 
734 Fourie (2009) SAJELP 117. 
735 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 226.  
736 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 33. 
737 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 33. 
738 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 226. 
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said to have been lacking in the enforcement of environmental laws.739 However, there has 
been positive change in the form of increased enforcement since the appointment and training 
of environmental management inspectors.740 This section analyses the use of various 
administrative measures, the empowering legislation, the officials authorised to enforce them, 
the consequences of not complying with them as well as their advantages and disadvantages. 
2.2.1 Directives 
Directives are provided for in various legislation.741 However, for purposes of this discussion, 
the focus is on directives issued under section 28 of NEMA and section 19 of the National 
Water Act (NWA).742 These provisions empower a competent authority to, not only direct a 
person to take steps to prevent environmental damage, but to also remedy the harm.743 
Particular consideration is given to these statutes because they are the key laws in the One 
Environmental System.744  
Directives under NEMA and the NWA are applicable when there is a breach of the duty of 
care.745 These statutes impose a duty on any person involved in activities that result in 
environmental harm to take reasonable measures to prevent the harm.746 Where one fails to 
take reasonable measures to prevent the harm, a competent authority may direct them to do 
so.747 Reasonable measures are specified in the legislation and include investigating, stopping 
and remedying environmental harm.748  
The competent authority for issuing directives under NEMA is the Director-General of the 
Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries (DEFF) or the head of the provincial 
environmental department.749 The competent authority for issuing directives under the NWA 
is a catchment management agency or, where such authority does not exist, the Minister of 
Water Affairs.750 Notably, local authorities, such as municipalities, are not empowered to use 
739 Fourie (2009) SAJELP 117. 
740 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 226. 
741 See section 45 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002; see also section 31A of 
the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 – Majority of the provisions of this Act have been repealed by 
NEMA, however section 31A is one of the provisions which still remains in effect. 
742 National Water Act 36 of 1998 (hereinafter NWA). 
743 Soltau (1999) SAJELP. The term competent authority, in the context of this chapter, refers to the officials 
authorised by legislation to enforce measures. 
744 Section 50A NEMA; section 163A NWA. 
745 Section 28 NEMA; section 19 NWA. 
746 F Feris ‘Compliance Notices – A New Tool in Environmental Enforcement’ (2006) 9 PELR 54. 
747 Section 28(4) NEMA; Section 19(3) NWA. 
748 Section 28(3) NEMA; Section 19(2) NWA. 
749 Section 28(4) NEMA. 
750 Section 19(3) read with section 72 NWA. 
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these administrative measures.751 This dispensation is rather unfortunate given that local 
government is usually the first to identify environmental damage and faces the adverse 
consequences, more so where the harm affects service delivery, like the supply of potable 
water.752 
There are a range of consequences that flow from non-compliance with a directive. Where a 
person fails to take reasonable measures in terms of NEMA or the NWA, the competent 
authority may take the instructed measures and recover the costs from the person.753 The costs 
may be recovered from the person responsible for the harm, the owner or person with a right 
to use the land at the time the harm was caused, or any person who failed negligently in 
preventing the harm from occurring.754 Failure to comply with a directive may lead to one 
being issued with a compliance notice in terms of NEMA.755 This administrative measure is 
discussed in further detail below. 
Among the consequences that flow from a failure to comply with a directive under NEMA, a 
criminal offence is not one of them.756 Therefore, non-compliance with a directive cannot be 
addressed using criminal proceedings.757 The competent authority may however institute civil 
litigation to apply for an interdict to order compliance with the directive.758 Despite the position 
under NEMA, non-compliance with a directive can amount to a criminal offence under the 
NWA.759 In essence, the directive issued under the NWA is more functional than the one issued 
under NEMA because it may be enforced through criminal proceedings. The result of a 
conviction for non-compliance with a directive is a fine or imprisonment.760  
An analysis of the discussion above reveals the advantages and disadvantages of directives. 
Among the advantages is the fact that competent authorities are empowered to specify the 
measures that best suit each situation.761 Thus, because they are tailored to each situation, they 
are more effective than other forms of enforcement measures, such as criminal sanctions.762 
751 Section 31A(2) of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 however empowers local authorities to issue 
directives.  
752 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 228. 
753 Section 28(7) & (8) NEMA; Section 19(4) & (5) NWA. 
754 Section 28(8) NEMA; Section 19(5) NWA. 
755 Section 31L NEMA. 
756 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 232. 
757 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 232. 
758 Summers ‘Common-law Remedies for Environmental Protection’ in Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement in South Africa (2009) 346 for a discussion of interdicts. 
759 Section 151(1)(d) NWA. 
760 Section 151(2) NWA. 
761 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 233. 
762 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 232. 
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Surprisingly, a directive may be issued where a harmful activity is legally authorised.763 
Furthermore, a directive is applicable even where a harmful activity is not regulated, such as 
activities not listed under NEMA as requiring an environmental impact assessment.764 Finally, 
directives do not require litigation, thus are cost-effective and can be used in emergencies.765 
Due to its effectiveness as an enforcement measure, this discussion notes one disadvantage of 
directives. The fact that non-compliance under NEMA does not constitute a criminal offence 
may be viewed as a disadvantage.766 However, this limitation may be countered by either 
resorting to civil litigation to obtain an interdict or criminal litigation under the NWA.767 
2.2.2 Notices 
A compliance notice, as the name suggests, is a measure used to secure compliance from 
someone who has defaulted.768 The competent authority to issue compliance notices is a 
designated environmental management inspector (inspector).769 These notices are issued where 
the competent authority reasonably believes that a person has not complied with the law or a 
permit.770 The compliance notice must include details of the non-compliant act, measures that 
must be taken and the time within which they must be taken to achieve compliance.771 
Failure to heed a compliance notice constitutes a criminal offence that may lead to the 
withdrawal or amendment of the permit concerned.772 If the defaulting party fails to take the 
steps specified in the compliance notice, the competent authority may take the prescribed steps 
and recover the costs from the offender.773 
The law also provides for a notice to withdraw an authorisation.774 Where an activity is 
regulated by an authorisation and its conditions have been breached, a competent authority is 
empowered to give notice of the breach and that it should be remedied.775 A failure to remediate 
the breach may lead to withdrawal of the authorisation.776 A number of statutes in South 
763 Section 28(1) NEMA. 
764 GN R386 and GN R387 in Government Gazette 28753 of 21 April 2006. 
765 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 33. 
766 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 233. 
767 Summers ‘Common-law Remedies for Environmental Protection’ in Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement in South Africa (2009) 346; section 151(1)(d) NWA. 
768 Feris (2006) PELR 55. 
769 Section 31L NEMA. 
770 Section 31L(1) NEMA. 
771 Section 31L(2) NEMA. 
772 Section 31N NEMA. 
773 Section 31N(2)(b) NEMA. 
774 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 33. 
775 Section 54(3) NWA. 
776 Section 54(3) NWA. 
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African environmental law make provision for such power.777 One such provision is found in 
NEMA and provides for the withdrawal of an environmental authorisation.778 If an offender 
continues with the permitted activity, which is the subject of the withdrawn authorisation, an 
interdict may be sought against him.779 
Notices have been welcomed as an effective enforcement measure for environmental laws.780 
The benefit of using this measure is that it can be issued relatively fast by a designated 
inspector.781 However, inspectors can only issue notices in respect of conduct when so 
mandated by legislation.782 Legislators should therefore ensure the designation of inspectors in 
an array of legislation to ensure effective environmental enforcement.783 The designation 
should be accompanied by appropriate training and the will to secure compliance.784 
2.2.3 Administrative Penalties 
An administrative penalty is a monetary sanction that is imposed on a violator of environmental 
law, not by a court, but by an authorised official.785 It is a fairly new measure in the enforcement 
of environmental law in South Africa specifically.786 More generally, the Criminal Procedure 
Act has, for many years, made provision for the admission-of-guilt fine.787 NEMA recently 
introduced its own admission-of-guilt fine.788  
An administrative penalty is now available under NEMA in the form of an admission fine.789 
This measure is specifically available when a person unlawfully conducts a listed activity 
without an environmental authorisation then applies for rectification.790 The admission fine 
could cost the violator up to R5 million.791 The application to rectify the wrongful conduct and 
to be issued with an environmental authorisation may only be considered after the fine has been 
777 Section 54 NWA; see also section 28 Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998. 
778 Regulation 47 – 50 of GN R385 in Government Gazette 28753 of April 2006. 
779 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 36. 
780 Feris (2006) PELR 68. 
781 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 235. 
782 Section 31L read with section 31D NEMA empower inspectors to issue compliance notices in relation to 
conduct regulated under NEMA and all specific environmental management Acts which include the National 
Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003, the National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 and the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004. 
783 Feris (2006) PELR 63. 
784 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 235. 
785 Fourie (2009) SAJELP 93; Kidd (2002) SAJELP 36. 
786 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 237. 
787 Section 57 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
788 Section 34G NEMA. 
789 Section 24G(4) NEMA; see section 55A of the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996 which provides for an 
administrative fine. 
790 Section 24G(1) NEMA. 
791 Section 24G(4) NEMA 
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paid.792 Such a measure is a powerful disincentive to corporations intending on engaging in 
unlawful conduct.793 
There is an important between admission-of-guilt fines and admission fines. Unlike an 
admission fine, an admission-of-guilt fine is a criminal measure.794 The initial imposition of 
both fines is similar. As is the case for admission fines, the provisions for admission-of-guilt 
fines empower an authorised official to issue an accused with a summons to appear in court or 
pay a fine before a specified date.795 Resolving to pay the fine negates the need to appear in 
court.796  
The difference between the two aforementioned measures becomes evident when a 
contravention is disputed by the recipient of the fine.797 Where a contravention is disputed, the 
burden of proof differs.798 If an admission-of-guilt fine is disputed, the prosecution must prove 
the contravention beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal court.799 However, where an 
admission fine is disputed, the offender must prove his case using the appeal process provided 
for in NEMA.800 A disputed admission fine may also be taken on review if issuing it is shown 
to be an administrative action.801 
Administrative fines have been hailed as an effective and feasible measure to enforce 
compliance with environmental laws.802 Their obvious advantage is that they may be imposed 
by an authorised official without recourse to a court. Preference is given to them over criminal 
measures as they are said to be more cost effective and easier to impose.803 It can be argued 
that a disputed admission fine will require equal resources as an admission-of-guilt fine to be 
litigated.804 However, Kidd provides empirical evidence showing that administrative fines are 
imposed successfully more often than penalties through other measures because of their ease 
792 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 238. 
793 Winstanley ‘Administrative Measures’ Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 238. 
794 Fourie (2009) SAJELP 94. 
795 Section 57 read with section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
796 Section 57 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
797 Fourie (2009) SAJELP 94. 
798 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 38. 
799 Section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
800 Section 43 NEMA. 
801 J Glazewski, P Snijman & L Plit ‘Compliance with and Enforcement of Environmental Laws’ in J Glazewski 
Commentary on Environmental Law in South Africa 16; C Hoexter ‘Administrative Law in South Africa’ 2 ed 
(2012) 108. 
802 Fourie (2009) SAJELP 93. 
803 Fourie (2009) SAJELP 93. 
804 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 38. 
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of use.805 Their ease lies in that they are seldom disputed because they do not result in a criminal 
record for its recipients as is the case for an admission-of-guilt fine.806 When a dispute does 
arise, the burden of proof lies with the recipient of the fine, thus resulting in a lesser strain on 
authorised officials to litigate using already overburdened governmental resources.807  
Because an admission fine under NEMA is limited to R5 million, this measure should be 
reserved for relatively minor contraventions.808 Serious offences can be penalised with criminal 
measures which make provision for heftier fines between R5 million and R10 million.809  
3 Alternative Compliance and Enforcement Measures 
The One Environmental System contains several measures to ensure compliance.810 However, 
some measures have not been used to their full potential.811 The traditional command-and-
control measures discussed above have been criticised as  being misapplied or unduly relied 
on.812 Resultantly, alternative compliance and enforcement measures have been left unused 
because their practical application remains uncertain.813 The discussion below explores 
measures other than command-and-control and their potential to complement the traditional 
measures. 
A shift towards alternative measures is noticeable and can be ascribed to the inability of 
command-and-control measures to secure consistent compliance.814 The scope of this research 
does not permit a discussion of all the available alternative compliance and enforcement 
measures. The range of alternative measures is complex and dynamic, thus an attempt to 
explore all such measures will prove arbitrary.815 The following discussion is therefore limited 
805 M Kidd The Protection of the Environment through the Use of Criminal Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis 
with Specific Reference to South Africa (unpublished PhD Thesis, University of KwaZulu Natal, 2002) 291. 
806 Fourie (2009) SAJELP 93. 
807 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 37. 
808 Kidd Protection of the Environment 293. 
809 Section 49B NEMA; Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South 
Africa 243. 
810 A Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 296. 
811 Abbot Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation 4. 
812 JG Nel & JA Wessels ‘How to use Voluntary, Self-regulatory and Alternative Environmental Compliance 
Tools: Some Lessons Learnt’ (2010) 13 PELR 49; Chapter 4, part 2 of this dissertation. 
813 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 296. 
814 Nel & Wessels (2010) PELR 49. Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 58. 
815 Nel & Wessels (2010) PELR 50. 
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to voluntary compliance measures and incentive-based measures as South African policy-
makers have focused on these.816 
Compliance and enforcement measures are best understood as lying along a spectrum with 
command-and-control measures at one end and voluntary compliance measures at the other 
end.817 Half way between these two poles lies incentive-based measures.818 As already noted, 
command-and-control measures involve the prescription of laws that must be complied with 
and enforced by authorised officials.819 Voluntary compliance measures are set by industries 
using standards to achieve objectives that they have prescribed for themselves with little state 
involvement.820  Incentive-based measures aim to encourage compliance with laws and 
voluntary standards through motivation and reward, rather than relying on sanctions.821 
3.1 Voluntary Compliance Measures 
Voluntary compliance measures are those taken by corporations of their own free will to limit 
the harmful environmental impact of their businesses.822 Voluntary compliance measures are 
not required by law and operate with limited involvement from enforcement authorities.823 
These measures are governed by standards with which corporations may choose whether or not 
to comply.824 Non-compliance therewith does not trigger the imposition of a sanction.825 The 
effective implementation of voluntary compliance measures depends on the self-discipline of 
corporations to comply, thereby reducing the dependency on overburdened governmental 
resources for enforcement.826  
816 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 58; Nel & Wessels (2010) PELR 50; National Treasury ‘Draft 
Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market-based Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform 
in South Africa’ (2006) 70 available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/Draft%20Environmental%20Fiscal%20Reform%20Policy%20
Paper%206%20April%202006.pdf, accessed on 03 June 2019. 
817 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 298. 
818 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 298. 
819 Chapter 4, part 2 of this dissertation. 
820 C Hilson Regulating Pollution (2000) 105. 
821 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 58. 
822 K Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance 
and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 269. 
823 C Hilson Regulating Pollution (2000) 105. 
824 Nel & Wessels (2010) PELR 51. 
825 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
269. 
826 Hilson Regulating Pollution 105. 
79 
Voluntary compliance measures have gained increasing prominence in South Africa as they 
are said to be more cost-effective than command-and-control measures.827 Instead of relying 
on state resources to gather information and develop it into regulations that must be enforced, 
voluntary compliance measures use industry knowledge and resources.828 With that said, 
voluntary compliance measures complement traditional command-and-control measures.829 
“They cannot, and should not, replace” the traditional measures.830 
The most notable voluntary compliance measures are self-regulation and co-regulation.831 The 
use of these measures has been endorsed by researchers and policy-makers alike.832 However, 
concerns have been raised about their efficacy as a tool for environmental enforcement to the 
extent that they may divert some resources from, and thereby detract from the gains achieved 
by, traditional enforcement.833 The lack of compliance monitoring also raises questions on the 
merit of voluntary compliance measures with the result that environmental authorities revert to 
traditional command-and-control measures.834 The discussion below explores the use of 
various self-regulatory and co-regulatory measures as well as the arguments made for and 
against them. 
3.1.1 Self-regulatory Measures 
Self-regulatory measures are self-imposed practices that are formulated and implemented by 
industry without state intervention.835 Corporations adopt these measures to gain a competitive 
advantage and to be viewed positively in the market place.836 In response to these pressures, 
corporations opt to regulate themselves by formulating standards and codes of practice, 
827 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
269. 
828 J Hanks ‘Achieving Industrial Sustainable Development in South Africa: What Role for ‘Self-regulatory’ and 
Co-regulatory Instruments’ (1998) 5 SAJELP 317. 
829 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 60. 
830 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
269; Kidd (2002) SAJELP 26. 
831 Hanks (1998) SAJELP 317. 
832 C Coglianese & J Nash ‘Performance Track’s Postmortem: Lessons from the Rise and Fall of EPA’s Flagship 
Voluntary Program’ (2014) 38 Harvard Environmental Law Review 12; E Biber ‘Do Voluntary Compliance 
Programs Improve Environmental Law?’ 2015 Journal of the Things we Like 435. 
833 Coglianese & Nash (2014) Harvard Environmental Law Review 34. 
834 A Ogus ‘Rethinking Self-regulation’ (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 99; Craigie, Snijman & Fourie 
‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in 
South Africa 60. 
835 I Ayres & J Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992) 103; Ogus 
(1995) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 98.  
836 Hanks (1998) SAJELP 318. 
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establishing monitoring programs and setting pollution reduction targets to limit their impact 
on the environment.837  
Proponents of self-regulation do not propose that it replace command-and-control measures.838 
These measures are meant to supplement traditional enforcement.839 Ideally, self-regulatory 
measures should govern behaviour where traditional measures fail to do so.840 Therefore, self-
regulation requires that corporations choose to go beyond the minimum standards that are 
required by law.841 It does not suffice for corporations to declare that they are committed to 
limiting environmental harm, they must actually take measures to improve environmental 
protection.842 Among the self-regulatory measures that are taken by corporations are firm-
specific measures, industry-specific measures and non-industry-specific measures.843 These 
measures are discussed below. 
The most notable firm-specific measure is the environmental management system (EMS).844 
Corporations in South Africa are increasingly adopting EMSs voluntarily or as part of an 
undertaking in an industry-wide code of practice.845 More generally, management systems are 
used to facilitate the day-to-day activities of a business.846 The environmental component of a 
management system enables a corporation to assess and monitor the environmental impacts of 
its business.847 It also identifies the measures that can be used to reduce the corporation’s 
environmental impact, such as reducing carbon emissions and pollution as well as adopting 
837 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
275. 
838 N Gunningham ‘Enforcing Environmental Regulation’ (2011) 23 Journal of Environmental Law 176; Nel & 
Wessels (2010) PELR 54.  
839 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 26. 
840 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
275; Kidd (2002) SAJELP 26. 
841 Hanks (1998) SAJELP 318; Italicised for emphasis. 
842 Hanks (1998) SAJELP 319. 
843 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
276; ‘Firm’ refers to a corporation, such as a mining company.  
844 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 30. 
845 M Kidd ‘Environmental Audits and Self-incrimination’ (2004) 37 Comparative and International Law 
Journal of Southern Africa 90; Enviropaedia ‘Environmental Management Systems’ available at 
http://www.enviropaedia.com/topic/default.php?topic_id=98 accessed on 20 June 2019. 
846 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
276. 
847 BC Lesinski ‘Environmental Management System’ (2002) 20 Preventive Law Reporter 3; SL Carelse A System 
for Integrated Environmental Management in Local Authorities to Inform Departmental Decision-making: The 
Case of Hessequa Municipality (unpublished Masters in Public Administration, Stellenbosch University, 2016) 
32.
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sustainable practices.848 In essence, an EMS contains a corporation’s commitment to 
environmental protection and how that is to be fulfilled.849 
EMSs are gaining traction in South Africa and corporations are adopting them due to pressure 
from consumers and shareholders.850 Furthermore, EMSs are increasingly being made a 
precondition for membership in certain industry associations and certification schemes.851 
Reporting and auditing of environmental commitments and progress are important elements of 
an EMS.852 Corporations in energy-intensive industries account for the most environmental 
reporting because their environmental impacts are either greater or more noticeable than those 
in other industries.853 
Industry-specific codes of environmental practice are the most commonly used for self-
regulation.854 Their use is motivated by the fact that the reputation of an entire industry may be 
tainted by the activities of one company in the industry.855 This is the case for industries in 
which consumers cannot easily distinguish the products of specific companies and the 
environmental impact of their activities, such as in the mining industry.856  The South African 
Mineral Reporting Codes are an example of industry-specific codes.857 
In addition to the two aforementioned categories of self-regulation, there are non-industry-
specific measures.858 These measures are adopted voluntarily and encourage the improvement 
of environmental practices.859 The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) has 
developed one such measure, which is operated together with the South African Bureau of 
848 Lesinski (2002) Preventive Law Reporter 3. 
849 Lesinski (2002) Preventive Law Reporter 3. 
850 M Kidd (2004) Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 90. 
851 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 328. 
852 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
277; For example, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange has formulated its own reporting standard called the 
FTSE/JSE Responsible Investment Index Series to promote corporate sustainability practices on environmental, 
social and governance matters. As of June 2018, 76 companies had been rated on the index. (available at 
https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSEIndexReviewItems/2018%20ESG%20Model%20Enhancements/ESG%20mo
del%20update_roadshow%20presentation_Sept%202018_pdf.pdf accessed on 20 June 2019).  
853 CJ de Villiers & DS Lubbe ‘Industry Differences in respect of Corporate Environmental Reporting in South 
Africa: A Research Note’ (2001) 9 Meditari Accountancy Research 81. 
854 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
277. 
855 MJ Lenox & J Nash ‘Industry Self-regulation and Adverse Selection: A Comparison Across Four Trade 
Association Programs’ (2003) 12 Business Strategy and the Environment 344.  
856 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
278.  
857 SAMCODES Standards Committee ‘About SAMCODES’ available at https://www.samcode.co.za/samcode-
ssc/about-samcodes accessed on 20 June 2019. 
858 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
280. 
859 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 30. 
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Standards (SABS).860 The ISO 14001 is a general standard that may be adopted by all 
corporations in all industries for improved environmental performance.861 To receive ISO 
14001 certification, a company must adopt an EMS that conforms to the ISO guidelines.862 The 
EMS must state the company’s current environmental impacts and how it intends on reducing 
the impact.863 Companies in South Africa are increasingly committing to reduce environmental 
impacts through ISO 14001 certification.864 However, the positive impact of ISO certification 
on the environment remains limited in that the certification is largely based on reporting by 
companies as opposed to audits by third parties.865 In this regard, the government has a potential 
role to play in encouraging the adoption of auditable EMSs to improve environmental 
performance with reduced government inspections.866  
3.1.2 Co-regulatory Measures 
Co-regulatory measures operate when the “interactive relationship between the government 
and industry is particularly close.”867 Generally, the environmental standards are determined 
by the government and the means to complying with the standards are set by the regulated 
industry.868 Co-regulation is considered to be a satisfactory compromise between traditional 
regulation and self-regulation.869 In essence, it appreciates the shortfalls and benefits of both 
self-regulation and traditional command-and-control measures in environmental 
enforcement.870 In contrast to self-regulation, which has no state involvement, co-regulation 
involves enforcement authorities soliciting compliance with the rules set.871 Unlike formal 
860 DAJ Taylor ‘Is ISO 14001 Standardization in Tune with Sustainable Development? Symphony or Cacophony?’ 
(1998) 13 Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 526; International Organisation for Standardisation ‘ISO 
14000 Family – Environmental Management’ available at https://www.iso.org/iso-14001-environmental-
management.html accessed 10 June 2019; South African Bureau of Standards ‘Environmental Management 
Services’ available at https://www.sabs.co.za/Sectors-and-Services/Services/EMS/ems_seriesofstandards.asp 
accessed 10 June 2019. 
861 Taylor (1998) Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 518. 
862 L Pinckard ‘ISO 14000 – Trade and Environment’ (1996) 8 Colorado Journal of International Environmental 
Law and Policy 40. 
863 C Mikulich ‘ISO 14000 – 14001, The Developing World’s Perspective’ (2003) 17 Tulane Environmental Law 
Journal 134; Taylor (1998) Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 519. 
864 Hanks (1998) SAJELP 321; Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement in South Africa 281. 
865 Taylor (1998) Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 524. 
866 Hanks (1998) SAJELP 321. 
867 L Csink & A Mayer ‘How to Regulate? The Role of Self-regulation and Co-regulation’ 2014 Hungarian 
Yearbook of International Law and European Law 405. 
868 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 29. 
869 Csink & Mayer 2014 Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law 406. 
870 Hanks (1998) SAJELP 323. 
871 Csink & Mayer 2014 Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law 405. 
83 
regulation, co-regulation allows industries to determine the most cost-effective way of 
complying with legal environmental standards.872 
Although co-regulatory measures take different forms, the most commonly used is the 
negotiated agreement.873 The most notable negotiated agreement in the One Environmental 
System lies in section 35 of NEMA.874 This section provides for environmental management 
cooperation agreements (EMCA) between government, industry and other interested parties.875 
The purpose of this measure is to promote cooperative environmental governance through 
intragovernmental cooperation and public participation.876 Although the contents of an EMCA 
are determined by the parties to the agreement, NEMA sets out a few guidelines that may be 
adopted.877 NEMA provides that an EMCA may be adopted to improve the legal standards that 
exist for environmental protection.878 In addition, the EMCA may set compliance targets, 
incentives and even penalties for non-compliance.879 
In theory, the NEMA EMCA has the potential to promote effective environmental compliance 
and enforcement.880 The use of the technical knowledge and resources of industry in 
partnership with environmental authorities could ensure that environmental issues are resolved 
in a pragmatic way.881 EMCAs are also capable of achieving their primary objective of 
cooperative environmental governance.882 In practice however, there is little optimism about 
the effectiveness of EMCAs to fulfil its intended purpose.883 The provisions of section 35 have 
been criticised for being convoluted and placing onerous obligations on the parties to such 
agreements.884 The cumbersome obligations in section 35 have led to a situation where such 
872 Hanks (1998) SAJELP 323. 
873 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
283. 
874 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 30; for a detailed discussion of environmental management cooperation agreements see 
W Scholtz ‘Co-operative and Participatory Governance via the Implementation of Environmental Management 
Co-Operation Agreements’ (2004) 11 SAJELP; GV Seekoe The Environmental Management Cooperation 
Agreement as a Co-Operative Environmental Governance Tool in a Segmented Environmental Administration 
(unpublished LLM Thesis, North West University, 2017). 
875 Section 35(1) NEMA. 
876 Section 35(1) NEMA read with section 2(b) NEMA and the long title of NEMA. The concept of cooperative 
environmental governance is explored more extensively in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
877 Section 35(1) NEMA. 
878 Section 35(3)(a) NEMA. 
879 Section 35(3)(d) NEMA. 
880 Scholtz (2004) SAJELP 184. 
881 Scholtz (2004) SAJELP 194. 
882 Seekoe The Environmental Management Cooperation Agreement 36. 
883 Seekoe The Environmental Management Cooperation Agreement 63; Scholtz (2004) SAJELP 192. 
884 Scholtz (2004) SAJELP 192; Seekoe The Environmental Management Cooperation Agreement 37 for a critique 
of section 35. 
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negotiated agreements are rarely concluded in South Africa.885 A revision of section 35 would 
better achieve the desired outcome of co-operative environmental governance.886 
3.2 Incentive-based Measures 
Incentive-based measures are based on the principle that it is more effective and efficient to 
encourage and reward compliance than to sanction non-compliance.887 These measures are 
either positive or negative in nature.888 Positive measures reward the conduct of those that 
minimise their impact on the environment by taking measures to protect the environment.889 
Conversely, negative measures are disincentives that prescribe costs to discourage conduct that 
is harmful to the environment.890 The range of available incentive-based measures includes 
market-based incentives, regulatory incentives and information-based incentives.891 The latter 
two incentives are seldom used in South Africa; thus, their discussion below is limited.892  
3.2.1 Market-based Incentives 
In the context of environmental law, market-based incentives are used to drive changes in the 
behaviour of market players (industries, consumers and investors) whose activities may cause 
harm to the environment.893 The underlying philosophy of these incentives is that ordinary 
markets generally value goods and services accurately.894 A market failure, therefore, occurs 
when the price of products does not accurately reflect the cost of production because certain 
externalities are not included in the costs.895 Externalities include all forms of pollution that 
arise from the production and consumption of products.896 A market failure warrants state 
intervention to influence industries to use natural resources more efficiently and to reduce the 
impact of externalities.897 To cure market failures, the government uses market-based 
885 Seekoe The Environmental Management Cooperation Agreement 60. 
886 Scholtz (2004) SAJELP 194; Seekoe The Environmental Management Cooperation Agreement recommend the 
form of revision that section 35 should take. 
887 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 58. 
888 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 58. 
889 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 300. 
890 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 300. 
891 Abbot Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation 4. 
892 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 58. 
893 PGW Henderson ‘Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection – Introduction’ (1994) 1 SAJELP 49. 
894 TC Schelling Incentives for Environmental Protection (1983) 1. 
895 PGW Henderson ‘Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection – Conceptual Framework’ (1995) 1 SAJELP 
56; Schelling Incentives for Environmental Protection 14; Henderson (1994) SAJELP 50. 
896 Schelling Incentives for Environmental Protection 15. 
897 National Treasury ‘Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market-based Instruments to Support 
Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa’ (2006) 41; Henderson (1995) 1 SAJELP 57. 
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incentives, also known as economic measures, to manipulate the cost of production to include 
externalities.898  
The aim of market-based incentives is to influence industries to internalise the environmental 
costs that are usually not considered in an ordinary market.899 In addition, they seek to promote 
the efficient use and management of natural resources and to raise revenue for the country to 
fund environmental protection.900 There are positive market-based incentives that reward 
efficient and sustainable activities and those that are negative in nature in that they discourage 
inefficient and unsustainable activities.901  
The use of market-based incentives in South Africa has grown steadily over the past three 
decades.902 Varying market-based incentives have been developed, however, the discussion 
below is limited to the carbon tax as it is one of the only economic measures with explicit 
environmental objectives.903 Many economic measures are primarily intended to increase 
revenue, with environmental protection as only an incidental outcome.904 Although introduced 
in June 2019, much debate already surrounds the carbon tax as an effective environmental 
enforcement measure.905 
Market-based incentives have been expanded through the Carbon Tax Act to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to the earth’s climate change.906 The Act aims to 
reduce emissions in a sustainable and affordable manner by imposing a carbon tax on certain 
industries such as mining and energy (especially, electricity generation).907 The carbon tax 
applies to all emissions produced by taxpayers via industrial processes and the burning of  fossil 
fuels.908  
898 Henderson (1994) SAJELP 51. 
899 Henderson (1994) SAJELP 51. 
900 PGW Henderson ‘Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection – The Way Forward’ (1995) 2 SAJELP 151. 
901 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 300.  
902 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 299. 
903 A Nahman, L Godfrey & R Wise ‘Market-based Incentives in South Africa’ (2008) 108 WIT Transactions on 
Ecology and the Environment 140; Henderson (1995) 2 SAJELP 151. 
904 National Treasury ‘Draft Policy Paper: A Framework for Considering Market-based Instruments to Support 
Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa’ (2006) 70 sets out various economic measures and their objectives. 
905 R De Jager ‘The Potential Implications of Introducing a Carbon Tax in South Africa’ (2018) 4 Journal of 
Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 88; T Toriola ‘A Blind Commitment or Strategic Approach’ (2015) 
15 Without Prejudice 66; E Stoddard ‘South Africa’s Carbon Tax Raises Questions and Hot Air’ Daily Maverick 
3 June 2019, available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-06-03-south-africas-carbon-tax-raises-
questions-and-hot-air/, accessed on 06 June 2019. 
906 Preamble of the Carbon Tax Act 15 of 2019. 
907 Section 3 read with Schedule 2 of the Carbon Tax Act 15 of 2019. 
908 Section 4 of the Carbon Tax Act 15 of 2019. 
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The taxpayer is liable for monitoring and reporting its emissions activities, which are verified 
by the DEFF.909 Once the emissions have been recorded and verified, the taxpayer is 
responsible for calculating and paying the carbon tax to the South African Revenue Service.910 
Essentially, the administration of the carbon tax requires an alignment of implementation 
processes of the DEFF and the South African Revenue Service. Provision for this arrangement 
has been set up to ensure the effective implementation of the Carbon Tax Act.911 
The carbon tax is based on the polluter-pays principle, which encourages industries to 
internalise the environmental costs of production and for investors and consumers to consider 
the externalities of industries with which they engage.912 The carbon tax is a negative economic 
measure in that it discourages the emission of greenhouse gases by imposing a tax.913 The 
Carbon Tax Act also provides for positive economic measures in the form of several tax-free 
emission allowances.914 Allowances are designed to reduce the taxpayer’s liability for the 
carbon tax.915 One such allowance is the carbon budget, which reduces tax liability when an 
emitter’s total emissions are below a stipulated limit (the budget).916 The carbon offset 
allowance provides flexibility in that it allows an emitter to choose between reducing its own 
emissions or funding a carbon offset project to reduce the country’s overall emissions.917 An 
emitter’s carbon tax liability may only be reduced through allowances by a total of 95 
percent.918 
Despite its good intentions, the carbon tax has not been well received.919 It is projected that the 
carbon tax will negatively impact the economy by causing a decrease in South Africa’s growth 
domestic product (GDP).920 South Africa, as a developing country, cannot afford even the 
909 Regulation 7 – 11 of GN 275 in Government Gazette 40762 of April 2017. 
910 Section 54AA of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964; Section 1 of the Customs and Excise Amendment 
Act 13 of 2019;  
911 National Treasury ‘Explanatory Memorandum for the Carbon Tax Bill’ (2018) available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2018/2018112101%20Explanatory%20Memorandum%20to%2
0the%202018%20Carbon%20Tax%20Bill%20-%2020%20Nov%202018.pdf, accessed 03 June 2019. 
912 Henderson (1995) 1 SAJELP 60. 
913 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 302. 
914 Chapter II of the Carbon Tax Act 15 of 2019. 
915 Section 1 of the Carbon Tax Act 15 of 2019. 
916 Section 12 of the Carbon Tax Act 15 of 2019. 
917 Section 13 of the Carbon Tax Act 15 of 2019. 
918 Section 14 of the Carbon Tax Act 15 of 2019. 
919 De Jager (2018) Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 116; Stoddard ‘South Africa’s Carbon 
Tax Raises Questions and Hot Air’ Daily Maverick 3 June 2019. 
920 B Merven, A Moyo, A Stone et al ‘Socio-economic Implications of Mitigation in the Power Sector Including 
Carbon taxes in South Africa’ (2014) Working paper for CDKN Project on Linking Sectoral and economy-wide 
models by the Energy Research Centre at the University of Cape Town available at 
https://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/16897 accessed 03 June 2019; T Callen ‘Gross Domestic Product: An 
Economy’s All’ International Monetary Fund 18 December 2018, available at 
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slightest drop in GDP as a result of the carbon tax.921 A World Bank report, which reviews the 
impact of carbon taxes in various jurisdictions over three decades, cautions the use of carbon 
taxes as they have been reported to cause overall economic loss.922 Of all the industries 
responsible for emissions in South Africa, the mining and metals industries are likely to be the 
most negatively affected due to an increase in electricity prices.923 Therefore, the Minerals 
Council, which represents the mining industry, expressed its disapproval of the tax as it will 
increase the costs of doing business, thus undermining employment levels and possible job 
creation.924  
Regarding its environmental impact, critics argue that the carbon tax is an inefficient tool for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.925 Studies show that the carbon tax is unlikely to motivate 
industries that are high emitters to reduce their emissions.926 The energy industry, for instance, 
accounts for 60 percent of the country’s total emissions.927 The low rates of the carbon tax are 
said to be insufficient to incentivise the energy industry to switch to less carbon-intensive 
means of generating electricity.928 It will be more cost effective for the energy industry to 
continue generating electricity and paying the tax than to take measures to reduce emissions.929 
Ultimately, the carbon tax is expected not to achieve its primary goal of reducing emissions.930 
Although proponents of the carbon tax argue that the tax does not sufficiently motivate 
environmental protection, they acknowledge it as a stepping stone to reducing greenhouse gas 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/gdp.htm, accessed 04 June 2019  defines Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) as a country’s overall economic activity. It refers to the monetary value of all goods and services 
consumed in a country over a certain period. 
921 I Laprecht ‘Study Suggests Carbon Tax will have Modest Growth Impact’ Moneyweb 11 November 2016 
available at https://www.moneyweb.co.za/mymoney/moneyweb-tax/study-suggests-carbon-tax-will-have-
modest-growth-impact/ accessed 03 June 2019. 
922 GR Timilsinis ‘Where is the Carbon Tax after Thirty Years of Research?’ (2018) World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 8493 at 26 available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/209041530236682559/Where-
is-the-carbon-tax-after-thirty-years-of-research accessed 03 June 2019. 
923 De Jager (2018) Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 101. 
924 Stoddard ‘South Africa’s Carbon Tax Raises Questions and Hot Air’ Daily Maverick 3 June 2019. 
925 De Jager (2018) Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 104; Stoddard ‘South Africa’s Carbon 
Tax Raises Questions and Hot Air’ Daily Maverick 3 June 2019. 
926 L Baker, J Burton, C Godhino et al ‘The Political Economy of Decarbonisation: Exploring the Dynamics of 
South Africa’s Electricity Sector’ (2015) Research Report by the Energy Research Centre at the University of 
Cape Town 48 available at http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/119/Papers-2015/15-
Baker-etal-Political_economy_decarbonisation.pdf accessed 03 June 2019. 
927 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) ‘Greenhouse Gas Emissions in South Africa’ 1 
available at https://www.climatelinks.org/resources/greenhouse-gas-emissions-factsheet-south-africa, accessed 
03 June 2019. 
928 De Jager (2018) Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 106. 
929 Department of Energy ‘Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity 2010 – 2030 Update Report’ 21 available at 
http://www.energy.gov.za/IRP/irp%20files/IRP2010_2030_Final_Report_20110325.pdf, accessed 03 June 2019. 
930 Timilsinis ‘Where is the Carbon Tax after Thirty Years of Research?’ (2018) World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 8493 at 57.  
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emissions.931 Researchers at the University of Cape Town propose that the tax revenue 
generated from the carbon tax be used to advance socio-economic causes such as education, 
housing and the installation of solar energy on government-funded housing.932 These 
approaches have been adopted in Switzerland and Chile.933 
Given that the carbon tax has been criticised as an ineffective and unnecessary measure to 
mitigate climate change and improve the economy, alternative measures should be 
considered.934 One such alternative is the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer’s 
Procurement Programme (the REIPPPP).935 Through the REIPPP, the country intends on 
increasing electricity generation through renewable energy.936 The program has been hailed as 
a success thus far and has been lauded for significantly reducing emission to a much greater 
extent than the carbon tax would and for increasing investments into the country.937 Instead of 
implementing the carbon tax, it seems more plausible for the government to promote the 
REIPPP.938  
The ultimate impact of implementing the carbon tax remains uncertain.939 Therefore, the 
Treasury has committed to reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of the tax after three 
years to determine whether the tax achieves its primary aim of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.940 To ensure that compliance with the Carbon Tax Act is achieved, the relevant 
authorities must ensure its effective implementation and enforcement.  
3.2.2 Regulatory Incentives  
Regulatory incentives encourage industries and consumers to do more than the law requires.941 
Industries that display high levels of environmental protection are rewarded with a reduction 
931 The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) ‘The Carbon Tax 2019 Explained’ available at 
https://www.wwf.org.za/our_news/news/?28421/The-Carbon-Tax-2019-explained accessed 03 June 2019. 
932 H Winkler ‘Reducing Energy Poverty through Carbon Tax Revenues in South Africa’ (2017) 28 Journal of 
Energy in Southern Africa 17. 
933 GR Timilsinis ‘Where is the Carbon Tax after Thirty Years of Research?’ (2018) World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 8493 at 51. 
934 De Jager (2018) Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 116. 
935 Baker, Burton, Godhino et al ‘The Political Economy of Decarbonisation: Exploring the Dynamics of South 
Africa’s Electricity Sector’ (2015) Research Report by the Energy Research Centre at the University of Cape 
Town 9. 
936 Baker, Burton, Godhino et al ‘The Political Economy of Decarbonisation: Exploring the Dynamics of South 
Africa’s Electricity Sector’ (2015) Research Report by the Energy Research Centre at the University of Cape 
Town 9. 
937 De Jager (2018) Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 112. 
938 De Jager (2018) Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 116. 
939 Stoddard ‘South Africa’s Carbon Tax Raises Questions and Hot Air’ Daily Maverick 3 June 2019. 
940 National Treasury ‘Media Statement – Publication of the 2019 Carbon Tax Act’ available at 
https://www.gov.za/speeches/publication-2019-carbon-tax-act-26-may-2019-0000 accessed 06 June 2019. 
941 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 304. 
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in regulatory responsibilities.942 The underlying premise of regulatory incentives is that 
incentivising voluntary environmental compliance may reduce the administrative compliance 
and enforcement burdens and costs for both enforcement authorities and those subject to 
regulation.943 Regulatory incentives are likened to self-regulation and include reduced 
reporting requirements, fewer inspections and expedited authorisation procedures.944 
South Africa currently has no regulatory incentives in use.945 The absence of these measures 
lends itself to several reasons, which include the over-reliance on formal regulation and 
command-and-control measures.946 Policy-makers and enforcement authorities are also quite 
sceptical of voluntary industry practices.947 Introduction of these measures is also likely to be 
a burden, although minuscule, on the resources and capacity of enforcement authorities.948  
The absence of regulatory incentives is alarming, however, given the recent shift in government 
policies towards including alternative compliance and enforcement measures.949 Arguments in 
favour of regulatory incentives emphasise their potential to encourage environmental 
protection.950 Although tempting, the government should exercise caution when considering 
introducing these measures by taking into account the burden on governmental resources and 
whether corporations are willing to participate in the proposed incentive schemes.951  
3.2.3 Information-based Incentives 
Information-based incentives are used to influence the behaviour of industries and “consumers 
through the collection and public distribution of information relating to the environmental 
performance of industries.”952 These measures take different forms, which include 
environmental certification, performance and compliance reporting as well as eco-labelling.953 
942 K Wilke What is in it for me: Exploring Natural Capital Incentives (2005) 6. 
943 WRQ Anton, G Deltas & M Khanna ‘Incentives for Environmental Self-regulation and implications for 
environmental performance’ (2003) 48 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 635. 
944 Anton et al (2003) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 633. 
945 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 327. 
946 W Scholtz ‘Introduction of Environmental Management Co-operation Agreements in South Africa’ (2004) 11 
SAJELP 38. 
947 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 327. 
948 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 327. 
949 Scholtz (2004) SAJELP 38. 
950 Scholtz (2004) SAJELP 39. 
951 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 327. 
952 Wilke What is in it for me: Exploring Natural Capital Incentives (2005) 14. 
953 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 298. 
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Environmental certification schemes allow industries to join schemes voluntarily in 
anticipation of securing a market advantage.954 There are international schemes of this nature 
that were developed to acknowledge and encourage environmentally sustainable 
investments.955 In South Africa, however, they are of very limited use.956 If their use expanded, 
the certification could be made a pre-requisite for procuring lucrative government tenders.957 
However, due care should be taken before expanding their use as they have garnered 
international and domestic criticism for being an inefficient means of securing voluntary 
environmental compliance.958   
Performance and compliance reporting is becoming more common in South Africa.959 
Legislation  aimed at environmental protection is increasingly making provision for such 
reporting as seen in the Carbon Tax Act.960 Reports are submitted to the relevant environmental 
authorities.961 There are processes that allow the general public to access such information,962 
however express provision for the public disclosure and analysis of these reports may 
encourage corporations to perform and report better.963 
Finally, the use of eco-labelling schemes in South Africa is on the increase as evident in the 
pollution and waste management legislation .964 This incentive encourages the production and 
consumption of products that display their environmental attributes.965 The display of such 
954 PA Moyo ‘Private Certification versus Public Certification in the International Environmental Arena: The 
Marine Stewardship Council and Marine Eco-label Fisheries Certification Schemes as Case Studies’ (2010) 43 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 539. 
955 International Organisation for Standardisation ‘ISO 14000 Family – Environmental Management’ available at 
https://www.iso.org/iso-14001-environmental-management.html accessed 10 June 2019 refers to the ISO 14001 
accredited certificate for environmental performance. 
956 Green Africa Directory ‘Green Certifications’ available at 
http://www.greenafricadirectory.org/resources/green-certifications/ accessed 10 June 2019, lists a number of 
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959 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism ‘Integrated Environmental Management Information 
Series 17 Environmental Reporting’ (2005) 5 available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/documents/strategies/integrated_environmentalmanagement_eim accessed 06 
June 2019. 
960 Regulation 7 of GN 275 in Government Gazette 40762 of April 2017. 
961 Regulation 11 of GN 275 in Government Gazette 40762 of April 2017 provides that reports detailing carbon 
emissions must be verified and validated by the Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries. 
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963 R Hillary ‘Environmental Auditing: Concepts, Methods and Developments’ (1998) 2 International Journal of 
Auditing 75. 
964 E van Zyl The Regulation of Eco-labelling in South Africa: A Comparative Analysis (unpublished LLM Thesis, 
Northwest University, 2004) 11; section 53(h) of the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 
of 2004; section 18(2) & section 16(1)(r) of the National Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008. 
965 C Tietjie ‘Voluntary Eco-labelling programmes and Questions of State Programmes and Questions of State 
Responsibility in the WTO/GATT Legal System’ (1995) 29 Journal of World Trade 123. 
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information on products can either encourage or discourage public support for a certain labelled 
product.966 Eco-labelling can be an effective enforcement tool in that it can be used to determine 
access into local and international markets, thus promoting sustainable production processes.967 
4 Conclusion 
The optimal selection and use of the measures explored are necessary to achieve the effective 
and efficient enforcement of the One Environmental System.968 Command-and-control 
measures are the most commonly used measures.969 Despite the status quo, critics argue that 
these measures, especially criminal sanctions, should be reserved for grave offences as 
enforcing them is resource and capacity intensive given that litigation is required.970 Criminal 
fines, for instance, are designed for serious offences, as they range between R5 million and 
R10 million.971  
Administrative measures are available for offences that are less serious than criminal 
offences.972 The administrative fine, for instance, may be imposed for environmental damage 
up to R5 million.973 Administrative measures have been hailed as highly effective because, 
unlike criminal measures, they do not impose heavily on governmental resources in that they 
are implemented by authorised officials and not by courts.974 Furthermore, authorities that 
enforce administrative measures have the expertise to secure compliance with relevant 
environmental laws in a specific manner that non-specialist courts would not be equipped to.975 
Despite their important role in enforcement, command-and-control measures are unable to 
secure compliance with laws consistently due to resource and capacity constraints.976 
Resultantly, policy-makers are shifting towards alternative measures to complement command-
966 A Bradbrook ‘Eco-labelling: Lessons from the Energy Sector’ (1996) 18 Adelaide Law Review 35. 
967 CC Erskine & L Collins ‘Eco-labelling: Success or Failure’ (1997) 17 The Environmentalist 126. 
968 Du Plessis & Nel ‘Driving Compliance to and Enforcement of South African Legislation by Means of a Hybrid 
of “New” Environmental Governance Instruments in L Paddock et al Compliance and Enforcement in 
Environmental Law: Toward More Effective Implementation’ (2011) 263; Nel & Wessels (2010) PELR 54; Kidd 
(2002) SAJELP 26. 
969 Kidd Environmental Law 268. 
970 Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 243. 
971 Section 49B NEMA. 
972 Fourie (2009) SAJELP 117. 
973 Section 24G(4) NEMA 
974 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 56. 
975 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 33. 
976 A Paterson & LJ Kotze ‘Towards a More Effective Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Regime for 
South Africa’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal 
Perspectives (2009) 377; Kidd (1998) SAJELP 189. 
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and-control measures.977 These measures “cannot, and should not, replace” the traditional 
measures.978 There are multiple voluntary compliance measures, such as EMSs and negotiated 
agreements, that can be used to supplement the traditional measures.979 Their voluntary nature 
makes them an attractive tool for environmental enforcement because they do not impose a 
heavy burden on government resources.980  The expansion of these measures should, however, 
be done with caution because they do not always achieve their intended outcome.981 The main 
reason for this anomaly is that voluntary measures often lack governmental oversight, 
transparency, legitimacy and accountability.982 This oddity can be overcome by requiring 
reports and increasing the oversight of compliance with voluntary measures.983 
Incentive-based measures have been expanded to supplement command-and-control measures, 
as seen with the introduction of the carbon tax.984 The purpose of the carbon tax to cure market 
failures and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is commendable.985 However, the projections 
of its success are not promising.986 Perhaps an appropriate alternative to the carbon tax is to 
promote the use of renewable energy.987 
The structure and enforcement of the aforementioned measures can be complex.988 Therefore, 
it is important that enforcement authorities consider the appropriateness of each measure in 
relation to the harm caused and the impact of enforcing such a measure.989 The effective 
enforcement of these measures will require the varying enforcement authorities to work 
together as mandated by the principle of cooperative environmental governance in NEMA.990 
This concept is explored in the following chapter. 
977 Nel & Wessels (2010) PELR 49. 
978 Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 
269; Kidd (2002) SAJELP 26. 
979 Paterson & Kotze ‘Towards a More Effective Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Regime for South 
Africa’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 377. 
980 Hilson Regulating Pollution 105. 
981 Ogus (1995) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 99. 
982 Paterson & Kotze ‘Towards a More Effective Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Regime for South 
Africa’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 377. 
983 Hanks (1998) SAJELP 321. 
984 Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 299. 
985 Henderson (1995) 1 SAJELP 151. 
986 De Jager (2018) Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 116; Stoddard ‘South Africa’s Carbon 
Tax Raises Questions and Hot Air’ Daily Maverick 3 June 2019. 
987 De Jager (2018) Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 116. 
988 Paterson & Kotze ‘Towards a More Effective Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Regime for South 
Africa’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 377. 
989 Paterson & Kotze ‘Towards a More Effective Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Regime for South 
Africa’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 377. 
990 NEMA Long Title.  
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Chapter 5:  
Recommendations:  
Cooperative Environmental Governance 
1 Introduction 
This research finds that weak intragovernmental cooperation is a significant threat to the 
effective implementation, that is the regulation and enforcement, of the One Environmental 
System.991 The effective implementation of the One Environmental System requires 
cooperation from the Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries (DEFF), Department 
of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) and the Department of Housing, Water and 
Sanitation (DHWS) along with provincial and local government.992 The Constitution provides 
for cooperative governance.993 Cooperative governance is then tailored to environmental 
management in NEMA’s provision for cooperative environmental governance.994  
The narrow scope of this research does not permit an extensive engagement with the vast 
literature on cooperative governance and its application to environmental matters.995 
Nevertheless, this chapter identifies cooperative environmental governance as a mechanism to 
991 Chapter 2 of this dissertation; Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources and Energy Research Unit Mineral 
Resources: Note after the Colloquium on the One Environmental System (2019) unpublished parliamentary 
document presented at the Colloquium on the One Environmental System convened by the Portfolio Committee 
on Environmental Affairs at the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 20 November 2018 (copy on file with 
author) 15. 
992 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings on the Underlying Socio-economic Challenges 
of Mining-affected Communities in South Africa (2016) at 45 available at 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/SAHRC%20Mining%20communities%20report%20FINAL.pdf 
accessed 17 February 2018. 
993 Chapter 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
994 Long title & Chapter 3 of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (hereinafter NEMA). 
995 See W Du Plessis ‘Legal Mechanisms for Co-operative Governance in South Africa: Successes and Failures’ 
(2008) 23 SA Public Law; LJ Kotze, JG Nel, W Du Plessis et al ‘Strategies to Integrate Policy at the Operational 
Level: Towards an Integrated Framework for Environmental Authorisation’ (2007) 14 SAJELP; C Bosman, L 
Kotze & W Du Pluessis ‘The Failure of the Constitution to Ensure Integrated Environmental Management from 
a Co-operative Governance Perspective’ (2004) 19 SA Public Law; EJ Nealer & M Naude ‘Integrated Co-
operative Governance in the Context of Sustainable Development’ (2011) 7 The Journal for Transdisciplinary 
Research in Southern Africa; J Nel & W Du Plessis ‘Unpacking Integrated Environmental Management – A Step 
Closer to Effective Co-operative Governance?’ (2004) 19 SA Public Law; T Coetzee ‘Co-operative Governance 
and Good Governance: Reality or Myth?’ (2010) 35 Journal for Contemporary History; LP Malan’ C-operative 
Environmental Management: The Applicability of the Multi-dimensional Model’ (2009) 44 Journal of Public 
Administration; L Malan ‘Intergovernmental Relations and Co-operative Government in South Africa: The Ten-
year Review’ (2005) 24 Politeia.  
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address the challenges faced in enforcing the One Environmental System.996 For the 
cooperative efforts to be effective, each of the three national departments, along with their 
provincial and local functionaries, must perform their respective duties.997 
2 Cooperative Environmental Governance 
To define cooperative environmental governance, an understanding of cooperative governance 
is required.998 Cooperative governance is defined as the state of all spheres of government, 
namely national, provincial and local government, working together to ensure an effective, 
efficient, transparent, accountable and coherent government.999 It is an essential mechanism for 
dealing with intragovernmental fragmentation and is an indispensable part of South Africa’s 
environmental regime.1000  
Cooperative governance in the context of environmental management is called cooperative 
environmental governance.1001 Cooperative environmental governance is defined as the 
integration of different spheres of government and line functionaries, such as departments, to 
maintain a sustainable environment.1002 The integration extends to industries and the public.1003 
The Constitution provides for cooperative environmental governance, as part of the broader 
cooperative governance obligation, in Chapter three.1004 This chapter requires the national, 
provincial and local spheres of government to perform varying functions that are unique to 
each sphere.1005 These distinct government functions should, however, be executed in 
accordance with the principles of cooperative governance outlined in chapter three.1006 
Intragovernmental cooperation entails exercising designated powers in a manner that does 
encroach on the integrity of other spheres, not assuming any power except those designated 
996 LJ Kotze ‘Environmental Governance’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 121 proposes cooperative environmental governance as 
a solution for fragmentation within government. 
997 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 13. 
998 Kotze ‘Environmental Governance’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 121. 
999 CL van Schalkwyk A Legal Perspective on the Role of Municipalities in Navigating the Relationship between 
Land Use Planning and Mining (unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2019) 23; Coetzee (2010) 
Journal for Contemporary History 86.  
1000 Kotze ‘Environmental Governance’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 121. 
1001 E Bray ‘Co-operative Governance in the Context of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 
1998’ (1999) 6 SAJELP 2; Du Plessis (2008) SA Public Law 108; Kotze ‘Environmental Governance’ in 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 121. 
1002 Bray (1999) SAJELP 2. 
1003 Kotze ‘Environmental Governance’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 121. 
1004 Chapter 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
1005 Section 41(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
1006 Section 41 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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and cooperating with one another in “mutual trust and good faith.”1007 These principles advance 
the effective operation of cooperative environmental governance.1008 Although each sphere and 
government department exists as an autonomous entity with unique mandates, they must 
function in a cooperative manner with one another.1009 
The remedy for intragovernmental fragmentation lies in the National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA), the Act that establishes the One Environmental System for 
mining.1010 NEMA states its purpose immediately as being, among others, to provide for 
cooperative environmental governance.1011 It establishes various institutions and procedures to 
achieve this end.1012 These include the Committee for Environmental Coordination, 
environmental management and implementation plans as well as environmental management 
cooperation agreements.1013 
In the context of national government cooperating with local and provincial government, the 
Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act (SPLUMA) becomes relevant.1014 SPLUMA 
requires municipalities to cooperate with national and provincial departments that are 
responsible for implementing legislation that affects, among others, mining activities.1015 The 
purpose of such cooperation is to coordinate activities and to give effect to the respective 
requirements of such legislation.1016 Cooperation is also encouraged to avoid duplication of 
powers and functions.1017 SPLUMA provides a mechanism through which spheres of 
government can collaborate and issue an integrated authorisation when several laws require 
authorisations before an activity begins.1018 Notwithstanding these processes in SPLUMA, all 
land development applications must be submitted to a municipality as the “authority of first 
1007 Section 41(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
1008 Kotze ‘Environmental Governance’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 123. 
1009 Section 41(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
1010 Long title & Chapter 3 NEMA; Bray (1999) SAJELP 2. 
1011 Long title NEMA. 
1012 Chapter 3 NEMA. 
1013 Chapter 3 & Chapter 8 NEMA. 
1014 Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 (hereinafter SPLUMA). 
1015 Chapter 3 SPLUMA. 
1016 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 13. 
1017 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 13. 
1018 Chapter 3 SPLUMA. 
96 
instance.”1019 This means that municipalities must ensure that zoning requirements are met 
before environmental authorisations are issued by the DMRE for mining activities.1020 
The discussion above illustrates that cooperative environmental governance is a recognised 
strategy for addressing the inefficiencies caused by intragovernmental fragmentation.1021 
However, there is little evidence to suggest that this strategy is working successfully in South 
Africa.1022 Like the One Environmental System, cooperative environmental governance is 
another sound law that lacks implementation.1023 Nevertheless, it remains an essential tool for 
addressing the inefficiencies caused by intragovernmental fragmentation if properly 
implemented.1024 
3 Practical Implications of Cooperative Environmental 
Governance 
To foster cooperative environmental governance, the DMRE, DEFF and DHWS need to start 
by fulfilling their respective duties efficiently.1025 The DMRE needs to improve its enforcement 
efforts, the DEFF must ensure that the One Environmental System is properly regulated and 
the DHWS needs to prioritise its regulation and enforcement of the National Water Act.1026 
The means that each department should take to achieve effective regulation and enforcement 
of the One Environmental System are discussed below.  
The main criticism levelled against the DEFF is the delay that it has caused in finalising the 
regulatory framework for the One Environmental System.1027 It is therefore recommended that 
the DEFF prioritise the finalisation of the relevant legislation, which includes the regulations 
1019 Section 33 SPLUMA; van Schalkwyk A Legal Perspective on the Role of Municipalities in Navigating the 
Relationship between Land Use Planning and Mining 190 provides clarity on this point. 
1020 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 2. 
1021 Kotze ‘Environmental Governance’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 121. 
1022 Coetzee (2010) Journal for Contemporary History 93. 
1023 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources and Energy Research Unit DMR Disregards Key Monitoring 
Provisions of NEMA and the One Environmental System for Mining 1. 
1024 Kotze ‘Environmental Governance’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 121. 
1025 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 45. 
1026 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 73 available at https://cer.org.za/news/zero-hour, accessed 15 March 2018; 
South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 43.  
1027 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 3. 
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for financial provision.1028 Furthermore, the DEFF must invoke its powers to deploy its 
environmental management inspectors when the DMRE faces capacity constraints.1029 
The DHWS has experienced challenges in its enforcement of the National Water Act in the 
context of the One Environmental System.1030 Notably, contributing to the effective 
enforcement of the One Environmental System has been hampered by capacity constraints to 
issue and enforce water use licences.1031 This challenge may be addressed by increasing the 
capacity within the DHWS to manage the demands posed by the volume of mining rights and 
environmental authorisations issued by the DMRE.1032 Increasing the capacity within the 
DHWS may require an inflation in the department’s budget allocation.1033  
This research reveals a wide pattern of weakness within the DMRE as the enforcement 
authority of the One Environmental System.1034 Given that the DHWS is also tasked with 
enforcement, the following recommendations may also apply to it.1035 
Enforcement of the One Environmental System needs to be made a priority within the DMRE 
and DHWS.1036 Effective enforcement requires more trained and appropriately qualified 
enforcement officials within the DMRE and DHWS that are designated with the necessary 
powers to fulfil this function.1037 The “appropriate” qualification may differ for different 
functions.1038 On the one hand, compliance inspections, may require technical knowledge in 
the fields of chemical engineering, geology, hydrology or environmental science.1039 On the 
other hand, criminal investigations may require a background in criminal law while civil 
1028 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 3. 
1029 Section 31D(4) NEMA. 
1030 K Forrest & L Loate ‘Coal, Water and Mining Flowing Badly’ Society, Work & Development Institute June 
2017 at 30 available at https://www.fes-
southafrica.org/fileadmin/user_upload/coal__water_and_minig_flowing_badly.pdf, accessed 23 February 2018. 
1031 Forrest & Loate ‘Coal, Water and Mining Flowing Badly’ Society, Work & Development Institute 2017 at 30. 
1032 Forrest & Loate ‘Coal, Water and Mining Flowing Badly’ Society, Work & Development Institute 2017 at 30. 
1033 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources and Energy Research Unit DMR Disregards Key Monitoring 
Provisions of NEMA and the One Environmental System for Mining 8. 
1034 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation.  
1035 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 73. 
1036 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 43. 
1037 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 73. 
1038 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 73. 
1039 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 73. 
98 
enforcement may require a qualification in constitutional, administrative and environmental 
law as well as litigation.1040  
Effective enforcement will be fostered by the management of a professional civil service with 
institutional memory. Essentially, the three departments responsible for the One Environmental 
System should develop strategies to train and retain enforcement officials, such as inspectors. 
Having an institutional memory implies the proper recording of all processes involved in 
training and retaining officials. Such strategies will ensure continuity and effective 
implementation that will outlive the uncertain nature of political appointments. The benefit of 
a civil service with institutional memory is that it promotes accountability as officials are able 
to learn from the successes and failures of their predecessors.  
Another recommendation that promotes accountability involves creating awareness about ways 
to report non-compliance to enforcement officials. The public should be encouraged to report 
non-compliance through various channels set up by the departments. A culture of 
whistleblowing should be encouraged even within the governmental departments. Officials 
should also be encouraged to report any activities by colleagues that impede the effective 
implementation of the One Environmental System. The three departments may also consider a 
rewards system for enforcement officers who achieve predetermined performance targets. 
To strengthen its enforcement efforts, the DMRE needs to foster meaningful collaboration with 
inspectors in the DEFF, the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA).1041 Historically, there has been a weak culture of cooperation between 
inspectors in the DMRE and those in the DEFF.1042 Furthermore, the practice of reporting 
complaints of violations to SAPS and furnishing files to the NPA for prosecution in the belief 
that violators will be punished has been proven to be ineffective.1043 Therefore, much work 
needs to be done to repair these important relationships.1044 The Interdepartmental Project 
1040 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 73. 
1041 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 73. 
1042 Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd v Magistrate for the District of Vredendal, Kroutz NO and Others [2017] 
2 All SA 599 (WCC) para 83 – 85 (hereinafter Mineral Sands Resources v Magistrate). 
1043 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 73. 
1044 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 73. 
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Implementation Committee has a pivotal role to play in driving and supporting the 
collaborative efforts.1045  
The DMRE and DHWS need to become more acquainted with the measures available to 
enforce the One Environmental System.1046 The various measures are discussed at length in 
chapter four of this research.1047 Notwithstanding the availability of criminal sanctions, priority 
must be given to developing as well as enforcing administrative and alternative compliance 
measures.1048 Internationally, there is a growing trend away from criminal measures towards 
administrative and alternative compliance measures.1049 The shift owes itself to the often time-
consuming and ineffective nature of criminal measures.1050 Effective enforcement can be 
achieved through administrative penalties because, for instance, the monetary fine that attaches 
to them is effective for punishing violations and deterring future non-compliance without 
litigation.1051 The optimal use and selection of the available enforcement measures by the 
DMRE and the DHWS is imperative given that South Africa’s criminal justice system is 
already overburdened.1052  
The lack of enforcement has been compounded by insufficient reporting by the DMRE on the 
targets and outcomes of the One Environmental System.1053 It is recommended that the DMRE 
prioritise transparent reporting on the implementation, accomplishments and shortcomings of 
the One Environmental System.1054 The DMRE must pay particular attention to producing 
substantially improved and formalised information on environmental issues pertaining to the 
mining sector through the Departmental Environmental Management Plan and its 
accompanying annual review.1055 The high quality of the Mine Health and Safety Inspectorate 
1045 Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Report on the Implementation Evaluation of the 
Environmental Governance in the Mining Sector (2015) 45 available at 
https://evaluations.dpme.gov.za/evaluations/510/documents/ae4636ed-1319-46e3-a03e-7536e7d9a4ec accessed 
23 March 2018. 
1046 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 43. 
1047 Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
1048 JG Nel & JA Wessels ‘How to use Voluntary, Self-regulatory and Alternative Environmental Compliance 
Tools: Some Lessons Learnt’ (2010) 13 PELR 49; Chapter 4, part 3 of this dissertation. 
1049 Nel & Wessels (2010) PELR 49. 
1050 Nel & Wessels (2010) PELR 49. 
1051 F Craigie, P Snijman & M Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in A Paterson & 
LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 56. 
1052 M Kidd ‘Alternatives to the Criminal Sanction in the Enforcement of Environmental Law’ (2002) 9 SAJELP 
26.  
1053 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources and Energy Research Unit DMR Disregards Key Monitoring 
Provisions of NEMA and the One Environmental System for Mining 1; Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
1054 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources and Energy Research Unit DMR Disregards Key Monitoring 
Provisions of NEMA and the One Environmental System for Mining 6. 
1055 Section 15(5) & 16(1)(b) NEMA. 
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Annual Report is a significant aid for the DMRE for purposes of reporting on the One 
Environmental System.1056 
Monitoring and evaluation have been undermined because the databases for environmental 
authorisation belonging to the DMRE and DEFF have not been linked. 1057  The DEFF has 
argued that the DMRE has failed to share the information available on its South African 
Mineral Resources Administration Database (SAMRAD).1058 The result is that the DEFF’s 
database for environmental authorisations provides information for all sectors, except for 
mining, since SAMRAD is insulated in the DMRE.1059  
To address the information-sharing woes, the DMRE needs to cooperate and link its database 
to that of the DEFF.1060 In addition, the three departments should develop a framework to 
ensure continuity given the dynamic nature of political appointments. The framework can take 
the form of a platform on which the departments can share information on, among others, 
authorisations, functions and powers of authorities and legal developments. A system of this 
nature will significantly improve implementation if properly developed as it has the potential 
to reduce duplication and conflicts between departments. The limited scope of this research 
does not permit a detailed recommendation on what form the shared platform should take. The 
departments are encouraged to develop a platform that will suit their needs and improve the 
implementation of the One Environmental System. 
The assessment of the DMRE’s performance reveals inconsistent enforcement of the regulatory 
framework.1061 There are a number of observations drawn from its weak performance.1062 
Firstly, the DMRE has shown little intent to invest in the capacity that it needs to enforce the 
One Environmental System effectively.1063 Second, the DMRE has had a weak culture of 
cooperation with the DEFF and DHWS.1064 Third, the DMRE has not worked closely with 
1056 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources and Energy Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the 
Colloquium on the One Environmental System 11. 
1057 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘One Environmental System Colloquium’ 20 November 2018. 
1058 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 8. 
1059 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 8.  
1060 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 8.  
1061 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
1062 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 71. 
1063 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 71. 
1064 Forrest & Loate ‘Coal, Water and Mining Flowing Badly’ Society, Work & Development Institute 2017 at 30. 
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local and provincial government to prevent mining from occurring in ecologically sensitive 
areas.1065 Lastly, the DMRE has not been transparent about violations of the regulatory 
framework.1066 The dereliction of duty is a cause for concern and leads to the conclusion that 
the DMRE is not the appropriate authority for enforcing the One Environmental System.1067 
This research recommends that the DEFF, instead of the DMRE, should be the enforcement 
authority for the One Environmental System.1068 The DEFF has “far more existing capacity 
and decades of experience enforcing environmental laws in various industries, including 
important parts of the mining industry until December 2014.”1069 Tasking the DMRE with the 
enforcement of the One Environmental System in December 2014 resulted in the duplication 
of mandates, which required a significant amount of resources and capacity to ensure effective 
and efficient environmental management.1070 It is not plausible for the DMRE to enforce the 
One Environmental System effectively while encouraging and promoting mineral 
extraction.1071 Instead, the DEFF should be appointed as the enforcement authority and retain 
authority for appeals.1072 
4 Conclusion 
Having identified the lack of intragovernmental cooperation between the authorities 
responsible for the One Environmental System, this chapter proposes solutions to achieve the 
effective enforcement of the One Environmental System.1073 The overarching proposal seeks 
to address the intragovernmental fragmentation by encouraging cooperative environmental 
governance.1074  
1065 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 7. 
1066 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 71. 
1067 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 45; Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero 
Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at XIII. 
1068 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 71. 
1069 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 71. 
1070 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 71. 
1071 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 71. 
1072 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 71. 
1073 Chapter 5, parts 1, 2 & 3 of this dissertation.  
1074 Chapter 5, parts 2 of this dissertation.  
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Although cooperative environmental governance exists as a mechanism for the regulating and 
enforcement authorities, it has proven to be a myth in the context of the One Environmental 
System.1075 All three spheres of government that are responsible for the One Environmental 
System are encouraged to adopt the constitutional mandate of cooperative governance.1076 In 
addition, they must consult NEMA and SPLUMA for guidance on the practical implications 
of cooperative environmental governance in the context of the One Environmental System.1077 
Adopting the principle of cooperative environmental governance means that the three spheres 
of government and their line functionaries, namely the DMRE, DEFF and DHWS must fulfil 
their respective duties efficiently.1078 The DMRE needs to improve its enforcement efforts, the 
DEFF must ensure that the One Environmental System is properly regulated and the DHWS 
needs to prioritise its regulation and enforcement of the National Water Act.1079  
Apart from relying on the political will of government officials to fulfil their duties, this 
research recommends ways in which the three departments can advance the effective 
implementation of the One Environmental System. Some of the notable recommendations 
include the departments developing a shared platform to ensure that the One Environmental 
System functions efficiently even after new officials have been appointed. In addition, 
inspectors must be managed as part of a professional civil service with an institutional memory 
that outlives political appointments. Furthermore, the departments are encouraged to create 
awareness on and promote whistleblowing by the public and government officials. Finally, the 
competent authorities may consider a rewards system for enforcement officials who achieve 
predetermined performance targets. 
With specific reference to enforcement, this research reveals a wide pattern of weakness within 
the DMRE as the enforcement authority of the One Environmental System.1080 The dereliction 
of duty is a cause for concern and leads to the conclusion that the DMRE is not the appropriate 
authority for enforcing the One Environmental System.1081 This research recommends that the 
1075 Coetzee (2010) Journal for Contemporary History 93. 
1076 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 45; Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources 
Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on the One Environmental System 15. 
1077 Chapter 5, parts 2 of this dissertation.  
1078 Chapter 5, parts 3 of this dissertation. 
1079 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 43; Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero 
Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 73. 
1080 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
1081 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 45. 
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DEFF should be the enforcement authority for the One Environmental System.1082 The DEFF 
has “far more existing capacity and decades of experience enforcing environmental laws in 
various industries, including important parts of the mining industry until December 2014.”1083 
1082 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 71. 
1083 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 71. 
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Chapter 6: 
Conclusion 
1 Reflections on the One Environmental System 
The research undertaken sets out the regulatory framework that governs the One Environmental 
System for mining.1084 The regulatory framework was introduced to streamline the 
environmental regulation of mining.1085 The most significant aspect of the regulatory 
framework is the allocation of powers to the competent authorities.1086 Briefly, the Department 
of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) is tasked with issuing mining-related environmental 
authorisations and enforcing environmental laws in the minerals extraction industry.1087 The 
Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries (DEFF) sets the regulatory framework and 
is the appeal authority for decisions taken by the DMRE.1088 Finally, the Department of Human 
Settlements, Water and Sanitation (DHWS) is responsible for regulating and enforcing the 
National Water Act.1089  
Although introducing the One Environmental System has improved the regulation of the 
environment in relation to mining, its regulation and more so enforcement have received more 
criticism than praise.1090 An assessment of the One Environmental System shows that it has not 
achieved its intended purpose of streamlining the environmental regulation of mining.1091  
1084 Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
1085 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings on the Underlying Socio-economic Challenges 
of Mining-affected Communities in South Africa (2016) at 45 available at 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/SAHRC%20Mining%20communities%20report%20FINAL.pdf 
accessed 17 February 2018; Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and 
Violation of Environmental Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at XIII available at https://cer.org.za/news/zero-
hour, accessed 15 March 2018; S Gore & G Howard ‘One Environmental System: reduced time frames for 
environmental authorisations applications’ 2014 Environmental Alert 1. 
1086 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 44. 
1087 Section 50A(2)(b) of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (hereinafter NEMA). 
1088 Section 50A(2)(b)-(c) NEMA. 
1089 Section 50A(2)(d) NEMA. 
1090 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System (2019) unpublished parliamentary document presented at the Colloquium on the 
One Environmental System convened by the Portfolio Committee on Environmental Affairs at the Parliament of 
the Republic of South Africa, 20 November 2018 (copy on file with author) 1; Centre for Environmental Rights 
‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at 
19.  
1091 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
105 
The One Environmental System is “not working” because it is not being effectively regulated 
and enforced.1092 The shortcomings identified in the DHWS relate to weak enforcement, which 
has been attributed to capacity constraints.1093 The DEFF has hampered the effective regulation 
of the One Environmental System by delaying the finalisation of the regulatory framework.1094 
The DMRE has received the most criticism for dereliction of its duties as the enforcement 
authority.1095 
When the One Environmental System was introduced, the regulatory framework was criticised 
for the conflict of interest inherent in allocating the power to enforce environmental laws with 
the DMRE, a department mandated to promote minerals extraction.1096 As such, the DMRE is 
said to be inappropriate an authority for environmental enforcement.1097 Further criticism 
levelled against the DMRE relates to its inconsistent enforcement of the regulatory 
framework.1098 Lastly, the DMRE has hampered a proper assessment of the One Environmental 
System and its enforcement efforts by failing in its legal duty to produce reports of its 
implementation targets and outcomes.1099 
In addition to the failure by the three competent authorities to honour their individual duties, 
there have been ongoing weakness in the inter-departmental relationships.1100 Cooperative 
governance in the environmental regulation of mining arguably has more points of weakness 
than strength.1101 The lack of intragovernmental cooperation extends to provincial and local 
government.1102   
1092 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
1093 K Forrest & L Loate ‘Coal, Water and Mining Flowing Badly’ Society, Work & Development Institute June 
2017 at 11 available at https://www.fes-
southafrica.org/fileadmin/user_upload/coal__water_and_minig_flowing_badly.pdf accessed 23 February 2018. 
1094 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
the One Environmental System 3. 
1095 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit DMR Disregards Key Monitoring Provisions of 
NEMA and the One Environmental System for Mining (2019) unpublished parliamentary document presented to 
the Portfolio Committee on Environmental Affairs at the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 19 November 
2018 (copy on file with author) 4. 
1096 Centre for Environmental Rights ‘Zero Hour: Poor Governance of Mining and Violation of Environmental 
Rights in Mpumalanga’ May 2016 at XIII. 
1097 South African Human Rights Commission National Hearings 45. 
1098 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit DMR Disregards Key Monitoring Provisions of 
NEMA and the One Environmental System for Mining 4. 
1099 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit DMR Disregards Key Monitoring Provisions of 
NEMA and the One Environmental System for Mining 1. 
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1101 Portfolio Committee on Mineral Resources Research Unit Mineral Resources: Note after the Colloquium on 
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Although the research identifies shortfalls in both the regulation and enforcement of the One 
Environmental System, the focus of the research is on enforcement, rather than regulation.1103 
The regulatory framework has areas of improvement, which are briefly addressed.1104 A 
lengthier discussion is dedicated to enforcement given that majority of the shortcomings of the 
One Environmental System have been attributed to enforcement.1105  
2 Theoretical Approach to Enforcement 
This research explains the One Environmental System from the theoretical perspective of the 
rationalist and normative theories of compliance and enforcement.1106 These theories provide 
a lens for understanding the basis on which regulated persons make compliance decisions.1107 
Furthermore, they theorise how enforcement authorities respond to compliance behaviour.1108 
Compliance and enforcement decisions do not fall squarely within one theory.1109 Both the 
rationalist and normative theories prevail to different degrees under different circumstances.1110 
Generally, compliance refers to the state of regulated persons abiding by the law and 
enforcement denotes the actions taken by authorities to secure compliance from regulated 
persons.1111 Both compliance and enforcement are understood differently under the rationalist 
theory and normative theory.1112 The rationalist theory assumes that regulated persons are 
likely not to comply with the law, whereas the normative theory assumes that regulated persons 
are law-abiding citizens.1113 While enforcers under the rationalist theory use a coercive 
approach to enforcement, enforcers under the normative theory use a cooperative approach to 
enforcement.1114 Enforcement authorities rarely rely exclusively on one approach.1115 An 
1103 Chapters 3 & 4 of this dissertation. 
1104 Chapters 2 & 5 of this dissertation. 
1105 Chapters 3 & 4 of this dissertation. 
1106 Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
1107 Chapter 3, part 2 of this dissertation. 
1108 Chapter 3, part 3 of this dissertation. 
1109 RA Kagan & JT Scholz ‘The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies’ in 
K Hawkins & JM Thomas (eds) Enforcing Regulations (1984) 68; K Hawkins ‘Compliance Strategy, 
Prosecution Policy, and Aunt Sally – A Comment on Pearce and Tombs’ (1990) 30 The British Journal of 
Criminology 453; D Zaelke, D Kaniaru & E Kruzikova Making Law Work: Environmental Compliance and 
Sustainable Development vol 1 (2005) 55; K Hawkin ‘Enforcing Regulation More of the Same from Pearce and 
Tombs’ (1991) 31 The British Journal of Criminology 428.  
1110 TF Malloy ‘Regulation, Compliance and the Firm’ (2003) 76 Temple Law Review 456 & 475. 
1111 Chapter 3, part 1 of this dissertation. 
1112 Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
1113 Chapter 3, part 2 of this dissertation. 
1114 Chapter 3, part 3 of this dissertation. 
1115 RL Glicksman ‘Coercive vs. Cooperative Enforcement: Effect of Enforcement Approach on Environmental 
Management’ (2015) 42 International Review of Law and Economics 135. 
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assessment of the One Environmental System shows that enforcement authorities use a flexible, 
hybrid approach that relies on both coercion and cooperation.1116  
Because the One Environmental System may be classified as a hybrid system of enforcement, 
this research recommends how this system should be implemented to ensure effective 
enforcement.1117 When enforcing compliance with laws, authorities should begin with the less 
intrusive cooperative approach which involves warnings and encouraging regulated persons to 
comply with the law.1118 It is only when these fail that authorities should resort to the coercive 
approach which involves fines, revocation of licences and criminal prosecution.1119 Shavell 
suggests that “the greater the harm, the higher the sanction should be.”1120 Maximum sanctions 
should be reserved for high offences because the stricter the sanction, the more costly it would 
be for the government to impose.1121 Having considered the theoretical underpinnings of 
compliance and enforcement, this research sets out the measures that are available to enforce 
the One Environmental System.1122  
3 Available Enforcement Measures 
As stated above, theoretically, authorities use a combination of coercive and cooperative 
measures to enforce the One Environmental System.1123  In practice, the theory holds true.1124 
The enforcement measures used are commonly categorised as command-and-control measures 
as well as alternative compliance measures.1125 On the one hand, command-and-control 
measures include criminal, administrative and civil measures.1126 On the other hand, alternative 
compliance measures include incentive-based measures and voluntary compliance 
measures.1127 
1116 Chapter 3, part 3 of this dissertation. 
1117 Chapter 3, part 3 of this dissertation. 
1118 J Braithwaite ‘Reward and Regulation’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 20. 
1119 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20; see section 31N NEMA for an example. 
1120 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20. 
1121 Braithwaite (2002) Journal of Law and Society 20. 
1122 Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
1123 Chapter 3 of this dissertation 
1124 M Kidd Environmental Law 2 ed (2011) 268; F Craigie, P Snijman & M Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in 
South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 51. 
1125 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 51. 
1126 M Kidd ‘Alternatives to the Criminal Sanction in the Enforcement of Environmental Law’ (2002) 9 SAJELP 
26. 
1127 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 26. 
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The effective enforcement of the One Environmental System requires the optimal selection and 
use of the available measures.1128 Command-and-control measures are the most commonly 
used measures.1129 Despite the status quo, critics argue that these measures, especially criminal 
sanctions, should be reserved for grave offences as enforcing them is resource and capacity 
intensive given that litigation is required.1130 Criminal fines, for instance, are designed for 
serious offences as they range between R5 million and R10 million.1131  
Administrative measures are available for offences that are less serious than criminal 
offences.1132 The administrative fine, for instance, may be imposed for environmental damage 
up to R5 million.1133 Administrative measures have been hailed as highly effective because, 
unlike criminal measures, they do not impose heavily on governmental resources in that they 
are implemented by authorised officials and not by courts.1134 Furthermore, authorities that 
enforce administrative measures have the expertise to secure compliance with relevant 
environmental laws in a specific manner that non-specialist courts would not be equipped 
to.1135 
Despite their important role in enforcement, command-and-control measures are unable to 
secure compliance with laws consistently due to resource and capacity constraints.1136 
Resultantly, policy-makers are shifting towards alternative measures to complement command-
and-control measures.1137 These measures “cannot, and should not, replace” the traditional 
measures.1138 There are multiple voluntary compliance measures, such as environmental 
management systems and negotiated agreements, that can be used to supplement the traditional 
1128 Du Plessis & Nel ‘Driving Compliance to and Enforcement of South African Legislation by Means of a Hybrid 
of “New” Environmental Governance Instruments in L Paddock et al Compliance and Enforcement in 
Environmental Law: Toward More Effective Implementation’ (2011) 263; JG Nel & JA Wessels ‘How to use 
Voluntary, Self-regulatory and Alternative Environmental Compliance Tools: Some Lessons Learnt’ (2010) 13 
PELR 54; Kidd (2002) SAJELP 26. 
1129 Kidd Environmental Law 268. 
1130 M Kidd ‘Criminal Measures’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement 
in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 243. 
1131 Section 49B NEMA. 
1132 M Fourie ‘How Civil and Administrative Penalties can Change the Face of Environmental Compliance in 
South Africa’ (2009) 16 SAJELP 117. 
1133 Section 24G(4) NEMA 
1134 Craigie, Snijman & Fourie ‘Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement’ in Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 56. 
1135 Kidd (2002) SAJELP 33. 
1136 Chapter 4, part 4 of this dissertation; A Paterson & LJ Kotze ‘Towards a More Effective Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement Regime for South Africa’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 377; M Kidd ‘Environmental Crime – 
Time for a Rethink in South Africa?’ (1998) 5 SAJELP 189. 
1137 Nel & Wessels (2010) PELR 49. 
1138 K Lehmann ‘Voluntary Compliance Measures’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance 
and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 269; Kidd (2002) SAJELP 26. 
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measures.1139 Their voluntary nature makes them an attractive tool for environmental 
enforcement because they do not impose a heavy burden on government resources.1140  The 
expansion of these measures should however be done with caution because they do not always 
achieve their intended outcome.1141 The main reason for this anomaly is that voluntary 
measures often lack governmental oversight, transparency, legitimacy and accountability.1142 
This oddity can be overcome by requiring reports and increasing the oversight of compliance 
with voluntary measures.1143 
To supplement command-and-control measures, incentive-based measures have been 
expanded as seen with the introduction of the carbon tax.1144 The purpose of the carbon tax to 
cure market failures and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is commendable.1145 However, 
the projections of its success are not promising.1146 Perhaps an appropriate alternative to the 
carbon tax is to promote the use of renewal energy.1147 
The structure and enforcement of the aforementioned measures can be complex.1148 Therefore, 
it is important that enforcement authorities consider the appropriateness of each measure in 
relation to the harm caused and the impact of enforcing such a measure.1149 The effective 
enforcement of these measures will require the varying enforcement authorities to work 
together as mandated by the principle of cooperative environmental governance in NEMA.1150 
This importance of this principle for the effective enforcement of the One Environmental 
System concept is explored below. 
1139 Paterson & Kotze ‘Towards a More Effective Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Regime for South 
Africa’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 377. 
1140 C Hilson Regulating Pollution (2000) 105. 
1141 A Ogus ‘Rethinking Self-regulation’ (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 99. 
1142 Paterson & Kotze ‘Towards a More Effective Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Regime for South 
Africa’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 377. 
1143 J Hanks ‘Achieving Industrial Sustainable Development in South Africa: What Role for ‘Self-regulatory’ and 
Co-regulatory Instruments’ (1998) 5 SAJELP 321. 
1144 Chapter 4, part 4 of this dissertation; A Paterson ‘Incentive-based Measures’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 299. 
1145 PGW Henderson ‘Fiscal Incentives for Environmental Protection – Conceptual Framework’ (1995) 1 SAJELP 
151. 
1146 R De Jager ‘The Potential Implications of Introducing a Carbon Tax in South Africa’ (2018) 4 Journal of 
Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 116; E Stoddard ‘South Africa’s Carbon Tax Raises Questions and 
Hot Air’ Daily Maverick 3 June 2019, available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-06-03-south-
africas-carbon-tax-raises-questions-and-hot-air/, accessed on 06 June 2019. 
1147 De Jager (2018) Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice 116. 
1148 Paterson & Kotze ‘Towards a More Effective Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Regime for South 
Africa’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 377. 
1149 Paterson & Kotze ‘Towards a More Effective Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Regime for South 
Africa’ in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa 377. 
1150 NEMA Long Title.  
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4 Concluding Remarks: Cooperative Environmental 
Governance 
This research finds that weak intragovernmental cooperation is a significant threat to the 
effective regulation and enforcement of the One Environmental System.1151 The effective 
regulation and enforcement of the One Environmental System requires cooperation from the 
DEFF, DMRE and the DHWS along with provincial and local government.1152 The 
Constitution makes provision for cooperation in the form of cooperative governance.1153 
Cooperative governance is then tailored to environmental management in NEMA’s provision 
for cooperative environmental governance.1154 The principle of cooperative governance is an 
essential mechanism for dealing with intragovernmental fragmentation and is an indispensable 
part of South Africa’s environmental regime.1155 
Cooperative governance is the state of all spheres of government, namely national provincial 
and local government, working together to ensure an effective, efficient, transparent, 
accountable and coherent government.1156 Cooperative governance in the context of 
environmental management is called cooperative environmental governance.1157 Cooperative 
environmental governance refers to the integration of different spheres of government and line 
functionaries, such as departments, to maintain a sustainable environment.1158 
To advance the effective enforcement of the One Environmental System, this research 
recommends the application of the principle of cooperative environmental governance to 
regulation and enforcement.1159 Although cooperative environmental governance exists as a 
mechanism for the regulating and enforcement authorities, it has proven to be a myth in the 
context of the One Environmental System.1160 All three spheres of government that are 
responsible for the One Environmental System are encouraged to make a concerted effort to 
1151 Chapters 2 & 5 of this dissertation. 
1152 Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
1153 Chapter 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
1154 Long title & Chapter 3 NEMA. 
1155 LJ Kotze ‘Environmental Governance’ in A Paterson & LJ Kotze (eds) Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 121. 
1156 T Coetzee ‘Co-operative Governance and Good Governance: Reality or Myth?’ (2010) 35 Journal for 
Contemporary History 86. 
1157 Chapter 5, part 2 of this dissertation; E Bray ‘Co-operative Governance in the Context of the National 
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998’ (1999) 6 SAJELP 2 
1158 Bray (1999) SAJELP 2. 
1159 Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
1160 Coetzee (2010) Journal for Contemporary History 93. 
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adopt the constitutional mandate of cooperative governance.1161 In addition, they must consult 
NEMA for guidance on the practical implications of cooperative environmental governance in 
the context of the One Environmental System.1162  
Adopting the principle of cooperative environmental governance means that the three spheres 
of government and their line functionaries, namely the DMRE, DEFF and DHWS must fulfil 
their respective duties efficiently.1163 The DMRE needs to improve its enforcement efforts, the 
DEFF must ensure that the One Environmental System is properly regulated and the DHWS 
needs to prioritise its regulation and enforcement of the National Water Act.1164  
Apart from relying on the political will of government officials to fulfil their duties, this 
research recommends ways in which the three departments can advance the effective 
implementation of the One Environmental System. Some of the notable recommendations 
include the departments developing a shared platform to ensure that the One Environmental 
System functions efficiently even after new officials have been appointed. In addition, 
inspectors must be managed as part of a professional civil service with an institutional memory 
that outlives political appointments. Furthermore, the departments are encouraged to create 
awareness on and promote whistleblowing by the public and government officials. Finally, the 
competent authorities may consider a rewards system for enforcement officials who achieve 
predetermined performance targets. 
With specific reference to enforcement, this research reveals a wide pattern of weakness within 
the DMRE as the enforcement authority of the One Environmental System.1165 The dereliction 
of duty is a cause for concern and leads to the conclusion that the DMRE is not the appropriate 
authority for enforcing the One Environmental System.1166 Therefore, this research 
recommends that the DEFF should be the enforcement authority for the One Environmental 
System.1167 The DEFF has “far more existing capacity and decades of experience enforcing 
environmental laws in various industries, including important parts of the mining industry until 
December 2014.”1168 
1161 Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
1162 Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
1163 Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
1164 Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
1165 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
1166 Chapter 2, part 5 of this dissertation. 
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